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INTRODUCTION
Most of the recent intellectual property literature concerns the "enclosure of the
public domain"' or the "one-way ratchet" of intellectual property protection.2 While
these concerns are significant and rightly placed, a different, and perhaps more
important, enclosure movement is currently taking place at the international level.
Instead of the public domain, this concurrent movement encloses the policy space of
individual countries and requires them to adopt one-size-fits-all legal standards that
ignore their local needs, national interests, technological capabilities, institutional
capacities, and public health conditions. Unlike the movement to enclose the public
domain, which "fenc[es] off common land and turn[s] it into private property, 3 the
international enclosure movement fences off areas that provide attractive policy
options for less developed countries. 4 By virtue of this enclosure, these countries are
forced to adopt inappropriate intellectual property systems, and they as a result have
also lost their ability to respond to domestic crises within their borders.
The crisis that hitherto has received the widest international attention concerns the
lack of ability by less developed countries to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and
tuberculosis.5 Consider HIV/AIDS, for example. Being the leading cause of mortality
I. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment
Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); James Boyle,
Fencing off Ideas: Enclosure and the Disappearance of the Public Domain, DAEDALUS, Spring
2002, at 13; James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public
Domain, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 33 [hereinafter Boyle, The Second
Enclosure Movement].
2. For discussions of recent expansion of intellectual property protection, see, for example,
LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: How BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW To LOCK
DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY (2004); Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement,
supra note 1; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, TRIPS-Round11: Should Users Strike Back?, 71 U.
Ctm. L. REV. 21, 22 (2004) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, TRIPS-Round II].
3. Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement, supra note 1, at 33-34.
4. The TRIPs Agreement distinguishes between developing and least developed countries.
This Article uses "less developed countries" to denote both developing and least developed
countries. When referring to the TRIPs Agreement, however, this Article returns to using the
terms "developing countries" and "least developed countries."
5. The access-to-medicines problem is not new. As Peter Drahos pointed out:
The scale of the access-to-medicines problem has been brought home by the
HIV/AIDS crisis. But for poor people and developing countries where the majority
of poor people live, the problem has existed for a long time. This problem was
there in the case of access to broad-spectrum antibiotics in the 1950s, when the
price of tetracycline in many developing countries was held constant for more than
ten years, at least in part allegedly due to a price cartel amongst Pfizer, Cyanamid,
Bristol, Squibb, and Upjohn. The problem was there in 1979 when Senator
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in Africa, the pandemic has claimed the lives of millions of poor, innocent people who
died primarily because they had no access to affordable drugs.6 As UNAIDS estimated
in 2002, "out of a total of 40 million infected people, 36 million who live in developing
countries have no access to anti-retroviral drugs, which could prolong their lives. In
fact, access to antiretroviral drugs is denied to 96 per cent of HIV carriers, totaling
between 5 and 7 million persons, who are in need of immediate treatment."
7
To respond to the public health crises in less developed countries and to mitigate
the adverse impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights8 ("TRIPs Agreement" or "Agreement"), members of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) agreed during the WTO Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong
("Hong Kong Ministerial") to amend the Agreement to allow member states with
insufficient or no manufacturing capacity to import generic versions of on-patent
pharmaceuticals. 9 The proposed amendment marked the first time the WTO agreed to
Kennedy made a speech pointing out that "in this International Year of the
Child... 2.6 million children will die this year from immunizable diseases
because they won't have access to already-developed vaccines." These days it has
become de rigueur for senior western political figures to bemoan the spread of the
HIV/AIDS crisis in developing countries.
Peter Drahos, Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical Markets: A Nodal Governance
Approach, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 401, 402 (2004) [hereinafter Drahos, Intellectual Property and
Pharmaceutical Markets] (footnotes omitted).
6. For discussions of the global HIV/AIDS crisis, see, for example, Symposium, The
Global AIDS Crisis, 17 CONN. J. INT'L L. 149 (2002); Symposium, Global Health and
Governance: HIVIAIDS, 23 THIRD WORLD Q. 191 (2002). Although commentators often use the
HIV/AIDS crisis to illustrate the adverse impact of the patent system on less developed
countries, the U.K. Commission on Intellectual Property Rights reminded that
[i]t is particularly important not to allow the debate in [the intellectual property]
area to be influenced unduly by the HIV/AIDS experience, dramatic though it is.
Apart from HIV/AIDS, which is the biggest single cause of mortality in
developing countries, TB and malaria claim almost as many lives. Together all
three diseases claimed nearly six million lives last year, and led to debilitating
illness for millions more. In addition, there are a number of less common diseases
which are collectively important. These include, for instance, measles, sleeping
sickness, leishmaniasis and Chagas disease.
COMM'N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
DEVELOPMENT POLICY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 30
(2002), http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final-report/CIPRfullfinal.pdf [hereinafter
IPR COMMISSION REPORT] (footnote omitted).
7. Rosine Jourdain, Intellectual Property Rights and Public Health in the RevisedBangui
Agreement, in TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE AND
SUSTAINABILITY 143, 143 (Christophe Bellmann, Graham Dutfield & Ricardo Melndez-Ortiz
eds., 2003) [hereinafter TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE].
8. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [hereinafter TRIPs
Agreement], Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Annex 1C, Legal Instruments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994)
[hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement].
9. General Council, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/641 (Dec. 8, 2005)
[hereinafter December 6 Decision], available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/trips-e/
wtl641_e.htm.
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amend one of its core agreements.10 If adopted, the amendment would make permanent
the temporary waivers granted by the decision of the TRIPs Council in August 2003."
A week before the Hong Kong Ministerial, the WTO member states also extended
the deadline for least developed countries to fully implement the Agreement.12 Along
with the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health13 ("Doha
Declaration"), which delayed the mandatory introduction of patent protection for
pharmaceuticals and the protection of undisclosed regulatory data until January 1,
2016,14 the recent amendments sought to respond to the dissatisfaction among less
developed countries of the international intellectual property system.
Although the amendment and the extension focused on the access-to-medicines
problem in less developed countries, they will also benefit developed countries, which
are experiencing increasing problems concerning access to medicines.' 5 Last year, for
10. Press Release, World Trade Org. [WTO], Members OK Amendment to Make Health
Flexibility Permanent (Dec. 6, 2005), http://www.wto.org/english/newse/pres05-e/
pr426_e.htm [hereinafter WTO Press Release] (noting that the proposed amendment marked
"the first time a core WTO agreement [was] amended").
11. General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 (Sept. 1, 2003), 43 I.L.M. 509 (2004)
[hereinafter August 30 Decision].
12. Press Release, WTO, Poorest Countries Given More Time to Apply Intellectual
Property Rules (Nov. 29, 2005), http://www.wto.org/english/news e/pres05_e/pr424e.htm.
The deadline was extended until July 1, 2013. The extension was limited to the very few
remaining member states that had yet to comply with the TRIPs Agreement or that had offered
protection in excess of the TRIPs requirements. See IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at
51 ("At least 70% of the population in [least developed countries] are in countries that provide
pharmaceutical patent protection, and 27 of the 30 LDCs in Africa also provide it."); SISULE F.
MUSUNGU & CECILIA OH, INNOVATION AND PUBLIC HEALTH, THE USE OF FLExBILrmEs IN TRIPS
BY DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: CAN THEY PROMOTE ACCESS TO MEDICINES? 8 (Commission on
Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health Studies 4C, August 2005)
("[V]irtually all of the LDC WTO Members have provided intellectual property regimes well
ahead of [the 2006] deadline."), available at http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/
studies/TRIPSFLEXI.pdf.
13. WTO, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2,
41 I.L.M. 755 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
14. Because the Doha Declaration only deferred the introduction of patent protection for
pharmaceuticals and the protection of confidential test data, some commentators and
policymakers have wondered whether exclusive marketing rights were also included as part of
the extension. See, e.g., Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,
Proposal on Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health-
Joint Communication from the African Group in the WTO, 6(f), IP/C/W/351 (June 24,2002)
[hereinafter African Group Proposal] ("[T]he transition period for least developed Members,
now extended to 1 January 2016, should cover the requirement under paragraphs 8 and 9 of
Article 70 to grant exclusive marketing rights, and in order that exclusive marketing rights do
otherwise operate as de facto patents they should be clearly delineated or defined to highlight
the flexibility."); Ellen 't Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and Access to Essential
Medicines: A Long Way from Seattle to Doha, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 27, 41 (2002) ("Though there
seemed to be an understanding among the negotiators in Doha that Paragraph 7 implied that
LDCs are not required to provide 'mail box' protection or 'exclusive marketing rights,' this is
not clear from the text of the declaration.").
15. Frederick M. Abbott, The Cycle ofAction and Reaction: Developments and Trends in
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example, U.S. health officials articulated concerns about the inadequate supply of
Tamiflu that might be needed to treat the avian flu pandemic.' 6 In addition, the
experience of the anthrax attacks in the United States demonstrated the possibility of
unforeseen situations of national emergency in developed countries, 17 while the
outbreak of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) viruses in spring 2003
highlighted the possibility for deadly infectious diseases to spread rapidly from one
country to another.' 8 Due to aging populations and increasing reliance on prescription
drugs, developed countries also face increasingly "strain[ed] government budgets and
burden[ed] private health benefits systems."' 19
Focusing on the access-to-medicines problem in less developed countries, this
Article examines the international enclosure movement and how it has curtailed the
ability of individual countries to respond to national crises within their borders. Part I
illustrates the complexity of decisions that countries need to make at the national level.
Intellectual Property and Health [hereinafter Abbott, Cycle ofAction], in NEGOTIATING HEALTH:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES 27, 29 (Pedro Roffe, Geoff Tansey &
David Vivas-Eugui eds., 2006) [hereinafter NEGOTIATING HEALTH] (stating that it is
"increasingly difficult to de-link" the access-to-medicines problem of less developed countries
from that of their more developed counterparts).
16. Anita Manning, Are You a Sitting Duckfor BirdFlu?, USA TODAY, Dec. 7,2005, at ID
("U.S. health officials and infectious-disease specialists have discouraged individual stockpiling
[of antiviral drugs that are thought to be effective in preventing or lessening the impact of the
avian flu], citing shortages and the risk of widespread misuse leading to drug-resistant
viruses.").
17. See Debora Halbert, Moralized Discourses: South Africa's Intellectual Property Fight
for Access to AIDS Drugs, 1 SEATrLE J. SOC. JUST. 257, 280 (2002) (discussing the anthrax
attacks in the United States).
18. As Obijiofor Aginam acknowledged, "[m]icrobes carry no national passports, neither do
they recognize geo-political boundaries or state sovereignty. Propelled by travel, trade, tourism,
the phenomenon of globalization, and a host of other factors, public health threats occasioned by
an outbreak of a disease in one remote part of the world can easily transcend national boundaries
to threaten populations in distant places." OBUIOFOR AGNAM, GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE:
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PUBLIC HEALTH IN A DIVIDED WORLD 6 (2005); see also Robert 0.
Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Introduction to GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 3
(Joseph S. Nye, Jr. & John D. Donahue eds., 2000) (observing that the first smallpox epidemic,
which is recorded in Egypt in 1350 B.C., "reached China in 49 A.D., Europe after 700; the
Americas in 1520, and Australia in 1789"); F.M. Scherer & Jayashree Watal, Post-TRIPS
Optionsfor Access to Patented Medicines in Developing Countries, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 913,938
(2002) ("Reducing the spread of infectious diseases such as AIDS and tuberculosis on other
continents has spillover benefits in reducing disease risks at home."). For a comprehensive
discussion of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, see generally THOMAS ABRAHAM,
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY PLAGUE: THE STORY OF SARS (2005). See also Peter K. Yu, SARS and
the Patent Race: What Can We Learn from the HIVIAIDS Crisis?, FINDLAW'S WRIT, May 29,
2003, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/20030529_yu.html.
19. Abbott, Cycle ofAction, supra note 15, at 29; see also MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH
ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: How THEY DECEIVE US AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT xii (rev. ed.
2005) (discussing how the estimated cost of Medicare prescription drug benefit increased from
$400 billion in late 2003 to between $720 billion and $1.2 trillion in February 2005); cf
ROBERT BALLANCE, JANOS POGANY & HELMUT FORSTNER, THE WORLD's PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRIES: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON INNOVATION, COMPETITION AND POLICY 202-03
(1992) (suggesting that the aging population problem may be bigger in less developed countries
than in their more-developed counterparts).
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This Part also explains why policymakers need wide policy space to devise solutions to
address these problems. It examines, in particular, the imbalance in the intellectual
property system, the lack of an indigenous capacity to manufacture pharmaceuticals,
and the defects of the local health care systems. This Part seeks to provide the needed
background information to better understand why the TRIPs Agreement needs to be
amended to allow policymakers to have wider policy space to develop intellectual
property policies to respond to public health crises within their national borders.
Although this Part separates for analytical purposes the different types of factors that
inhibit access to medicines, it points out that all of these factors are interrelated in a
complex, symbiotic relationship regardless of their direct relevancy to intellectual
property protection. While correcting the imbalance in the intellectual property system
is, by no means, a panacea, a failure to make such correction will perpetuate, or even
exacerbate, the existing access-to-medicines problem.
Part II traces the development of the international enclosure movement. It begins by
showing how the international intellectual property system was originally designed to
preserve the autonomy of countries to devise their own intellectual property policies.
This Part then traces how the one-size-fits-all templates enshrined in the TRIPs
Agreement and the recent bilateral and regional trade agreements have drastically
reduced the policy space available to less developed countries. As this Part shows,
despite their limited economic development and technological capabilities, less
developed countries are increasingly required to adopt legal standards that are more
suitable for their richer and more developed trading partners.
Part III examines the resistance efforts less developed countries have put up against
the international enclosure movement. By focusing on the Decision on the
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health20 ("August 30 Decision") and the recently proposed Article 31 bis of the
TRIPs Agreement,2 1 this Part illustrates the danger of the international enclosure
movement. Although the Doha Development Round of Trade Negotiations ("Doha
Round") in the WTO drew attention to the development needs of less developed
countries and helped them resist the further adoption of new one-size-fits-all legal
standards, it did not enable them to reclaim their lost policy space or roll back the
recent expansion of intellectual property rights, for which policymakers in less
developed countries and many nongovernmental organizations have hoped. Instead, the
Doha Round merely identified the policy space needed by less developed countries and
facilitated their negotiation with their developed counterparts about the governing
standards within that particular space.
Part IV advances three explanations for the increasing enclosure of policy space of
less developed countries by their richer and more developed trading partners. These
explanations include the power asymmetry between developed and less developed
countries, the incentive-investment divide between national and foreign intellectual
property policies, and the globalization of intellectual property rights. Following the
discussion of each explanation, this Part offers suggestions on how countries can
reform the international intellectual property system to preserve the autonomy needed
to tailor policies to local conditions and how less developed countries can reclaim their
lost policy space to facilitate greater access to essential medicines.
20. August 30 Decision, supra note 11.
21. December 6 Decision, supra note 9 (proposing Article 31 bis).
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I. THE NEED FOR POLICY SPACE
In response topleasfrom American companies, artists, and inventors for action to
address proliferating global piracy, the United States a decade ago forced
intellectual property rights onto the Uruguay Round agenda. But for our
unremitting pressure, the more than one hundred countries who participated in
the Round would not have negotiated stronger rules and disciplines. It was the
United States which understood, more than anyone, that uniform protection of
intellectual property rights around the world would promote the expansion of
international trade, global economic growth, and job creation... And until the
final stages of the negotiations, many of our trading partners wanted weak or
non-existent global intellectual property standards, generous exemptions for
developing countries, or the indefinite postponement of multilateral rules so that
their local pirates could continue copying American pharmaceuticals, films,
sound recordings, software, and books. Fortunately, the outcome was a
disappointment for the "purveyors ofpiracy. "
-United States Trade Representative Clayton K. Yeutter
22
You hear that in my country perhaps one out of nine [people] are infected with
HIV. Imagine if you [in this auditorium] represented the South African
population, and we counted out, one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight,
nine-you have AIDS. One, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine-AIDS.
We are in fact speaking about the daughter of the wife of the sister of the
husband of the father of the brother of someone. Perhaps my call to you would
be to put the face of one ofyour loved ones to represent the statistics. Maybe that
would help to bring those numbers to life.
-Archbishop Desmond Mpilo Tutu
23
Although many people in the developed world have benefited from better health and
longer life, more than two million people in the less developed world continue to lack
essential, and often lifesaving, medicines.24 The life expectancy rate in less developed
countries is disappointingly low, 25 and many of these people suffer from avoidable life-
22. Pharmaceutical Patent Issues: Interpreting GA 7T. Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 227 (1996) (statement of Ambassador Clayton K. Yeutter, United States
Trade Representative).
23. Desmond Mpilo Tutu, We Can Be Human Only Together, 1 SEATrLE J. SOC. JUST. 253,
253 (2002).
24. See Ricardo Mel~ndez-Ortiz & Khalil Hamdani, Preface to NEGOTIATING HEALTH,
supra note 15, at vii ("Despite evidence of full synergy between good health and economic
prosperity, an overwhelming 2 million people die every year from preventable and curable
diseases."); Karin Timmermans, Ensuring Access to Medicines in 2005 and Beyond, in
NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 15, at 41 ("From 1977 to 2002, the number of people with
regular access to most of the medicines they need has increased from 2.1 billion to nearly 4
billion. While a significant achievement, some 2 billion people still do not have such access.")
(citation omitted).
25. GiAN LUCA BuRci & CLAUDE-HENRI VIGNES, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 165
(2004) ("[T]hose living in absolute poverty are five times more likely to die before reaching the
age of five, and two-and-a-half times more likely to die between the ages of fifteen and 59, than
2007]
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threatening diseases. Commentators generally blame this mishap on the high drug
prices caused by the artificial monopolies created by the intellectual property system.
While it is undeniable that intellectual property protection is partly responsible for the
high prices and resulting inaccessibility of drugs, it is important not to ignore other
access barriers that may be only related, or even completely irrelevant to, such
protection.
Using the access-to-medicines problem, this Part illustrates the complexity of
decisions countries need to make at the national level and the symbiotic relationship of
the various factors that could affect the outcome of these decisions. This Part explains
why policymakers need wide policy space to devise solutions to address problems in
their countries. It examines, in particular, the imbalance in the intellectual property
system (the IP-relevant factors), the lack of an indigenous capacity to manufacture
pharmaceuticals (the IP-related factors), and the defects of the local health care
systems (the IP-irrelevant factors).26 Although these labels highlight the different
impact the intellectual property system has on the various factors, the last Section
underscores their symbiotic relationship. In doing so, it seeks to dissuade others from
citing the IP-irrelevant factors to downplay the problems in the current unbalanced
intellectual property system.
A. Intellectual Property Protection
In the public health debate, the pharmaceutical industry27 and the intellectual
property system are often demonized, and the mass media are filled with "sound
bites" describing the patents system as "evil '29 and Big Pharma as "greedy. 30 As
those in higher income groups.").
26. See Roy Widdus, Product Development Partnerships on 'Neglected Diseases':
Intellectual Property and Improving Access to Pharmaceuticals for HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis
and Malaria, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 15, at 205,221 (distinguishing between IP-
relevant and IP-irrelevant factors).
27. Throughout this Article, the term "pharmaceutical industry" refers to manufacturers and
developers of patented pharmaceuticals. The pharmaceutical industry and some commentators
have used research-based pharmaceutical companies to distinguish these companies from their
generic competitors. However, the term is a misnomer, because generic manufacturers also
undertake research, while some research-based companies also manufacture generic drugs or
own generic subsidiaries.
28. As two commentators noted: "[W]hile it appears that northern consumers sometimes
benefit, and northern drug firms always benefit from the tightening of intellectual property
standards in the pharmaceutical area, the south never benefits. All the south gets are higher
prices, fewer manufacturing jobs, and fewer drugs to choose from in the long run." Eyal
Benvenisti & George W. Downs, Distributive Politics and International Institutions: The Case
of Drugs, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 21, 25 (2004); see also Elhanan Helpman, Innovation,
Imitation, and Intellectual Property Rights, 61 ECONOMETRICA 1247, 1274 (1993) ("[I]f anyone
benefits [from strong intellectual property protection in less developed countries], it is not the
South.").
29. See, e.g., Ranjit Devraj, Lesser-Than-Evil Patent Law Pleases Drug Firms, INTER PRESS
SERVICE, Mar. 24, 2005 (describing patent law as "lesser-than-evil"); Patents Jurisprudence,
HINDU, June 10, 2003 ("Patents are monopolies and monopolies are evil unless regulated by law
designed to serve social justice, national interests and pragmatic considerations."); Uniform
Problems, TIMES INDIA, Aug. 12, 1999 ("The new patents regime is an evil endangering the
health of the poor masses."); Andrew Leonard, Big Pharma to Africa's Aid? Really?,
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Graham Dutfield summarized succinctly, major pharmaceutical companies have been
widely criticized for taking advantage of their intellectual property rights3' in two
ways:
[F]irst, by charging high prices for treatments for diseases that heavily affect poor
people that are unable to afford them; and second, by putting pressure on
developing country governments to prevent the local manufacture or importation
of cheaper copied versions of the drugs produced in countries where either they
cannot be patented or where the patents are not respected.32
In response to these critics, the industry claims that "a globally strong patent system
is essential for them to remain in the highly expensive business of discovering and
developing new drugs." 33 As it explains, the pharmaceutical business is extremely
risky, and the research and development (R&D) costs are always very high.34 Without
SALON.COM, Jan. 20, 2006, at http://www.salon.com/tech/htww/2006/01/20/africadrugs_2/
index.html (referring to one "extreme voice" that holds the perspective, "patents are evil").
30. See, e.g., Nitya Nanda & Ritu Lodha, Making Essential Medicines Affordable to the
Poor, 20 WIS. INT'L L.J. 581, 584 (2002) ("The main obstacle to a more constructive direction
in the industry is the greed of pharmaceutical companies, which see greater profits in drugs to
reduce cholesterol for rich American consumers than in drugs to tackle the killer diseases which
affect the world's poorest people."); Al Martinez, Thoughts of Mortality While Scanning the
Menu, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2005, at E12 (describing "today's greedy pharmaceutical industry
that will shove anything on the market that will make money"); Steven Pearlstein, Politics Slows
Agreement on Lifesaving Drugs, WASH. POST, July 4, 2003, at El (mentioning the "greedy drug
companies").
31. Although patents provide the primary protection for pharmaceuticals, other forms of
intellectual property also offer protection. See Keith E. Maskus, Ensuring Access to Essential
Medicines: Some Economic Considerations, 20 WIS. INT'L L.J. 563, 569 (2002) (discussing the
use by Novartis AG of a different trade name for its anti-malarial drug to protect against parallel
importation); Pedro Roffe with Christoph Spennemann & Johanna von Braun, From Paris to
Doha: The WTO Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, in
NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 15, at 9, 14-15 ("[I]n the case of some drugs, the most
efficient manufacturing process is protected as a trade secret or by a separate patent, which may
even be owned by a different company.").
32. Graham Dutfield, Introduction to TRADING IN KNOWLEDGE, supra note 7, at 6-7.
33. Roffe, supra note 31, at 12; see also Richard Adelstein, Equity and Efficiency in
Markets for Ideas, 17 CONN. J. INT'L L. 249, 260 (2002) ("Dismantling the system of patent
monopolies to allow more poor people access to AIDS drugs now might leave us with no way to
mobilize resources against the next great global epidemic.").
34. As Michael Scherer explained:
Most of the R&D outlays incurred by pharmaceutical companies are made to
discover therapeutically interesting molecules and prove their efficacy and safety
through extensive human trials-i.e., to create knowledge that approximates what
economists call a pure public good. Absent legal barriers to copying, once a drug
has been found to be safe and effective, another firm might come up with a generic
equivalent by spending roughly a million dollars on production process methods
and formulation and begin to compete with the pioneering firm. If such generic
imitation were widespread and rapid, surplus revenues that repay pioneers' initial
R&D outlays and make them worthwhile would be severely eroded, undermining
incentives to invest in research and product testing. Because of the huge disparity
between drug finding and imitation costs, multi-industry surveys show,
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strong intellectual property protection, the industry would not be interested in making
the significant investment needed for developing new medicines, and generic
manufacturers would have nothing to copy at all. The lack of intellectual property
protection, therefore, would stifle the progress of medical and scientific advances-a
result that would be detrimental to both the developed and less developed worlds.
While the industry was correct in identifying the need for protection in the first
place, it did not directly respond to the criticisms. After all, most critics challenge
neither the importance of intellectual property protection nor the need for incentives to
encourage pharmaceutical companies to develop new medicines. Instead, they question
whether strong worldwide protection is needed to create the requisite incentives or
whether such protection is justified in light of the considerable social costs and the
existing public health crises. As Sir Richard Sykes, the former chairman of
GlaxoSmithKline PLC, acknowledged, "[flew would argue with the need for IP
protection in the developed world, but some question whether it is appropriate to
extend its coverage to the developing world, which the TRIPS agreement is gradually
doing.,
35
To bolster their case against Big Pharma, critics have pointed out that the industry
has overstated its self-reported R&D costs by including in the calculation substantial
marketing expenses that are only marginally relevant to therapeutic innovation.36 Some
noted further that these marketing expenses, as compared to R&D expenses, are not
pharmaceutical manufacturers attach unusually high importance to the patent
system, which in effect grants them 20 years of exclusive rights to their invention
from the time a patent application is filed, as a means of recouping their R&D
expenditures.
F.M. Scherer, The Pharmaceutical Industry and World Intellectual Property Standards, 53
VAND. L. REv. 2245, 2247 (2000) [hereinafter Scherer, The Pharmaceutical Industry]. But see
F.M. Scherer, Pricing, Profits, and Technological Progress in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 7 J.
ECON. PERSP. 97, 98 (1993) (noting that "[b]etween 1960 and 1991, pharmaceuticals held first
or second rank in 24 years out of 32 on Fortune magazine's annual tabulation of median after-
tax profit returns on stockholder's equity for its 500 largest industrial corporations" and that
"[o]n average, over the 32-year period, the return on equity for pharmaceuticals was 18.4
percent, compared to 11.9 percent for all 500 industrials").
35. IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 30. Some commentators have noted that
"new drugs must be sold worldwide, since no company can fully exploit a patented product,
recouping its research and development costs solely in its own home market, even in the two
largest national markets, the USA and Japan." Judy Slinn, Research and Development in the UK
Pharmaceutical Industry from the Nineteenth Century to the 1960s, in DRUGS AND NARCOTICS
IN HISTORY 168 (Roy Porter & Mikuld§ Teich eds., 1995), quoted in GRAHAM DUTFIELD,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE LIFE SCIENCE INDUSTRIES: A 20TH CENTURY HISTORY
108 (2003); see also Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Research-Based Pharmaceutical Companies: The
Need for Improved Patent Protection Worldwide, 2 J.L. & TECH. 307, 307 (1987) ("Whether
[the commitment of America's research-based pharmaceutical companies] can continue depends
greatly upon the extent to which foreign governments allow innovators to be rewarded for their
inventiveness, monetary investment, and intellectual labor.").
36. See ANGELL, supra note 19, at 119 (stating that marketing and administration expenses
"is the largest single item in big pharma's budget, larger than manufacturing costs and much
larger than R&D"); Roffe, supra note 31, at 13 (noting that "[d]oubts have been raised about the
actual costs of R&D involved in the development of new drugs (especially compared to the
marketing costs of pharmaceutical companies)").
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what patents are supposed to pay for in public interest terms. 37 They also note that the
United States federal government and its national laboratories, such as the National
Institutes of Health, have financed a large portion of the R&D costs, 38 while major
pharmaceutical companies have devoted significant amounts of wasteful resources in
developing "me-too drugs" that achieve no or only limited therapeutic advances.
39
Thus, the actual need for incentives to invent, critics argue, is much less than the
industry has claimed.
In addition, the critics claim that the pharmaceutical industry has been abusing the
intellectual property system it obtained. Although patents protect most pharmaceuticals
for only twenty years, giving them an estimated effective marketing period of about
fourteen years,40 the industry has used the intellectual property system to prolong its
37. Thanks to Christopher May for pointing this out.
38. See Roffe, supra note 31, at 13 (noting "the important role that publicly funded R&D
plays in the discovery of new drugs"); ANGELL, supra note 19, at 56 ("[T]he few innovative
drugs that do come to market nearly always stem from publicly supported research.").
39. See DUTFIELD, supra note 35, at 98 (discussing me-too drugs). In response, however,
the industry explained:
[N]o drug company sets out deliberately to develop a follow-on drug. Innovative
companies working in the same therapeutic area compete to be the first to market
to treat that condition. Normally, just one company can win that race and the
medicines produced by runner-up companies become labeled "me too" by default,
although they may actually have been developed in parallel with or even earlier
than the first drug to market.
INT'L FED'N PHARM. MFRS. & Ass'NS [IFPMA], ADAPTIVE INNOVATION, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: How PATENT EXTENSION LEADS TO MORE, BETTER AND
SAFER MEDICINES 7 (Feb. 3, 2006), http://www.ifpma.org/documents/NR4234/Adapting/20
Innovation%20int.pdf.
40. As Kevin Outterson explained:
The exclusive marketing period is shorter than the 20-year patent term because
several years pass from the patent date until the drug is approved for marketing.
By the late 1990s, the U.S. pharmaceutical exclusive marketing period was
approximately 14 years. There is some evidence that the period is longer for recent
antibiotics. For the last two novel antibiotics approved by the FDA
(Zyvox/linezolid and Cubicin/daptomycin), the exclusive marketing period
indicated by the FDA Orange Book is 14 to 21 years for Zyvox and 13 to 16 years
for Cubicin.
Kevin Outterson, The Vanishing Public Domain: Antibiotic Resistance, Pharmaceutical
Innovation and Global Public Health, 67 U. Prr-r. L. REV. 67, 72 n.24 (2005) [hereinafter
Outterson, Vanishing Public Domain] (citing CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, How INCREASED
COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 45-48 (1998)) (citations omitted). Although the pharmaceutical
industry has complained about the long delay caused by the regulatory process, one
commentator suggested that the process has served "as an insurance mechanism for the
pharmaceutical industry to avoid the high costs associated with product liability for unsafe and
ineffective drugs." James Thuo Gathii, Construing Intellectual Property Rights and Competition
Policy Consistently with Facilitating Access to Affordable AIDS Drugs to Low-End Consumers,
53 FLA. L. REV. 727, 771 (2001) [hereinafter Gathii, Construing Intellectual Property Rights];
see also STUART 0. SCHWEITZER, PHARMACEUTICAL ECONOMICS AND POLICY 36 (1997) (noting
that "many [pharmaceutical] companies are wary of pursuing drug research relevant to pregnant
women because of two recent liability suits"); Alex Berenson, Jury Calls Merck Liable in Death
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market exclusivity. As Barbara Rosenberg noted, the legal techniques used by the
industry include:
" the use of legal provisions and loopholes to apply for a patent extension
aiming to extend patent terms;
* suing generic manufacturers for patent infringement in order to increase costs
of generics entering the market and to discourage entry (usually referred to as
sham litigation);
* applying for excessively broad patents to block research by competitors;
* the modification of drug molecules or the recombination of existent drugs in
slightly different ways for which new patents are applied and that may result
in an extension of 20 years of exclusionary power;
" the intentional layering of several patents to secure broad and continual
exclusionary rights; and
* the use of brand names to increase barriers to entry for a generic drug
manufacturer. 4'
To make matters worse, the inherent complication and the structural defects of the
patent system in many less developed countries have caused generic manufacturers to
become uncertain about which patents are relevant to the manufacture or sale of a
particular drug. These manufacturers are also confused about the appropriate patent
subject matter, the novelty requirement, and the standards for the inventive step. 42 The
many poor-quality patents issued by the local authorities, 43 including those that have
of Man on Vioxx, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2005, at Al (reporting that a Texas jury found Merck
liable and awarded the widow of a man who died in 2001 after taking the drug $253.5 million in
the first Vioxx trial).
41. Barbara Rosenberg, Market Concentration of the Transnational Pharmaceutical
Industry and the Generic Industries: Trends on Mergers, Acquisitions and Other Transactions,
in NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 15, at 74-75.
42. See James Love, Four Practical Measures to Enhance Access to Medical Technologies,
in NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 15, at 241,252 (describing the inherent complication and
structural defects of patent systems in less developed countries).
43. The local authorities in less developed countries are not the only ones that are criticized
for the poor quality of the issued patents. Recently, commentators have also widely criticized the
U.S. patent system. For discussions of problems within the U.S. patent system, see generally
FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND
PATENT LAW AND POLICY (2003), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf; ADAM B.
JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DIscONTENTS: How OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM Is
ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT To Do ABOUT IT (2004); Comm. ON
INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECON., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF
THE NAT'L ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21 ST CENTURY (Stephen A. Merrill, Richard C.
Levin & Mark B. Myers eds., 2004). As John Thomas explained, "[b]udgetary limitations, an
exploding filing rate, and the increasing range of patentable subject matter are among the
reasons that U.S. patent quality appears to be on the decline." John R. Thomas, The
Responsibility of the Rulemaker: Comparative Approaches to Patent Administration Reform, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 727, 728 (2002). Indeed, the problems in the U.S. system are so
widespread that Keith Maskus and Jerome Reichman have called for a "moratorium on stronger
international intellectual property standards" to prevent the transplant of problems abroad. See
Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private Knowledge Goods and
the Privatization of Global Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF
TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 3, 36-39 (Keith E.
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already been struck down elsewhere in the world, have also stifled the development of
generic drugs. 44
In the past decade, major pharmaceutical companies have also used business
strategies, such as mergers, acquisitions, co-marketing, co-promotion, and strategic
partnerships, 45 to augment their market power and to reduce, or at least delay, generic
competition." While these mergers and acquisitions allow the companies to decide
whether they want the acquired generic manufacturers to continue with production of
generic drugs, co-optation and co-marketing strategies force generic manufacturers to
divert energies and technological capabilities from generic production.47 Because some
amount of technological capability is required to manufacture drugs, a change of
production will reduce generic competition by taking away the needed resources and
technological capabilities.
Even worse, the trend of mergers and acquisitions has been recently heightened by
the reduced competitiveness of the pharmaceutical industry. By the mid- 1990s, major
pharmaceutical companies found it "increasingly difficult to introduce drugs that
[were] truly innovative. '"48 To bolster competitiveness and to generate new revenue
Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS]
(explaining the need for such a moratorium).
44. See Maskus & Reichman, supra note 43, at 36-39 (describing the problem created by
poor-quality patents issued in less developed countries); see also Carlos M. Correa, Can TRIPS
Agreement Foster Technology Transfer to Developing Countries?, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
GOODS, supra note 43, at 227, 253 (describing the problem created by the listing of "patents of
dubious merit and relevance" in the Orange Book, which lists patents identified by companies as
relevant to medicines sold in the U.S. market, and the United States's recent effort in promoting
a similar system through its free trade agreements). To reduce the confusion over those patents
that have already been struck down in developed countries, one commentator proposed to "[s]et
up an alert system on patent revocations in developed countries." Timmermans, supra note 24,
at 47. This system may be even more effective if it creates a presumption of non-infringement
for those generic manufacturers that take advantage of the system.
45. Co-marketing refers to "the sale and marketing of a defined product, which is to be
conducted independently and under different trademarks by each party." Rosenberg, supra note
41, at 71. Co-promotion refers to "the sale and marketing of a defined product under a single
trademark, where the parties cooperate in managing the overall process of commercialization,
from manufacture through sale to the ultimate consumer." Id.
46. Competition has a significant impact on drug prices. For example, "[i]n the USA, the
price per dose of penicillin fell from $20 during the Second World War (when the government
purchased all penicillin produced) to $1 in 1946, and to 10 cents in 1949. Between 1948 and
1955, the price of streptomycin plunged from $20 per gram to only 15 cents." DUTFIELD, supra
note 35, at 118; see also IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 36 (citing a recent study that
found that "at least five generic competitors are necessary to push prices down to a minimum");
Alan 0. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha "Solution, " 3
CHI. J. INT'L L. 47, 47 (2002) (citing a U.N. study that reports that "150 mg of the HIV drug
fluconazole costs $55 in India, where the drug does not enjoy patent protection, as compared to
$697 in Malaysia, $703 in Indonesia, and $817 in the Philippines, where the drug is patented").
47. See Rosenberg, supra note 41, at 72.
48. Meir Perez Pugatch, Intellectual Property, Data Exclusivity, Innovation and Market
Access, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 15, at 97, 116. While the manufacturing
capabilities, sales growth, R&D expenditures, and ability to generate profits remain high for the
industry, the ability to introduce new drugs declined from fifty-three new molecular entities
during 1996 to about twenty in 2000. Id.; see also DUTFIELD, supra note 35, at 96-97 (exploring
reasons for the lack of therapeutic breakthroughs by major pharmaceutical companies).
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streams, they introduced a new trend of consolidation in the pharmaceutical sector.49
While their desperation for new revenues have made it difficult to develop charitable
initiatives that respond to public health crises in the less developed world,50 the
increasing concentration of the pharmaceutical industry has led to greater intellectual
property protection. As the market power of these companies grows, they lobby for
stronger intellectual property protection, which, in turn, results in further consolidation
and restructuring of the pharmaceutical industry.5 1 In the end, a vicious cycle of
lobbying and consolidation emerges to reduce competition in the local markets,52 and
the high drug prices and limited therapeutic choices have made consumers worse off.
B. Indigenous Manufacturing Capacity
While the imbalance in the intellectual property system and the consolidation of the
pharmaceutical sector have created barriers to accessing essential medicines in many
less developed countries, intellectual property protection plays a far less important role
in reducing such access in countries that lack an indigenous capacity to develop and
manufacture pharmaceuticals. Indeed, when the pharmaceutical industry has to explain
why strong intellectual property protection does not impede access to medicines, it
usually advances three primary claims to highlight the irrelevancy of intellectual
property protection. First, many less developed countries have no or limited intellectual
property protection, and major pharmaceutical companies do not hold patents in every
49. See SCHWEITZER, supra note 40, at 118 ("Whether in response to rising R&D costs or
increased risk associated with developing a successful drug, drug firms throughout the world
have consolidated, either through outright mergers or joint marketing agreements."); Assad
Omer, Access to Medicines: Transfer of Technology and Capacity Building, 20 WIS. INT'L L.J.
551 (2002) ("Mergers and acquisitions are seen as a means of gaining access to the technology
of the firm acquired, of realizing economies of scale and scope, of creating the necessary
revenue base for R&D activity, and of speedily penetrating world markets by improving both
market access and distribution"); Rosenberg, supra note 41, at 70 ("One reason the industry is
having consolidation is because the industry's ability to come up with research flow is not
keeping [up] with the attrition for products going off patent.") (quoting remarks of a senior
executive of Pharmacia).
50. See Gathii, Construing Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 40, at 768-69
(discussing the internal debate within Bristol-Meyers Squibb when it backed out of a
commitment of a $100 million charitable initiative). But see Scherer & Watal, supra note 18, at
935 ("Under the tax laws of the United States, which is the only nation for which we have
detailed information, donations sometimes permit sufficient tax savings to entail little or no out-
of-pocket cost to the drug manufacturers.").
51. See IPR COMMIssION REPORT, supra note 6, at 37 ("There is evidence from some
countries that the introduction of patents (for example in Italy in 1978) or strengthening the
regime, as in Canada in the 1990s, by increasing the market power of foreign multinationals,
will result in the consolidation and restructuring of the domestic industry."); Maskus, supra note
31, at 567 ("[A]s patents are granted in the future, it is likely that generic production will be
delayed, and the number of generic competitors reduced, in countries where they had been
active such as India, China, and Brazil. Pharmaceutical markets in those nations are likely to
become more concentrated and less competitive.").
52. See IPR CoMMissioN REPORT, supra note 6, at 37 (noting that this cycle "may entail
significant costs to the consumer by reducing the degree of competition in the market and
increasing imports").
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drug they develop. Second, many diseases in less developed countries are considered
neglected, and generic manufacturers are free to develop drugs for those diseases.
Third, the health care systems of many less developed countries are inadequate, and the
access-to-medicines problem is largely attributed to these inadequacies. This Section
discusses the first two claims, and the next Section explores the last.
Consider the first claim. Although the TRIPs Agreement and the existing
international intellectual property system have been protective of maj or pharmaceutical
companies, many less developed countries have yet to offer protection, or at least
strong protection, for pharmaceuticals.53 Even if protection exists, many drugs will
remain unprotected, either because the manufacturers have chosen not to apply for a
patent in a particular country or because local or foreign competitors have found ways
to develop drugs that offer similar therapeutic benefits without violating the patent.
5 4
In fact, because the TRIPs Agreement did not require full protection of
pharmaceuticals until January 1, 2005, 55 generic manufacturers in Argentina, Brazil,
China, India, South Africa, and Thailand have been successful in developing cheap,
generic versions of on-patent drugs. 56 In light of this development, the pharmaceutical
industry has suggested that the access-to-medicine debate is more properly framed as
one between the protection of the pharmaceutical industry and its generic competitors.
In March 1998, for example, "PhRMA representative Tom Bombelles suggested that
South Africa was a pawn used by India and Argentina to undermine TRIPS. '57 As
Debora Halbert noted, by suggesting that "in reality, the debate [was] really about
whom [sic] will be able to sell South Africa medication," the industry successfully
"shift[ed] the focus away from the enormous health crisis in Africa., 58
In the second claim, the industry stated that many less developed countries suffer
from neglected diseases, examples of which include measles, malaria, tuberculosis,
sleeping sickness, leishmaniasis, and Chagas disease. 9 Although these diseases affect a
53. See Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual
Property in China in Post-WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901 (2006) [hereinafter Yu, From
Pirates to Partners 11] (noting that China's rampant counterfeiting problems have greatly
reduced Pfizer's market for Viagra in the country).
54. See Maskus, supra note 31, at 567.
55. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 8, art. 65(4) ("To the extent that a developing country
Member is obliged by this Agreement to extend product patent protection to areas of technology
not so protectable in its territory on the general date of application of this Agreement for that
Member, as defined in paragraph 2, it may delay the application of the provisions on product
patents of Section 5 of Part II to such areas of technology for an additional period of five
years.").
56. Although these countries have been widely recognized for their generic production,
Italy had a thriving generic drug industry in the 1950s and the 1960s. See Scherer, The
Pharmaceutical Industry, supra note 34, at 2250 (discussing the generic drug industry in Italy).
57. Halbert, supra note 17, at 267.
58. Id. at 267-68.
59. For a discussion of neglected diseases, see generally Patrice Trouiller, Piero Olliaro, Els
Torreele, James Orbinski, Richard Laing & Nathan Ford, Drug Development for Neglected
Diseases: A Deficient Market and a Public Health Policy Failure, 359 LANCET 2188 (2002).
For the pharmaceutical industry's response to the neglected-diseases problem, see generally
Boris Azais & Maciej Gajewski, IFPMA, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FOR NEGLECTED




large segment of the population in less developed countries, major pharmaceutical
companies, due to the limited profit margins and the lack of reliable profits, have been
uninterested in devoting resources to their treatments. 60 As one commentator noted:
The World Health Organization (WHO) has estimated that only 4.3 per cent of
pharmaceutical R&D expenditure is targeted at those health problems, such as
malaria and tuberculosis, which primarily concern low- and middle-income
countries. According to James Orbinski, former president of the International
Council of Mddecins Sans Frontires (MSF), while 95 per cent of active
tuberculosis cases occur in developing countries, no new drugs for the disease
have been developed since 1967. Furthermore, between 1975 and 1999, 1393 new
drugs were developed, of which only 13 were for tropical diseases; put differently,
90 per cent of investment into health-related R&D has focused on concerns that
only affect 10 per cent of the global population.
61
Moreover, maj or pharmaceutical companies have chosen to focus their energies and
resources on other therapeutic needs. For example, they have invested substantially to
develop lifestyle drugs, such as Viagra, Rogaine, and diet drugs. As Henry Gadsden,
the former CEO of Merck, once told his researchers, "there are more well people than
sick people. We should make products for people who are well. 62 In addition, the
companies have spent a considerable amount of resources on developing and refining
drugs that are fairly important in the developed world, such as treatments for cancer,
diabetes, and heart and respiratory diseases. Even when they explore treatments for
diseases that are dominant in less developed countries, like malaria, they tend to focus
more on "prophylaxis for travellers from developed countries rather than [on] vaccines
which would be of greater relevance to sufferers in the developing world.
' 63
From the standpoint of profit maximization, the preferences of major
pharmaceutical companies make good sense. Although these drugs benefit fewer
people and may not be lifesaving, their sale guarantees the companies a predictable,
and often handsome, rate of return. Indeed, because many major pharmaceutical
companies need a threshold return of close to $1 billion to justify investment, they have
found unattractive the low-end markets in less developed countries.64 Many of these
companies also face increasing pressure to develop blockbuster drugs to replace old
60. See IPR CoMMIssION REPORT, supra note 6, at 32-33 (estimating that "less than 5% of
the money spent worldwide on pharmaceutical R&D is for diseases that predominantly affect
developing countries" and pointing out that the "presence or absence of IP protection in
developing countries is of at best secondary importance in generating incentives for research
directed to diseases prevalent in developing countries"); ScHWEITZER, supra note 40, at 3
(noting that the pharmaceutical industry "is criticized for its marketing and pricing practices-
and even for its research and development priorities").
61. Roffe, supra note 31, at 13 (citations omitted).
62. DUTFIELD, supra note 35, at 97; see id. ("[I]t is a fact of economic life that the most
profitable medicines are not necessarily the ones that save the most people's lives or even that
save any lives at all.").
63. IPR COMMIssIoN REPORT, supra note 6, at 33; see also id. ("The majority of HIV
vaccines are being developed for genetic profiles of subtype B, prevalent in developed countries,
but most AIDS sufferers in developing countries are types A and C.").
64. See id. at 32 ("[L]arge pharmaceutical companies are unwilling to pursue a line of
research unless the potential outcome is a product with annual sales of the order of$1 billion.").
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ones whose patent protection will soon expire. As Merrill Goozner observed, "[t]here
were fifty-two drugs with more than $1 billion in sales in 2000, but forty-two were
slated to lose their patent protection by 2007."65
The industry's lack of response and its seeming indifference to the public health
crises in the less developed world, therefore, necessitates local solutions-in particular
the indigenous development and manufacture of pharmaceuticals for treatment of
diseases that are unavailable in developed countries and the importation of generic
versions of these products from other, usually less developed, countries. Unfortunately,
the strong patent rights held by foreign patent holders have significantly curtailed the
ability to develop drugs in these countries. To break the patents, commentators and
policymakers have suggested the use of compulsory licenses (including the importation
of generic drugs under such a license), parallel importation, price control, and other
regulatory measures.66
Consider, for example, compulsory licensing. Although differential pricing-the
practice of charging drugs at different prices in different regions, countries, or market
segments--could enable companies to make more profits by including both high-end
and low-end customers,67 major pharmaceutical companies have been reluctant to
make their drugs available at discounted prices, for three reasons. First, they are
concerned that the discounted drugs would flow back as parallel imports to their
markets in developed countries, such as the United States or members of the European
Communities.68 As Alan Sykes explained:
65. MERRILL GOOZNER, THE $800 MILLION PILL: THE TRUTH BEHIND THE COST OF NEW
DRUGS 229 (2004); see also ANGELL, supra note 19, at 15 ("[S]ome of the top-selling drugs-
with combined sales of another $35 billion a year-are scheduled to go off patent within a few
years of one another.").
66. See Abbott, Cycle ofAction, supra note 15, at 29-30 (discussing regulatory responses).
But see Robert Weissman, A Long, Strange TRIPS: The Pharmaceutical Industry Drive to
Harmonize Global Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining WTO Legal Alternatives
Available to Third World Countries, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1069, 1115 (1996) (criticizing
the use of price controls as "an unsatisfactory policy instrument").
67. For a discussion of differential pricing, see generally Patricia M. Danzon & Adrian
Towse, Theory and Implementation of Differential Pricing for Pharmaceuticals, in
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS, supra note 43, at 425.
68. See Maskus, supra note 31, at 566-67 ("There are concerns that if medicines were
offered to poorer patients at lower prices the drugs could be resold in the higher-priced segment
of the market."). "While arbitrage is often cited as a factor preventing differential pricing, the
real magnitude of the concern must be kept in perspective. Large pharmaceutical companies
understand the problems of arbitrage and know how to take appropriate safeguards." Peter J.
Hammer, Differential Pricing of Essential AIDS Drugs: Markets, Politics and Public Health, 5
J. INT'L ECON. L. 883, 889 n. 10 (2002). The August 30 Decision, for example, requires products
produced under a Paragraph 6 license to be "clearly identified as being produced under the
system set out in this Decision through specific labelling or marking." August 30 Decision,
supra note 11, 2(b)(ii); see also Carlos P6rez del Castillo, General Council, The General
Council Chairperson's Statement (Aug. 30, 2003), http://www.wto.org/english/newse/
news03 e/trips stat 28aug03_e.htm [hereinafter Chairperson's Statement] (including a .'[b]est
practices' guidelines" listing the measures major pharmaceutical companies have undertaken "to
differentiate products supplied through donor or discounted pricing programmes from products
supplied to other markets"); DUTFIELD, supra note 35, at 110 ("Companies also use trade mark
law to extend their market power beyond the patented drug's expiry date."); Shubha Ghosh,
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Parallel importation invariably reduces the rents that are earned by pharmaceutical
patent holders. To the degree that those rents are important to inducing worthwhile
R&D investments, as suggested above, this effect is unfortunate. Parallel imports
may also exacerbate the deadweight costs of monopoly by forcing patent holders
to abandon price discrimination and revert to policies approaching those of a non-
discriminating monopolist, curtailing global output in the process. 69
Although Professor Sykes was right in terms of the inefficiency created by parallel
importation in theory, he overstated the practical impact of such importation. Thus far,
many major pharmaceutical companies have refused to take advantage of the low-end
markets even though the entry into those markets would potentially generate more
profits for them. As a result, the low-end markets remain underserved, and drugs
imported from abroad have been sold at a uniform global price. Even when drugs are
available at discount prices in less developed countries, "studies of multinational
company pricing policies (mainly for ARVs) [have indicated] that until recently there
was remarkably little correlation between the price of the same drug and a country's
per capita income. 70
Second, major pharmaceutical companies fear that the price concessions would
reveal the marginal costs of drug production and would result in public or
governmental pressure in developed markets that calls for lower prices, at least for
low-income households.7' Indeed, "the practice of health authorities in some richer
countries to engage in 'reference pricing' has made the pharmaceutical industry more
reluctant to set lower prices in less developed countries.72 As Keith Maskus explained,
"[i]n a reference pricing system, price controls in one country are based on an index of
prices in comparison countries. To the extent that the comparison group includes
developing economies, firms may prefer not to offer price discounts there. 73 To solve
the reference-pricing problem, two commentators recently proposed the use of
confidential rebates in government procurement.74
Finally, because wealth is usually distributed very unevenly in many less developed
countries-South Africa being the most cited example-some pharmaceutical
companies choose to sell their products at high prices that are affordable by the "more
affluent minority, ' ' 75 even if it means that the product will become unaffordable to the
Pills, Patents, and Power: State Creation of Gray Markets as a Limit on Patent Rights, 53 FLA.
L. REv. 789, 810 (2001) (discussing how trademarks "serve as barriers to entry for generic
manufacturers"). Moreover, "clinical needs in the third world may dictate a range of differences
in terms of appropriate drug combinations, composition and dosages. These clinical differences
can be consciously exploited to promote product differentiation between first- and third-world
treatments." Hammer, supra, at 893.
69. Sykes, supra note 46, at 64.
70. IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 36-37.
71. See Abbott, Cycle ofAction, supra note 15, at 29; Hammer, supra note 68, at 893-94
("[E]ven without the threat of physical arbitrage, implicitly revealing information in the very act
of setting lower prices in developing countries could lead to an unravelling of high prices in
developed countries.").
72. Maskus, supra note 31, at 567.
73. Id.
74. Danzon & Towse, supra note 67, at 445 (proposing to address "parallel trade and
external referencing.., in low-income countries or market segments using confidential rebates
as part of their procurement arrangements").
75. F.M. Scherer & Jayashree Watal, Post-TRIPS Options for Access to Patented Medicines
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larger and poorer majority. 76 As Professor Maskus noted, some "pharmaceutical firms
and their distributors in poor countries may find it more profitable to sell drugs in low
volumes and high prices to wealthier patients with price-inelastic demand rather than in
high volumes at low prices to poorer patients.
77
Notwithstanding these concerns, compulsory licensing has been widely used
throughout the world, including by such developed countries as Canada, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. As the U.K. Commission on Intellectual Property
Rights noted, "Canada used compulsory licensing extensively in the pharmaceutical
field from 1969 until the late 1980s. This resulted in prices of licensed drugs being
47% lower than in the US in 1982. The UK also used compulsory licensing until the
1970's, including for important drugs such as Librium and Valium."78 Even the United
States has used various compulsory licensing and price control mechanisms to protect
low-income households in the country, despite its lack of a national public health
emergency. 79 The United States Code also includes a special provision that allows for
the use of patented items by the government and its contractors in return for
compensation through a proceeding before the Federal Court of Claims. s° It is,
in Developing Countries 45 (Comm'n on Macroeconomics & Health, Working Paper No.
WG4:1, 2001), http://www.cmhealth.org/docs/wg4_paperl .pdf.
76. Danzon & Towse, supra note 67, at 455 ("[P]ricing in some [less developed countries]
is dominated by the demands of small, affluent populations, resulting in prices that are
unaffordable to the majority of poorer people.").
77. Maskus, supra note 31, at 566. For a discussion of how the current access-to-medicines
debate has been misplaced by ignoring the difference in price elasticities of demand for
pharmaceuticals in developed and less developed countries, see generally David W. Opderbeck,
Patents, Essential Medicines, and the Innovation Game, 58 VAND. L. REv. 501 (2005). As
David Opderbeck noted, "The level of patent protection in developing countries and [least
developed countries] does not matter when there is an inelastic market for the drug in the
North." Id. at 541.
78. IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 42 (footnote omitted).
79. See Srividhya Ragavan, The Jekyll and Hyde Story of International Trade: The
Supreme Court in PhRMA v. Walsh and the TRIPS Agreement, 38 U. RICH. L. REv. 777, 796-
812 (2004) [hereinafter Ragavan, Jeyll and Hyde Story] (discussing the use of compulsory
licensing and price control mechanisms by the United States under circumstances less
threatening than national emergencies).
80. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2000). As the provision provides:
Whenever an invention described in and covered by a patent of the United
States is used or manufactured by or for the United States without license of the
owner thereof or lawful right to use or manufacture the same, the owner's remedy
shall be by action against the United States in the United States Court of Federal
Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation for such use
and manufacture ....
For the purposes of this section, the use or manufacture of an invention
described in and covered by a patent of the United States by a contractor, a
subcontractor, or any person, firm, or corporation for the Government and with the
authorization or consent of the Government, shall be construed as use or
manufacture for the United States.
Id.; see also Frederick M. Abbott, Managing the Hydra: The Herculean Task of Ensuring
Access to Essential Medicines, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS, supra note 43, at 393, 412
[hereinafter Abbott, Managing the Hydra] ("No country facilitates government use of patents
better than the United States.").
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therefore, no surprise that many less developed countries have become dissatisfied with
the international intellectual property system, while others have questioned whether
their developed trading partners were trying to "kick away the ladder" that would have
allowed them to catch up.
8
'
Unlike domestic production under a compulsory license (or parallel importation),
importation under a compulsory license creates a different problem for major
pharmaceutical companies. Instead of forcing these companies to sell at a low price
against their wishes, such importation allows generic competitors to provide market
substitutes in the companies' present and future markets. While price control and price
discrimination may result in the availability of drugs that can be imported through
parallel trade, the drugs needed in less developed countries are often unavailable. As a
result, importation under a compulsory license is needed, and careful negotiation has
been conducted in the Doha Round to facilitate such importation.
Despite their benefits, compulsory licenses, parallel importation, and regulatory
measures provide only limited assistance for countries that lack an indigenous capacity
to develop and manufacture pharmaceuticals to mitigate the access-to-medicines
problem. A country cannot force a major pharmaceutical company to import a drug
against its wishes or to devote resources to develop treatments for a neglected
disease.8 2 Likewise, a country that seeks importation-either under a compulsory
license or through parallel trade-has to depend on the availability of the discounted or
generic version of the drugs elsewhere and the willingness and ability of the source
countries to export the products. Importation is simply impossible in situations where
the drugs are unavailable in other countries.
Consider, for example, Brazil, which has been viewed by many as the poster child
for using compulsory licensing-or, to be more precise, for threatening the use of
compulsory licensing-to obtain concessions from major pharmaceutical companies.8
3
81. HA-JOON CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER: DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE 4 (2002) (tracing the phrase to FREIDRICH LIST, THE NATIONAL SYSTEM OF
POLITICAL ECONOMY 39 (Sampson Lloyd trans., 1885)).
82. The only possibility seems to be the nationalization of foreign pharmaceutical
companies, which provides short-term gains while making long-term sacrifices in the country's
loss of foreign direct investment, its tarnished international reputation, and its becoming the
subject of trade sanctions and embargoes.
83. See, e.g., IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 43 (discussing the Brazilian
National STD/AIDS Program); 't Hoen, supra note 14, at 32 ("The Brazil AIDS program serves
as a model for some developing countries that are able to produce medicines locally.").
Commentators, nevertheless, noted the importance of not being overly optimistic of the
concessions Brazil obtained from major pharmaceutical companies:
What bargaining on price actually does is allow the U.S. and EU to exchange a
one time price break for preserving the integrity of the regime as a whole. No rule
is renegotiated, no new precedent is established that will operate, however subtly,
to redefine the regime or jeopardize the institutionalization of the principles it
contains. As a result, it seems more appropriate to view a price break as an isolated
victory that is materially important in the short term, but institutionally irrelevant
in the long term. Like a political pressure valve installed by the developed states to
protect their interests, a price reduction releases pent up pressure for reform while
insuring that the underlying system is never placed in jeopardy.
Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 28, at 46; Nanda & Lodha, supra note 30, at 585 ("The
extension of price reductions to developing countries is inferior to a policy of defining and
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As Pedro Roffe noted, "[w]hile the [Brazilian] Government never issued a compulsory
licence, it managed to use the mere threat of issuing one to reduce the price of
individual HIV/AIDS retroviral drugs by up to 75 per cent."8 4 Notwithstanding the
success, it is important to remember that Brazil was successful because it also
possessed two unique conditions that made its threat credible. First, the country has an
indigenous capacity to develop and manufacture pharmaceuticals, and that capacity has
created "a strong negotiating capacity for obtaining low prices from patent holders."85
Second, Brazil contains a lucrative middle class market that U.S. pharmaceutical firms
cannot afford to lose or alienate. Compared to other less developed countries, the
country "is less dependent on the U.S. for . . . a market for its own exported
products.,
8 6
As shown by the Brazilian example, the lack of ability of less developed countries
to develop and manufacture pharmaceuticals can be attributed to three sets of factors.
First, they may lack the needed technical expertise. While the patent system requires
applicants to disclose their technology, such disclosure is indecipherable to those
unskilled in the art87-and sometimes even to those skilled in the art despite the
enablement requirement.88 To develop the expertise, countries therefore cannot just
study patents filed or granted in foreign countries. Instead, they need to send their local
scientists abroad to study, bring in foreign experts to train them, or introduce an
indigenous patent system.8 9
defending a national IP policy in health-related commodities ....
84. Roffe, supra note 31, at 15; see also Joan Rovira, Creating and Promoting Domestic
Drug Manufacturing Capacities: A Solution for Developing Countries, in NEGOTIATING
HEALTH, supra note 15, at 227, 236 (noting that the significant productive capacity in the public
sector in Brazil "allowed the country to make the threat of compulsory licensing credible and, as
a consequence, gave it a strong negotiating capacity for obtaining low prices from patent
holders"); Timmermans, supra note 24, at 46 (noting that strategies seeking voluntary licenses at
reasonable royalty rates "are bound to be the most successful when they are backed up by a
realistic 'threat' to use TRIPS safeguards or competition laws").
85. Rovira, supra note 84, at 236.
86. Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 28, at 44.
87. See Peter Drahos & John Braithwaite, Economics, Politics, Law and Health:
Intellectual Property, Corporate Strategy, Globalisation: TRIPS in Context, 20 WIS. INT'LL.J.
451, 460 (2002) (noting that "[s]ome of the core knowledge related to the invention was kept
back from the patent system as private 'know-how"' and that "[p]atents were drafted in ways
that satisfied the patent office, but were virtually useless to public readers of the documents");
Edmund W. Kitch, The Patent Policy ofDeveloping Countries, 13 UCLA PAc. BASIN L.J. 166,
171-76 (1994) (discussing how patents alone might not contain all the necessary information to
promote technological advances).
88. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000) ("The specification shall contain a written description
of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear,
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art... to make and use the
same."); TRIPs Agreement, supra note 8, art. 29(1) ("Members shall require that an applicant
for a patent shall disclose the invention in a manner sufficiently clear and complete for the
invention to be carried out by a person skilled in the art .... ").
89. Kitch, supra note 87, at 171-76. Nevertheless, the development of such a system does
not necessarily result in a transfer of technology, especially if less developed countries are
mainly used as manufacturing sites while key technologies are isolated and protected abroad.
See Paul J. Heald, Mowing the Playing Field: Addressing Information Distortion and
Asymmetry in the TRIPS Game, 88 MINN. L. Ruv. 249, 258-60 (2003) (discussing the different
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Second, less developed countries may lack the financial resources to build up the
manufacturing capacity, managerial resources, and business environment that are
needed to make the investment worthwhile. For example, studies have shown that the
following conditions are crucial for countries to become internally competitive
pharmaceutical manufacturers:
* gross domestic product (GDP) greater than about US $100 billion;
* population greater than about 100 million;
* sufficient numbers of the population enrolled in secondary and tertiary
education;
* competitiveness index (UNIDO) greater than about 0.15; and
* a net positive pharmaceutical balance of trade.90
Because the markets in less developed countries are very small, it may be virtually
unprofitable to develop a local industry that is primarily restricted to the domestic
market.91 Even when several less developed country markets are aggregated, there is no
guarantee that the combined market would generate enough purchasing power to make
the development of such an industry attractive.92
Moreover, due to a lack of economies of scale, the costs of drug development
(including those of clinical studies needed to prove the therapeutic effect of a drug and
to secure regulatory approval) may be very high. While large generic manufacturers
may be able to afford costly bioequivalence studies, the costs of these studies might be
prohibitive for small and midsized firms. 93 A case in point is Colombia. "A study in
Colombia estimated that the requirement of bioequivalence studies for anti-
hypertensive and anti-inflammatory drugs would increase the price of domestically
concerns about intellectual property protection between the marketing division and the research
and manufacturing division of a foreign company); Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note
53, at 965-69 (discussing the use of isolation to protect key intellectual assets in countries with
rampant counterfeiting and piracy problems).
90. Rovira, supra note 84, at 234.
91. Id. at 229 (noting that a limited market size "might make unprofitable a local industry
restricted to the domestic market"); see also Orphan Drug Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360ee (2004)
(providing additional incentives for pharmaceutical companies to undertake research into
diseases that affect only a small number of people); Thomas F. Cotter, Market Fundamentalism
and the TRIPSAgreement, 22 CARDoZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 307, 335 (2004) ("Even in the United
States, it took the Orphan Drug Act to make research into some drugs with relatively small
demand profitable."). As one commentator explained:
The difference between demand and need is more than semantic. It is important in
differentiating between what "is," or what "will be," on the one hand, and what
"ought to be," on the other. Need is an important measure of professionally
determined objectives but it is often a poor predictor of consumer behavior, either
in the health sector or more generally. It is also less useful than one might wish in
making forecasts or simulations of policy decisions. Consumption is more
determined by demand factors than need ....
SCHWEITZER, supra note 40, at 74; see also Hammer, supra note 68, at 888 ("[Flor a market to
exist, there must be effective consumer demand manifested in the willingness and ability to pay.
Objective need does not automatically translate into effective market demand.").
92. See Maskus, supra note 31, at 568 ("[P]urchasing power, even if aggregated across a
number of markets, may not be enough to make drug development attractive.").
93. Rovira, supra note 84, at 234.
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manufactured products by a percentage of between 46 and 61 per cent." 94 It is,
therefore, no surprise that a recent study presented at a World Bank forum noted the
lack of evidence to suggest that domestic production will necessarily reduce prices and
improve quality and access to medicines.
95
Finally, less developed countries are often vulnerable to development-related
problems that affect the "availability of special technologies, reliable supplies of high-
quality raw materials, dependable provision of top-quality water, electricity, gas and
other utilities ... [and] sufficient human resources, such as experts in pharmaceutical
development, quality assurance and regulatory processes." 96 Insufficient regulatory
capacity has also resulted in a high percentage of drugs failing quality control tests as
well as the wide availability of counterfeit drugs.
97
In sum, many different factors determine whether a country has manufacturing
capacity, and the capacity level varies from one country to another. To underscore
these varying levels of manufacturing capacity, a study by the United Nations
Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) grouped countries into the following
categories:
1. no manufacturing facilities and dependency upon imported, finished
medicines;
2. packaging of already formulated medicines and small-scale local production
of sterile or non-sterile formulations, such as intravenous (IV) fluids;
3. formulation of drugs in final dosage form and some production from
imported intermediates;
4. production from imported intermediates and manufacture of some
intermediates from local materials; and
5. production of active substances and processing to produce the required
pharmaceutical dosage forms.
98
Although the study was published in 1980, its main conclusion remains valid today.
"[T]he high technological capacity required for research and development ... and
[active pharmaceutical ingredients] production is concentrated in the industrialized
94. Id.
95. W.A. KAPLAN & R. LAING, LOCAL PRODUCTION OF PHARMACEUTICALS: INDUSTRIAL
POLICY AND ACCESS TO MEDICINES: AN OVERVIEW OF KEY CONCEPTS, ISSUES AND OPPORTUNITIES
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH (HNP Discussion Papers, World Bank, 2005),
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/HEALTHNUTRITIONANDPOPULATION/Resources/2816
27-1095698140167 /KaplanLocalProductionFinal.pdf, cited in Rovira, supra note 84, at 232.
96. Rovira, supra note 84, at 233 (quoting World Health Org. [WHO], MANUFACTURE OF
ANTIRETRoVIRALS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE 1 (2004),
http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdffiles/EB 114/B 114_15-en.pdf).
97. See BURCi & VIGNES, supra note 25, at 188 ("[E]ven if drugs are available, weak drug
regulation may mean that they are substandard or counterfeit."); Nanda & Lodha, supra note 30,
at 586 ("Surveys from a number of developing countries show that between 10 and 20 percent
of sampled drugs fail quality control tests.").
98. Rovira, supra note 84, at 230; see also Nanda & Lodha, supra note 30, at 589




world and in a few emerging countries." 99 The rest of the world either consists of
formulators or has insufficient or no manufacturing capacity.
C. Health Care System
The last claim the pharmaceutical industry and their supporters usually advance
concerns impediments within the local health care system. As one commentator asked
rhetorically, '"What is the point of developing drugs when they cannot be
distributed?""00 Some commentators and pundits even went so far to claim that the
local impediments are so serious that the intellectual property system has only limited
impact on the access to medicines in these countries. In their studies, Amir Attaran and
Lee Gillespie-White found that "the extreme dearth of international aid finance, rather
than patents, is most to blame for the lack of antiretroviral treatment in Africa."'' As
these commentators imply, patent reforms would not be effective unless reforms were
first taken to address the local impediments.
Among the oft-cited IP-irrelevant factors are "poor management, high inflation,
pervasive corruption, crumbling infrastructure, ethnic/civil conflicts, population
displacement, excessive military spending, inequitable distribution of resources and
chronic youth unemployment."' 0 2 The industry also underscore the fact that the poor in
these countries often have to struggle to meet basic needs; they "lack clean drinking
water, food, shelter, electricity, schools, and basic health care."' 3 Even with the
promise of low-cost or donated drugs, it is unclear how much more effectively these
countries can provide cures and treatments for diseases.1
4
While the development-related problems in these countries are serious and the local
health care systems are inadequate, it is a mistake to use these problems to dismiss the
impact of the unbalanced intellectual property system on access to medicines. Poor
99. Rovira, supra note 84, at 231. Countries that have the capacity to produce these
ingredients "include India, China, Thailand, Egypt, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina and, to some
extent, Yugoslavia and Turkey." Id.
100. Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, US Declares Opposition to WHO R&D Resolution as
Proponents Raise Questions, INTELL. PROP. WATCH, http://www.ip-watch.org/
weblog/index.php?p=311 (May 22, 2006) (quoting Julian Morris, Executive Director,
International Policy Network).
101. Amir Attaran & Lee Gillespie-White, Do Patents for Antiretroviral Drugs Constrain
Access to AIDS Treatment in Africa?, 286 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 1886, 1891 (2001).
102. J.M. Spectar, The Hybrid Horseman of the Apocalypse: The Global AIDS Pandemic &
the North-South Fracas, 29 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 253, 267 (2001); Pharm. Research & Mfrs.
Am. [PhRMA], Health Care in the Developing World, http://world.phrma.org/exec.sunimary.
html.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2007) ("Some developing countries also are hampered by political
leadership that lacks the will to confront or even acknowledge their nation's health care
needs.").
103. Peter K. Yu, Bridging the Digital Divide: Equality in the Information Age, 20 CARDOZO
ARTs & ENT. L.J. 1, 10 (2002).
104. See IPR COMMIssION REPORT, supra note 6, at 31 ("[W]ithout extra funding for
medicines and health delivery services, treatment for all those requiring [antiretroviral therapies
for HIV/AIDS] will remain unaffordable even at the cheapest generic prices."); Scherer &
Watal, supra note 18, at 939 ("[I]t must be recognized that the poorer residents of the world's
least affluent nations cannot pay even the marginal cost of drugs that might save their lives or
permit them to become productive workers.").
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countries, by definition, are poor; they lack resources, technical expertise, and
economic development. As Sisule Musungu of the South Centre reminded the U.K.
Commission on Intellectual Property Rights:
I would like to discourage the Commission from arriving at the conclusion in this
debate (that it is all} about infrastructure and resources. If that is the conclusion, I
think you will have what the title says: "People are Poor". So don't make
recommendations that people are poor because we know that. We are trying to
solve their problems, not to tell them that they are poor.l15
Today, the health care systems of many less-developed countries suffer from
underdevelopment, and the lack of health care personnel, medical knowledge, and the
needed infrastructure to administer medicines and to deliver cures and treatments has
compounded the public health crises. ° Consider Nigeria, for example:
In 2001, Nigeria on the advice of activists purchased generic anti-AIDS drugs. The
World Bank, the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Gates
Foundation, among others, donated more than $150 million to help with
distribution.
Two years later, only about 800 people have been treated, and the tons of drugs
in the government stockpile will expire in less than six months. The Nigerian
Directorate of the National Programme to Fight AIDS concluded that Nigeria's
woeful health infi-astructure was the real reason for the failure.1
0 7
105. IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 39 (quoting Sisule Musungu, Presentation at
Session on Medicines, Commission on Intellectual Property Rights Conference (Feb. 21-22,
2002)).
106. See IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 38 ("[I]mproper administration [of
medicines] may [also] contribute to the development of drug resistance, apart from being
ineffective."); see also Colin Robert Crossman, Arming Our Enemies: How Parallel Imports
CouldIncrease Antimicrobial Resistance, 31 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 823,824-33 (2006)
(discussing resistance to antimicrobials); Nanda & Lodha, supra note 30, at 587 ("Irrational use
of drugs also remains widespread, despite progress in drug selection, therapeutic information
and training... [and] is contributing to growing anti-microbial resistance, particularly in
relation to major infectious diseases, including bacterial diarrhoea, gonorrhoea, malaria,
pneumonia and tuberculosis."). For example, some drugs may be "exhausted through antibiotic
resistance by the time it reaches the public domain." Outterson, Vanishing Public Domain,
supra note 40, at 73. If these drugs are introduced or administered improperly during the patent
term, they may lose their effectiveness by the time the patents expire and will never become
available to the less developed world in the same way they do to their more developed
counterparts. As Kevin Outterson lamented, the poor in those situations will be "left with
nothing except a cruel memory of a fading hope." Id.
107. Robert Goldberg, Disease Control, WASH. TIMES, May 15, 2003, at A19. As Keith
Maskus explained:
Many poor countries have a shortage of clinics, hospitals, medical personnel
and means for transporting patients. The inability to fund health programs
adequately is partially the result of chronically limited budgets. It also stems from
governments placing relatively little emphasis on social programs including health.
The resource constraint may be compounded by an inability to levy user charges to
cover even the operational costs of providing public health care services. Poor
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Combined with factors discussed in the previous Sections, this example shows that less
developed countries are often confronted with different types of factors.
Thus, the problems confronting less developed countries in the public health area
are not limited to intellectual property protection. IP-irrelevant factors are also
important causes of the problem. When researchers account for the causes of the
access-to-medicines problem, they usually include three different types of factors.
Some of them are IP-relevant, some of them are only IP-related (in the sense that
intellectual property protection is not directly relevant to the outcome of the factors),
and the remainder are IP-irrelevant.
Consider, for example, the list compiled by the WHO Department of Essential
Drugs of the various factors contributing to the proper access to medicines. The first
group of factors, which concern the availability of the needed therapeutic products,
includes such factors as basic research, discovery, and development-all factors in
which intellectual property protection arguably plays an important role. However, the
list also includes a second group of factors that affect the accessibility of the product:
* ensuring quality, rational selection, and appropriate prescribing and use;
* a distribution system of effectiveness and efficiency;
* economic factors-for example, cost, pricing, procurement, and financing;
and
* knowledge and 'health-seeking' behaviour of 'consumers.' 108
Although the intellectual property system may influence the effects of some of the
economic factors, in particular availability of the products at affordable prices and the
choice of sources of those products, many of the factors remain largely IP-irrelevant
(or at best IP-related).'°9
Similarly, Keith Maskus, a former World Bank economist, grouped the three types
of factors together in his list concerning the demand and supply of essential medicines.
As Professor Maskus explained:
Access refers to both supply and demand factors. The supply of essential
medicines has both a static dimension, referring to difficulties in distributing
existing drugs, and a dynamic dimension, referring to the effectiveness of
incentives to develop new drugs. Demand factors, which are also both static and
dynamic, include incomes, financing, and prices. Thus, several elements contribute
to the shortage of medicines relative to needs in poor countries."1
0
communities may be isolated from health care systems by geography, language,
and differences in beliefs about disease and appropriate modes of healing.
Maskus, supra note 31, at 565; see also IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 30 ("Where
appropriate treatments already exist, access to them depends on affordability, and the
availability of the health service infrastructure to support delivery.").
108. Widdus, supra note 26, at 217.
109. Even the economic factors include such IP-irrelevant factors as "import tariffs,
procurement efficiency, and distributor mark-ups." Id.; see also IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 6, at 37 ("The actual price [of the drug] to the patient is complicated by import duties, local
tariffs, taxes and wholesaler profits.").
110. Maskus, supra note 31, at 565.
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Interestingly, regardless of whether he focuses on the supply or demand side or static
or dynamic factors, the list includes all three types of factors-factors that are IP-
relevant, IP-related, and IP-irrelevant.
In sum, although inappropriate intellectual property protection contributes to high
drug prices and the resulting access-to-medicines problem in less developed countries,
it is important not to overlook many of the other factors that are only related or
completely irrelevant to intellectual property protection. Because defects in the current
intellectual property system can be indirectly responsible for a lack of access to
medicines in these countries by affecting the impact of the IP-irrelevant factors, even
though they may not be directly responsible for such a lack, it is very important to
distinguish among the IP-relevant, IP-related, and IP-irrelevant factors and develop
solutions that are tailored to each type of factor. While a correction of the imbalance in
the intellectual property system may not alleviate the adverse effects of the IP-
irrelevant factors, confusion over the different types of factors will not only delay
efforts to address the problems, but may also exacerbate them by misdirecting
resources and energies while creating illusions of success.
D. A Complex, Symbiotic Relationship
Although the foregoing discussion intentionally separates for analytical convenience
the IP-relevant, IP-related, and IP-irrelevant factors, this Section points out that the
complex and symbiotic relationship between intellectual property and public health has
rendered none of these factors determinative.' " This is, indeed, why commentators and
policymakers sometimes confuse the impact of these factors in policy debates
concerning access to medicines. For example, intellectual property protection may
affect a country's technological base as well as its ability to transfer technology (or its
need to acquire technology for promoting economic development). Such transfer, in
turn, would affect a country's indigenous capacity to develop and manufacture
pharmaceuticals. Meanwhile, an appropriate intellectual property system could help
facilitate the transfer of technology from the technology-rich countries to the
technology-poor ones.' 2 Article 66 of the TRIPs Agreement, for example, requires
111. See Abbott, Managing the Hydra, supra note 80, at 424 (noting that the public health
problem in less developed countries "is multi-faceted, and addressing one aspect often reveals
new challenges").
112. As Edith Penrose explained:
The strongest argument supporting the proposition that foreign patenting helps
to transfer technology, thus assisting economic development, is essentially as
follows: much of the technology required for industrial development is patented,
and the patents are owned by business corporations in the industrial countries. The
disclosure of the technology which is contained in the patent grant and is public
knowledge is rarely sufficient to permit its full application without the know-how
and the technical help of the patentee. Business firms will not give this know-how
and this help in conditions which might rob them of the protection their patents
provide and in circumstances where it would be difficult to prove ownership and
where consequently anyone could use the technology made available; moreover,
"embodied technology," that is, patented machinery, is often obtainable only from
firms holding the patents, who may refuse to sell in the absence of patent
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developed countries to provide incentives for their businesses and institutions to help
create "a sound and viable technological base" in least developed countries by
promoting and encouraging transfer of technology.'1 3 Intellectual property protection
may also be essential to the development of generic manufacturers. For example,
commentators have attributed the success of the generic drug industry in India to the
country's patent law." 4 Although the law did not offer protection to pharmaceutical
products until recently, it offered strong protection to processes used in manufacturing
pharmaceuticals." 5
Moreover, health problems go hand in hand with poverty, which to some extent can
be furthered by high drug prices, especially if a significant portion of the population is
in need of medical assistance.1 6 As Geoff Tansey noted:
Three of the Millennium Development Goals directly focus on health-reducing
child mortality, improving matemal health, and combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and
other diseases. Another goal-to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger-is
increasingly affected by the health of the population in many developing countries,
especially in rural Africa where HIV/AIDS is devastating farming families and
undermining their ability to farm." 7
Indeed, "if a sick person has to pay more for a pharmaceutical product as a result of a




protection. Thus, the patent becomes a necessary, though naturally not a sufficient,
condition for the transfer of technology.
Edith Penrose, International Patenting and the Less Developed Countries, 83 ECON. J. 768, 771
(1973).
113. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 8, art. 66(2).
114. As Peter Drahos noted: "India's success in building a strong pharmaceutical industry
was based in large measure upon its recognition of patents for pharmaceutical processes, but not
for pharmaceutical products." Peter Drahos, Securing the Future of Intellectual Property:
Intellectual Property Owners and Their Nodally Coordinated Enforcement Pyramid, 36 CASE
W. REs. J. INT'L L. 53, 76 (2004).
115. Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970; § 5, 27 INDIA A.I.R. MANUAL 450 (2d ed. 1979) v.27
(stipulating that "[i]n the case of inventions... claiming substances intended for use, or capable
of being used, as food or as medicine or drug... no patent shall be granted in respect of claims
for the substances them selves, but claims for the methods shall be patentable").
116. See WHO, THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 1995: BRIDING THE GAPS 1 (1995) ("Poverty
wields its destructive influence at every stage of human life from the moment of conception to
the grave. It conspires with the most deadly and painful diseases to bring a wretched existence to
all who suffer from it."); Spectar, supra note 102, at 258 ("It is becoming increasingly apparent
that underdevelopment causes AIDS and that AIDS causes underdevelopment."); Tutu, supra
note 23, at 254 ("I do not have to tell you that disease causes poverty, and poverty causes
disease; it is a horrendous, deadly, unholy symbiosis."). See generally Spectar, supra note 102,
for a discussion of the nexus between the global AIDS pandemic and development problems in
Africa and showing how AIDS fuels poverty and how, in turn, poverty fuels the spread of AIDS.
117. Geoff Tansey, Introduction: Legal Fictions and Public Health, in NEGOTIATING
HEALTH, supra note 15, at 2.
118. IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 36; see also Maskus, supra note 31, at 565
("Poor households may sacrifice medical treatment in favor of other urgent needs.").
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At the macro level, health problems could also lower the productivity of a
country-to the point that it will fall behind its trading partners in terms of economic
development, technological innovation, industrial progress, and national
competitiveness. As Srividhya Ragavan noted in the HIV/AIDS context, "[a]n
epidemic increase of AIDS reduced life expectancy and affected labor and economic
output, as the younger casualties increase. Consequently, national productivity declined
in several developing nations since the loss of labor from the loss of each life affected a
proportionate value of output."" 9
Thus, although this Article separates the different types of factors that affect the
access-to-medicines problem, the factors are, in reality, interrelated and therefore can
be both the causes and effects of each other. Accordingly, if we are to effectively
address the public health crises in less developed countries, it is very important to take
a holistic perspective and target each aspect of the problem, because efforts that
succeed in addressing one aspect may alleviate the impact of the others. To do so,
countries need to have considerable policy space to tailor their intellectual property
systems not only to IP-relevant conditions, but also to IP-related and IP-irrelevant
ones. Although correcting the imbalance in the intellectual property system is, by no
means, a panacea, a failure to make such correction will certainly perpetuate, or even
exacerbate, the existing access-to-medicines problem in light of the complex
relationship.
II. THE ENCLOSURE OF POLICY SPACE
When intellectual property protection is criticized for its ill effects on public health,
critics have always described the intellectual property system as if it were a single,
uniform system. However, such a description cannot be more inaccurate. There are,
indeed, many different types of intellectual property systems. A system that is effective
in a rich country may not work well for a poor country. Likewise, a system that works
well for a predominantly agricultural economy may be unsuitable for a high-technology
economy.
For rhetorical effects, this Article uses the labels "rich-country" and "poor-country"
to denote the different types of intellectual property systems needed by developed and
less developed countries, as well as to underscore the interrelatedness of the IP-
relevant, IP-related, and IP-irrelevant factors. Despite the labels, it is important to bear
in mind that there is a wide spectrum of intellectual property systems, which range
from no protection in any sector on the one end to very strong protection in all
technological fields on the other, with varying protection in varying fields in
between. 1
20
119. Ragavan, Jekyll and Hyde Story, supra note 79, at 821 (footnotes omitted); see also
WHO, THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 1999: MAKING A DIFFERENCE 49 (1999) ("[Malaria] causes
widespread premature death and suffering, imposes financial hardship on poor households, and
holds back economic growth and improvements in living standards.").
120. See sources cited in Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual
Property in China in the Twenty-First Century, 50 AM. U. L. REv. 131, 233 n.502 (2000)
[hereinafter Yu, From Pirates to Partners 1].
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It is also important to remember that, like the self-selected designations in the
TRIPs Agreement of "developing country" and "least developed country," 121 there are
many levels of economic development and gradations of poverty. Although both
Burkina Faso and India are described as "less developed countries" in this Article, they
face very different problems and have different amounts of resources for addressing
their problems. In fact, two commentators recently proposed an index to illustrate how
the U.N. classification of developed, developing, and least developed countries "is an
inappropriate basis for achieving an equitable balance between the rights of patent
owners and users."' 22 As they explained, "The U.N. classification, based solely on per
capita income, was developed for giving economic aid. It was not meant for handling a
complex issue such as HIV/AIDS, which encompasses epidemiological issues (such as
incidence of infection in the population)."'123
Although in theory countries need different systems due to their varying economic,
social, cultural, and technological conditions, in practice they may not be able to adopt
a particular system even if that system would best suit their interests and local
conditions. Whether they can do so will depend on whether they have sufficient policy
space. With the establishment of the TRIPs Agreement and the proliferation ofbilateral
and regional trade agreements, the policy space for countries to maneuver their
intellectual property policy has been very limited. As a result, less developed countries
sometimes have to implement a rich-country intellectual property system despite their
limited economic development and technological capabilities.
A. Pre-Enclosure
When the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property ("Paris
Convention") was established, 124 countries disagreed significantly over such issues as
compulsory licenses, parallel importation, working requirements, and filing systems.' 25
Some countries, like the Netherlands and Switzerland, did not even have a patent
system, 26 while others, like Germany, remained heavily influenced by the anti-patent
121. For discussions of these designations, see generally Guglielmo Verdirame, The
Definition of Developing Countries Under GA7T and Other International Law, 39 GERMAN
Y.B. INT'L L. 164 (1996); WTO, Who Are the Developing Countries in the WTO?,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/devele/dl whoe.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2006).
122. Bradly Condon & Tapen Sinha, Global Diseases, Global Patents and Differential
Treatment in WTO Law: Criteria for Suspending Patent Obligations in Developing Countries,
26 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1, 41 (2005).
123. Id.
124. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, revised at
Stockholm July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 306 [hereinafter Paris Convention]. The
Paris Convention is the first international industrial property regime covering patents,
trademarks, industrial designs, and other forms of unfair competition.
125. For a discussion of the different permissible standards under the Paris Convention, see
generally G.H.C. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS CONVENTION FOR THE
PROTECTION OF INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY (1968).
126. Although the Netherlands enacted patent law in 1817, it repealed the law in 1869. Fritz
Machlup & Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century, 10 J. EcoN. HIST.
1, 3, 5 (1950). For a discussion of the Netherlands and Switzerland during the time when they
did not have a patent system while nearly all other industrialized countries had such a system in
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movement.127 To enable countries to coordinate patent protection at the international
level, the Paris Convention struck a compromise by allowing each country to decide
how it protects patents within its borders.12 8 Instead of creating a uniform system, the
Convention embraced the anti-discrimination principle of national treatment and left
considerable room for countries to experiment with different patent systems.
129
For example, countries could decide whether they wanted to include a local working
requirement or a compulsory licensing provision. 130 They could explore whether the
protection of patents in processes provided sufficient incentives or whether they also
needed to extend protection to products. They could even determine whether they
wanted to protect patents in the first place. In the case of the Netherlands and
Switzerland, for example, the contracting members of the Paris Convention allowed
them to join the Convention without even implementing patent protection.' 3'
Eventually, Switzerland introduced patent protection in 1888,32 and the Netherlands
followed suit in 1910.133
Although the Paris Convention worked well for developed country members for
decades, the decolonization effort and the subsequent emergence of less developed
countries have called into question the extent of protection in the international
intellectual property regime. While there was initial disagreement among member
states over the extent of harmonization,' 34 such disagreements gave way to those
place, see generally ERIC SCHIFF, INDUSTRIALIZATION WITHOUT NATIONAL PATENTS (1971).
127. Peter K. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents in the International Intellectual Property
Regime, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 323, 349 (2004) [hereinafter Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents].
For discussions of the anti-patent movement, see generally Heinrich Kronstein & Irene Till, A
Reevaluation of the International Patent Convention, 12 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 765 (1947);
Machlup & Penrose, supra note 126.
128. Roffe, supra note 31, at 9 ("The local exploitation of patents-and subsequently the
granting of compulsory licenses-was conceived, at the time of the Paris Convention, as the
balancing element and the compromise to appease the European anti-patent sentiments of the
19th century."). The original Paris Convention is excerpted in EDITH TILTON PENROSE, THE
EcoNoMIcs OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM 56-57 (1951).
129. See Paris Convention, supra note 124, art. 2 (providing for the national treatment of
foreign rights holders).
130. See STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS: NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 9-16 (1975) (discussing the "laboratory effects" of legal
innovation); Sungjoon Cho, A Bridge Too Far: The Fall of the Fifth WTO Ministerial
Conference in Cancun and the Future of Trade Constitution, 7 J. INT'L ECON. L. 219, 238
(2004) (discussing the "laboratory effect" of regionalism, which allows countries to experience
trial and error and learning-by-doing at the regional level); John F. Duffy, Harmony and
Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685, 707-08 (2002) (discussing how
countries can develop legal systems by experimenting with new regulatory and economic
policies through interjurisdictional competition).
131. See Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 127, at 351-52. Nevertheless, it is
important to note that both countries had trademark laws in place, and such protection might
have justified their membership in the Paris Convention. See SCHIFF, supra note 126, at 22.
132. PENROSE, supra note 128, at 123-24. Commentators have disagreed as to whether 1888
or 1907 should be regarded as the year in which the Swiss patent system began. See SCHIFF,
supra note 126, at 85-86.
133. Machlup & Penrose, supra note 126, at 6.
134. The members of the original Paris Convention included Belgium, Brazil, Ecuador,
France, Great Britain and Ireland, Guatemala, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Salvador, Serbia,
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between the existing and new members of the Paris Convention. In the mid- I970s, less
developed countries began to demand a revision of the Paris Convention to lower the
minimum standards of intellectual property protection as applied to them and to expand
compulsory licenses available under the Convention.1 35 Meanwhile, the United States
objected vehemently to those demands, thus precipitating the famous stalemate




In response to this stalemate, developed countries, led by the United States and
influenced by multinational corporations,137 abandoned the intellectual property-based
forum in the mid-1980s in favor of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), 3 s a trade-based forum which eventually became the WTO. After negotiations
for close to a decade, countries finally agreed to the Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, 139 which included in its annex an
intellectual property-related multilateral agreement known as the TRIPs Agreement.140
To the benefit of the pharmaceutical industry, which lobbied heavily for stronger
international intellectual property protection,'14 the TRIPs Agreement remade the
Spain, Switzerland, and Tunis. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 127, at 351.
Ecuador denounced the Convention a year after the Convention went into effect in 1884, and the
United States ratified the Convention in 1887. Id. Interestingly, these members were at very
different stages of industrial development. As Friedrich-Karl Beier pointed out:
It is interesting to note that of the 14 signatory states, the large majority were only
at the beginning of their industrial development, including such countries as
Brazil, Ecuador, Guatemala, Salvador, Serbia, and Tunesia. Thus, the Paris
Convention was not conceived and agreed upon as a protective instrument for
industrialized countries. It included from the beginning countries in various stages
of technological, economic and legal development. Of the original signers of the
Paris Convention, only England, France and-to some extent-Switzerland were
industrially developed. The majority of the other more developed nations, the
Untied States, Japan, Germany and Austria were initially skeptical as to the
benefits of the Paris Convention and onlyjoined it later; the United States in 1887,
Japan in 1899, Germany in 1903 and the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1909.
Friedrich-Karl Beier, One Hundred Years of International Cooperation-The Role of the Paris
Convention in the Past, Present andFuture, 15 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 1, 3-4
(1984).
135. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 127, at 357.
136. See id.
137. See generally SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2003) (discussing how multinational corporations have
lobbied in both the United States and the European Communities for the creation of the TRIPs
Agreement).
138. See Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 127, at 357-58 (discussing the shifting
of negotiations in the intellectual property area by developed countries from the World
Intellectual Property Organization forum to the WTO forum).
139. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 8.
140. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 8.
141. See SELL, supra note 137, at 47-48. An important indicator of the success of these
lobbying efforts was the Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations (ACTN), which was
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international intellectual property rules based on the rich-country model and modified
the system in four significant ways.
First, "[i]t introduced the concept of non-discrimination in all fields of technology
for patent applications."'142 Article 27 states explicitly that patents need to "be available
for any inventions, whether products or processes, in allfields of technology, provided
that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial
application."'143 It further stipulates that "patents shall be available and patent rights
enjoyable without discrimination as to the place of invention, the field of technology
and whether products are imported or locally produced." 144 This provision is important
because many less developed countries had, until the establishment of the TRIPs
Agreement, offered protection only to the processes of manufacturing pharmaceuticals,
but not to pharmaceutical products. As one commentator recalled:
A study published by the United Nations in 1975 found that many developing and
developed countries excluded pharmaceutical products as patentable inventions.
At that time, the list covered most of the developing world as well as the Soviet
Union and the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe. Austria, Canada, Italy,
Japan, Spain and Switzerland were also in the same category and Italy and Japan
even excluded pharmaceutical processes from patent protection. 145
To allow member states time and resources to develop their patent system, the
Agreement provided a transitional period of four years for developing countries and
initially a period often years for least developed countries.146 (The transitional period
for least developed countries has recently been extended to seventeen and a half years
for most products.) 147 In addition, the Agreement allowed those countries that had yet
to offer patent protection for pharmaceutical products to introduce such protection no
later than January 1, 2005.148 To make up for the lack of protection, the Agreement
required these countries to set up a mailbox system to collect applications that were
filed before the introduction of patent protection 149 and to offer exclusive marketing
rights for five years from the date of marketing approval or until the time when the
patent was either granted or denied.150
Although the Doha Round extended the deadline for least developed countries to
offer protection for pharmaceuticals to 2016,151 the compliance deadline for
developing countries, like Argentina, Brazil, India, South Africa, and Thailand,
constituted by the Executive Branch to solicit private sector views on trade policy. The
committee was chaired by none other than Edmund Pratt of Pfizer. Id. at 48.
142. Roffe, supra note 31, at 9.
143. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 8, art. 27(1) (emphasis added).
144. Id.
145. Roffe, supra note 31, at 13 (citing UNITED NATIONS, THE ROLE OF THE PATENT SYSTEM
IN THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1975)); see also Scherer, The
Pharmaceutical Industry, supra note 34, at 2247-48 ("Even Switzerland, home to three of the
world's leading pharmaceutical companies, abstained until 1977 from granting drug product
patents.").
146. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 8, arts. 65-66.
147. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
148. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 8, art. 65(4).
149. Id. art. 70(8)(a).
150. Id. art. 70(9).
151. Doha Declaration, supra note 13, 7.
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remains the same. Because these countries, along with China, are the main providers to
other less developed countries of generic drugs and related ingredients, the expiry of
the transitional period for developing countries is likely to result in an increase in the
prices of new medicines and a corresponding decrease in access. 5 2 By taking away the
domestic market needed to make it profitable to develop a generic drug industry, the
end of this transitional period could also dry up the sources of generic medicines, even
though the recently proposed amendment to the TRIPs Agreement allows member
states to export generic medicines to other countries lacking sufficient manufacturing
capacity.
Second, the TRIPs Agreement includes a set of complex procedural rules
delineating the conditions under which a country can issue a compulsory license 53-
or, in TRIPs terms, "[the] use [of the patent] without authorization of the right
holder."' 54 Article 31(b), for example, states that a compulsory license may not be
issued unless "the proposed user has made efforts to obtain authorization from the right
holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have not
been successful within a reasonable period of time."' 55 Member states are allowed to
waive the "reasonable commercial efforts" requirement "in the case of a national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public
noncommercial use."' 156 Article 31(c) states that "the scope and duration of [the
license] shall be limited to the purpose for which it was authorized."' 57 Articles 3 1(d),
(e), and (f) require that such uses be "non-exclusive, ' ' 58 "non-assignable,', 59 and
"authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Member
authorizing such use."'160 Articles 31(g) and (h) further provide that such uses "be
152. See Timmermans, supra note 24, at 41-42; see also IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra
note 6, at 35 ("The existence of patents in potential supplier countries may allow the patentee to
prevent supplies being exported to another country, particularly through controls on distribution
channels.").
153. See Roffe, supra note 31, at 9.
154. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 8, art. 31.
155. Id. art. 31(b).
156. Id.
157. Id. art. 31(c).
158. Id. art. 31(d).
159. Id. art. 3 1(e).
160. Id. art. 31 (f). Although the word "predominantly" is undefined in the TRIPs Agreement,
commentators have noted that Article 31 (f) also allows countries to authorize "export of a 'non-
predominant' part of the production." Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO Medicines Decision:
World Pharmaceutical Trade and the Protection ofPublic Health, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 317, 319
(2005) [hereinafter Abbott, WTO Medicines Decision]; accord Scherer & Watal, supra note 75,
at 29 ("The 'predominantly' term in Article 31 (f) clearly implies that some exportation under
compulsory license in the exporting nation will be allowed."). Even the European Communities
conceded, in their proposal for a permanent Paragraph 6 solution, that Article 3 1(f) "does...
allow a non-predominant part of the products concerned to be destined to supply foreign
markets (except under the circumstances addressed by Article 31 (k))." Communication from the
European Communities and Their Member States, Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration of the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 3, IP/C/W/352 (June 20, 2002) [hereinafter EC
Proposal]. Meanwhile, the African Group has proposed to interpret Article 3 1(f) "to mean that
up to 49.9 percent of the production can be exported." African Group Proposal, supra note 14,
6(d).
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terminated if and when the circumstances which led to it cease to exist and are unlikely
to recur"161 and that "the right holder ... be paid adequate remuneration in the
circumstances of each case, taking into account the economic value of the
authorization."' 162 Finally, "any decision relating to the remuneration provided in
respect of [the license] shall be subject to judicial review or other independent
review."'
63
Third, the TRIPs Agreement planted the seed for the protection of undisclosed
information, which has not been covered by any previous multilateral agreement. 164
Article 39(3) specifically provides:
Members, when requiring, as a condition of approving the marketing of
pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical products which utilize new chemical
entities, the submission of undisclosed test or other data, the origination of which
involves a considerable effort, shall protect such data against unfair commercial
use. In addition, Members shall protect such data against disclosure, except where
necessary to protect the public, or unless steps are taken to ensure that the data are
protected against unfair commercial use.
65
Although the pharmaceutical industry has been pushing for a much broader
interpretation, 166 commentators have suggested that the meaning of"unfair commercial
use" under this provision should be interpreted in a similar fashion as in trade secret
law. 67 As Jerome Reichman pointed out, such an interpretation "follows from the fact
that the drafters of Article 39.3 expressly linked it to Article 1Obis of the Paris
Convention and thus to the duty it imposes to avoid any 'act of competition contrary to
honest practices in industrial or commercial matters."",168 Commentators have also
161. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 8, art. 31(g).
162. Id. art. 31(h).
163. Id. art. 310).
164. JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 4 (2001) (noting that undisclosed information "has never been the subject of any
multilateral agreement before").
165. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 8, art. 39(3).
166. IFPMA, A REVIEW OF ExISTING DATA EXCLUSIVITY LEGISLATION IN SELECTED
COUNTRIES (4th rev. ed. 2005), http://www.ifpma.org/documents/NR2306/DataExclusivity_
JAN05_revised.doc [hereinafter IFPMA REVIEW].
167. See Jerome H. Reichman, The International Legal Status of Undisclosed Clinical Trial
Data: From Private to Public Goods, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 15, at 133, 141-42
[hereinafter Reichman, InternationalLegal Status] ("[T]he meaning of'unfair commercial use'
will depend upon the kind of practices that domestic and foreign trade secret laws have
traditionally regarded as unfair."); see also IPR CoMMissioN REPORT, supra note 6, at 50
("TRIPS does not require the imposition of data exclusivity, as such, on these test data, only
protection against unfair commercial use."); Carlos Maria Correa, Unfair Competition Under
the TRIPSAgreement: Protection of Data Submittedfor the Registration ofPharmaceuticals, 3
CHI. J. INT'L L. 69, 71 (2002) [hereinafter Correa, Unfair Competition Under the TRIPS
Agreement] ("At the time the TRIPS Agreement was concluded, few countries had adopted the
exclusivity approach developed in the United States and Europe.").
168. Reichman, International Legal Status, supra note 167, at 142 (quoting Paris
Convention, supra note 124, art. l0bis(2)); see also Correa, Unfair Competition Under the
TRIPSAgreement, supra note 167, at 75-76 ("Even if it may be argued that free riding or unfair
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highlighted the additional requirement that the affected pharmaceutical or agricultural
chemical products "utilize new chemical entities."'
169
Fourth, the TRIPs Agreement requires that the mandatory dispute settlement
process of the WTO be used to settle all disputes arising under the Agreement.
70
Although the dispute resolution provision does not focus specifically on
pharmaceuticals or patent protection, it improves the enforceability of international
intellectual property laws and provides countries with substantial exports of
pharmaceutical products a means to induce other trading partners to protect their
products. It is, therefore, no surprise that the first intellectual property dispute to reach
the WTO Dispute Settlement Body concerned the United States' challenge to the
noncompliance of India's patent system with respect to its lack of a mailbox system as
required by Article 70(8) of the TRIPs Agreement.'71
Indeed, many commentators have considered the dispute settlement process a
crowning achievement of the Uruguay Round. 172 Ironically, although the process was
primarily used by developed countries in the first few years of its establishment, less
developed countries have recently begun to use the process more frequently.173 Despite
their growing use of the process, the latter have had only very limited success in getting
developed countries to amend their laws.' 74 Some commentators, as a result, have
begun to question the effectiveness of the WTO dispute settlement process.1
75
use of such data by third parties may create unfair advantages or unjust enrichment, it is not the
role of an intellectual property system to solve competition problems that do not relate to the
creation or use of ideas.").
169. Correa, Unfair Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 167, at 74-75
(discussing "new chemical entity" as an important condition for the application of Article 39(3)
of the TRIPs Agreement).
170. See TRIPs Agreement, supra note 8, art. 64.
171. Panel Report, India-Patent Protectionfor Pharmaceutical andAgricultural Chemical
Products, WT/DS50/R (Sept. 5, 1997) [hereinafter India Mailbox Panel Report].
172. See William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: The First Ten Years, 8 J.
INT'L ECON. L. 17, 32 (2005) ("Dispute settlement is one of the great successes of the WTO.");
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the Uruguay Round:
Putting TRIPS andDispute Settlement Together, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 275 (1997) (noting that the
two achievements of the Uruguay Round are, as the title suggests, "Putting TRIPS and Dispute-
Settlement Together"); Ruth Okediji, Towardan International Fair Use Doctrine, 39 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 75, 149-50 (2000) ("One of the most celebrated accomplishments of the WTO
system is the dispute resolution mechanism which adds legitimacy to the overall design of the
new trading system." (footnote omitted)).
173. See Davey, supra note 172, at 17 ("The first half of [the first ten years of operation of
the WTO dispute settlement process]-from 1995 through 1999-was characterized by
extensive use of the system by the United States initially, and later by the EU."); id. at 24
(noting that "the US and the EC no longer were as dominant as complainants in the system" and
that "developing country use of the system increased dramatically" in the second half of the first
decade of operation of the WTO dispute settlement process).
174. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners 11, supra note 53, at 939-40 (discussing the United
States' failure to amend laws despite adverse decisions before the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body).
175. See, e.g., Benvenisti & Downs, supra note 28, at 21 ("[T]ribunals are institutionally
inclined to level the playing field among states, but because their power and prestige depends on
the extent to which their decisions are followed by powerful states, this entrepreneurial bent is
inevitably held in check to some degree.").
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C. TRIPs Flexibilities
While the TRIPs Agreement required stronger protection of pharmaceuticals, many
countries remained reluctant to introduce such protection until the implementation
deadline. Consider India, for example. Following its loss in the WTO dispute
settlement process, India introduced a "mailbox" system collecting patent applications
that had been filed since the inception of the TRIPs Agreement and exclusive
marketing rights pursuant to Article 70(9) of the Agreement. 176 However, the country
did not strengthen the patent protection of pharmaceutical products (as compared to
pharmaceutical processes) until it introduced a new patent law shortly before the
January 1, 2005, deadline. 77 While this law, no doubt, will have a major impact on the
development and availability of cheap, generic drugs and related ingredients, it
includes specific provisions to allow generic manufacturers to continue selling drugs
that are already developed by paying reasonable royalties to the patent holders. 178 The
law also "limit[s] the granting of patents on minor improvements to existing products
in a provision addressing new forms of the same substance and new uses of known
substances.",1
79
Moreover, the TRIPs Agreement did not foreclose all the policy space available to
less developed countries under the Paris Convention. To balance the heightened
protection the Agreement requires, Articles 7 and 8, along with the preamble, include
various public interest safeguards. For example, Article 7 states explicitly that "[t]he
protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should contribute to the
promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer and dissemination of
technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of technological
knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a
balance of rights and obligations."'18 0 Article 8 recognizes the needs of member states
to "adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to promote the
public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socio-economic and technological
development, provided that such measures are consistent with the provisions of this
Agreement."' As Jerome Reichman suggested, these safeguards, taken together, may
provide "a basis for seeking waivers to meet unforeseen conditions of hardship."'18
2
Indeed, the WTO dispute settlement panel considered Articles 7 and 8 very
favorably in Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, in which the
176. The Patents (Amendment) Act, 1999, No. 17, Acts of Parliament, 1999, available at
http://www.ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/patact_99.PDF.
177. The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005, available at
http://www.ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/patent_2005.PDF; see Abbott, Cycle ofAction, supra note
15, at 27 (noting that India did not introduce pharmaceutical product patent protection until the
beginning of 2005); see also Srividhya Ragavan, Of the Inequals of the Uruguay Round, 10
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 273, 281 (2006) (discussing recent changes in the Indian patent
regime).
178. Abbott, Cycle ofAction, supra note 15, at 27.
179. Id. at27-28.
180. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 8, art. 7.
181. Id. art. 8(l).
182. J.H. Reichman, The TRIPS Agreement Comes ofAge: Conflict or Cooperation with the
Developing Countries, 32 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 441, 461 (2000) (footnote omitted).
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European Communities challenged the regulatory review and stockpiling exceptions in
the Canadian patent law for violation of the TRIPs Agreement.1 83 Although the panel
agreed with the European Communities that "the three limiting conditions attached to
Article 30 testify strongly that the negotiators of the Agreement did not intend Article
30 to bring about what would be equivalent to a renegotiation of the basic balance of
the Agreement," it maintained that "the specific meaning given to [those] limiting
conditions.., must be examined with particular care [in light of] ... the goals and the
limitations stated in Articles 7 and 8.L."184
In addition, the TRIPs Agreement includes many "flexibilities" that countries built
into its intentionally ambiguous provisions during the negotiation process. As
Jayashree Watal noted, the "constructive ambiguities"' 85 inherent in these provisions
might further provide less developed countries with a bulwark against the continuous
expansion of intellectual property rights and might even enable them to .'claw[]' back
much of what was lost in the negotiating battles in TRIPS."' 86 These flexibilities are
important, because less developed countries, through careful interpretation of the
ambiguous provisions, may be able to push for language that meets their needs while
preserving the policy space appropriately reserved to them during the negotiation
process.
Article 1 of the TRIPs Agreement states specifically that member states are "free to
determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement
within their own legal system and practice."'1 87 As Frederick Abbott highlighted, this
freedom includes at least the following flexibilities:
The TRIPS Agreement... does not... restrict the authority of governments to
regulate prices. It . . .permits [compulsory or government use licenses] to be
granted. It permits governments to authorize parallel importation. The TRIPS
Agreement does not specify that new-use patents must be granted. It allows patents
to be used for regulatory approval purposes, and it does not require the extension
of patent terms to offset regulatory approval periods. The TRIPS Agreement
provides a limited form of protection for submissions of regulatory data; but this
protection does not prevent a generic producer from making use of publicly
183. Panel Report, Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, § 7.26, at 154,
WT/DS1 14/R (Mar. 17, 2000).
184. As the Panel stated in full:
In the Panel's view, Article 30's very existence amounts to a recognition that the
definition of patent rights contained in Article 28 would need certain adjustments.
On the other hand, the three limiting conditions attached to Article 30 testify
strongly that the negotiators of the Agreement did not intend Article 30 to bring
about what would be equivalent to a renegotiation of the basic balance of the
Agreement. Obviously, the exact scope of Article 30's authority will depend on
the specific meaning given to its limiting conditions. The words of those
conditions must be examined with particular care on this point. Both the goals and
the limitations stated in Articles 7 and 8.1 must obviously be borne in mind when
doing so as well as those of other provisions of the TRIPS Agreement which
indicate its object and purposes.
Id.
185. WATAL, supra note 164, at 7.
186. Id.
187. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 8, art. 1(1).
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available information to generate bioequivalence test data. The TRIPS Agreement
provides substantial discretion for the application of competition laws.
18 8
Finally, policymakers, commentators, and nongovernmental organizations have also
begun to explore the potentially conflicting obligations of less developed countries
under the human rights treaties, 8 9 such as the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 90 the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,' 9 1 and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 92 They
argue that human rights obligations will provide the "maximum limits" of intellectual
property protection. 1
93
In recent years, human rights organizations have been particularly sympathetic to
the inability of less developed countries to afford protection for patented
pharmaceuticals in light of the massive HIV/AIDS crises within their borders. In
August 2000, for example, the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Protection and
Promotion of Human Rights adopted Resolution 2000/7 on "Intellectual Property
Rights and Human Rights," which stated that "actual or potential conflicts exist
between the implementation of the TRIPS Agreement and the realization of economic,
social and cultural rights."' 194 In June 2001, the United Nations Commission on Human
Rights further explored the relationship between human rights and intellectual property
rights, noting, in particular, that access to medicines is a human right and that the
188. Abbott, Cycle of Action, supra note 15, at 30 (citations omitted).
189. See, e.g., Paul L.C. Torremans, Copyright as a Human Right, in COPYRIGHT AND
HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (Paul L.C. Torremans ed., 2004); Laurence R. Helfer, Toward a Human
Rights Framework for Intellectual Property, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 971 (2007) [hereinafter
Heifer, Toward a Human Rights Framework]; Peter K. Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual
Property Interests in a Human Rights Framework, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1039 (2007)
[hereinafter Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests].
190. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/8 10 (Dec.
10, 1948).
191. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (1976) (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
192. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, openedfor signature
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).
193. See, e.g., Dreyfuss, TRIPS-RoundII, supra note 2, at 27 ("[T]he WTO system must
begin to recognize substantive maxima on the scope of available protection...."); Laurence R.
Helfer, Human Rights and Intellectual Property: Conflict or Coexistence?, 5 MINN. INTELL.
PROP. REv. 47, 58 (2003) (noting the need to articulate "maximum standards of intellectual
property protection" because "[t]reaties from Beme to Paris to TRIPS are all concerned with
articulating 'minimum standards'); Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement
and New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1,
58-59 (2004) [hereinafter Heifer, Regime Shifting] (discussing how less developed countries
can use a strategy of "regime shifting" to develop counterregime norms that set up maximum
standards of intellectual property protection); Okediji, Toward an International Fair Use
Doctrine, supra note 172, at 168 (proposing to develop an international fair use doctrine as a
"ceiling"); Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 369, 402
(2006) ( "[T]he international intellectual property regime, to some extent, is handicapped by its
lack of maximum standards.") (emphasis in original).
194. ESCOR Res. 2000/7, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2000/7 (Aug. 17, 2000).
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TRIPs Agreement should be interpreted with flexibilities to promote such access. 95
Most recently, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR)
stated in its interpretive comment of the ICESCR:
The right of authors to benefit from the protection of the moral and material
interests resulting from their scientific, literary and artistic productions cannot be
isolated from the other rights recognized in the Covenant. States parties are
therefore obliged to strike an adequate balance between their obligations under
article 15, paragraph 1 (c), on one hand, and under the other provisions of the
Covenant, on the other hand, with a view to promoting and protecting the full
range of rights guaranteed in the Covenant. In striking this balance, the private
interests of authors should not be unduly favoured and the public interest in
enjoying broad access to their productions should be given due consideration.
States parties should therefore ensure that their legal or other regimes for the
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from one's scientific,
literary or artistic productions constitute no impediment to their ability to comply
with their core obligations in relation to the rights to food, health and education, as
well as to take part in cultural life and to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress
and its applications, or any other right enshrined in the Covenant. Ultimately,
intellectual property is a social product and has a social function. States parties
thus have a duty to prevent unreasonably high costs for access to essential
medicines, plant seeds or other means of food production, or for schoolbooks and
learning materials, from undermining the rights of large segments of the
population to health, food and education.
1 96
In sum, although the TRIPs Agreement has strengthened intellectual property
protection while reducing the policy space of WTO member states, it still has left some
space for less developed countries to develop their own intellectual property system.
Unfortunately, this limited space is now beginning to disappear as the United States
and the European Communities push aggressively for bilateral and regional TRIP-plus
trade agreements. Apart from these agreements, the lack of legal expertise and the
desperate need for financial assistance also have made it difficult for less developed
countries to take advantage of the flexibilities built into the TRIPs Agreement.
D. TRIPs-Plus Enclosure
While less developed countries were examining the flexibilities available under the
TRIPs Agreement and promoting their development agenda at the World Intellectual
195. The High Commissioner, Report of the High Commissioner on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights: The Impact of the Agreement on Trade-RelatedAspects oflntellectual Property
Rights on Human Rights, 32, delivered to the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (June 27, 2001).
196. Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 17: The Right of
Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resultingfrom Any
Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of Which He ls the Author (Art. 15(1)(c)), 35, U.N.
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Property Organization (WIPO), 97 their developed counterparts were actively exploring
ways to increase intellectual property protection without reopening the TRIPs
negotiations. Lobbied heavily by the pharmaceutical industry, 198 the United States and
the European Communities began to explore the use of bilateral and regional trade
agreements to increase protection of pharmaceuticals outside of the TRIPs
Agreement.'" Through these agreements, developed countries sought to reduce the
negotiating position and policy space of their less developed counterparts while further
aligning intellectual property laws of their trading partners with those of their own.
200
Although the United States is not the only country that has aggressively pushed for
TRIPs-plus trade agreements, this Article focuses primarily on the United States'
actions because of their representativeness for the recent bilateral and regional efforts,
their considerable implications for public health, and their differences from similar
agreements initiated by the European Communities, which are often filled with more
compromises among its members.
20
'
Commentators generally describe the bilateral or regional trade agreements as
"TRIPs-plus," suggesting that the new agreements require a higher degree of protection
than is required under the TRIPs Agreement. However, to properly understand the
impact of the different provisions and the needed policy responses, it is important to
distinguish among three different types of provisions: "TRIPs-plus," "TRIPs-extra,"
and "TRIPs-restrictive." 20 2 "TRIPs-plus" provisions increase the commitments of less
developed countries by increasing the protection stated in the TRIPs Agreement, which
allows member states to "implement in their law more extensive protection than is
required by this Agreement, provided that such protection does not contravene the
197. See World Intellectual Prop. Org. [WIPO], Press Release, Member States Agree to
Further Examine Proposal on Development (Oct. 4, 2004), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/prdocs/
en/2004/wipo_pr2004_396.html (reporting about the proposal by Argentina and Brazil to
"'fully incorporate' and 'to take immediate action in providing for the incorporation of a
"Development Agenda" in the Organization's work program."').
198. See Abbott, WTO Medicines Decision, supra note 160, at 349-50 ("U.S. PhRMA
stands strongly behind [the recent bilateral and regional] efforts.") (citing PHRMA, "SPECIAL
301" SUBMISSION TO THE USTR, app. B (2004)).
199. Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 127, at 392-400.
200. As the Trade Act of 2002 stated:
The principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding trade-related
intellectual property are... to further promote adequate and effective protection
of intellectual property rights, including through... ensuring that the provisions
of any multilateral or bilateral trade agreement governing intellectual property
rights that is entered into by the United States reflect a standard of protection
similar to that found in United States law ....
19 U.S.C. § 3802(b)(4)(A)(i)(II) (2000).
201. MUSUNGU & OH, supra note 12, at ix ("The EU trade policy with respect to intellectual
property protection in third countries especially developing countries is more nuanced and a
little more favourable to public health in developing countries.").
202. See, e.g., MARISTELA BASSO & EDSON BEAs, EXPLORING OPTIONS AND MODALITIES TO
MOVE THE IP DEVELOPMENT AGENDA FORwARD 7 (2005), http://www.iprsonline.org/
unctadictsd/bellagio/Bellagio2005/Mbasso_Paper.pdf(discussing "the TRIPS-plus and TRIPS-
extra trend"); Carlos M. Correa, Remarks at the Hong Kong Trade and Development




provisions of this Agreement." 20 3 For example, although the TRIPs Agreement requires
the protection of patents for only twenty years, recent free trade agreements have
required a limited extension of the patent term based on the period during which a
product undergoes regulatory review,204 similar to the Hatch-Waxman Act of 1984 in
the United States.05
By contrast, "TRIPs-extra" provisions add commitments that are not covered by the
TRIPs Agreement. Examples of these provisions are those that call for the
establishment of a data-exclusivity regime to protect clinical trial data submitted during
the regulatory approval process, 20 6 the linkage of the registration of pharmaceutical
products to their patent status, 207 and the requirement that patents be granted for "new
uses," or second indications, of known compounds. 208 Because Article 6 of the TRIPs
Agreement notes that the Agreement does not resolve the exhaustion issue, one can
also classify as TRIPs-extra a provision banning parallel importation of cheap, generic
203. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 8, art. 1(1).
204. See, e.g., Central America-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement art. 15.9.6, May
28, 2004 [hereinafter CAFTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/
Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA-DRFinalTexts/assetuploadfile934_3935.pdf; United States-
Australia Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austl., art. 17.9.8, May 18, 2004 [hereinafter U.S.-
Australia FTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/rradeAgreements/Bilateral/Australia_
FTA/FinaiText/assetuploadfile469_5141.pdf; United States-Singapore Free Trade
Agreement, U.S.-Sing., art. 17.9.8, May 6,2003 [hereinafter U.S.-Singapore FTA], available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/Singapore-FTA/Final-Texts/
asset upload file708_4036.pdf.
205. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417,
§ 156, 98 Stat. 1585, 1598 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 355 (2000)); see also DrFIELD,
supra note 35, at 128 (discussing supplementary protection certifications that were used to make
up for the time taken to secure marketing authorization in Europe).
206. See, e.g., CAFTA, supra note 204, art. 15.10.1; U.S.-Australia FTA, supra note 204,
art. 17.10.1; U.S.-Singapore FTA, supra note 204, art. 16.8.1.
207. See, e.g., CAFTA, supra note 204, art. 15.10.2; U.S.-Australia FTA, supra note 204,
art. 17.10.4; U.S.-Singapore FTA, supra note 204, art. 16.8.4; see generally Carlos M. Correa,
Bilateralism in Intellectual Property: Defeating the WTO System for Access to Medicines, 36
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 79, 88-91 (2004) [hereinafter Correa, Bilateralism in Intellectual
Property]. As Professor Correa noted:
The patent-registration linkage ignores that patents are private rights, as stated in
the Preamble of the TRIPS Agreement, and that, whether a given product infringes
or not, a patent is a legal matter entirely separate from the technical issues
concerning safety and efficacy of drugs. Health authorities have no knowledge or
experience whatsoever to assess the claims of a patent.
Id. at 89. Professor Correa also criticizes the patent registration linkage for "creat[ing] a
presumption of validity of pharmaceutical product patents which health authorities are neither
empowered nor have the capacity to challenge." Id. at 91.
208. See, e.g., U.S.-Australia FTA, supra note 204, art. 17.9.1; U.S.-Bahrain Free Trade
Agreement, U.S.-Bahr., art. 14.8.2, Sept. 14, 2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov/
assets/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/BahrainFTA/finaltexts/asset_upload file211 _6293.pdf.
Cf Abbott, Cycle ofAction, supra note 15, at 30 ("The TRIPS Agreement does not specify that
new-use patents must be granted."); Correa, Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, supra note
207, at 82 ("[WTO m]embers have considerable discretion in defining this concept, which
excludes second indications, new formulations, or dosage forms.").
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drugs.209 Similarly, one can consider as TRIPs-extra a provision allowing the
contracting parties to resolve their dispute in a forum other than the mandatory WTO
dispute settlement process. 10 As the coverage of intellectual property laws continues to
expand,211 TRIPs-extra provisions are likely to be found in many free trade
agreements.
From the standpoint of dispute resolution, these TRIPs-extra provisions are also
likely to be very important, as the WTO rules do not require disputes arising under
these provisions to be settled by the mandatory WTO dispute settlement process. In
fact, the existence of these provisions has helped rejuvenate the United States Trade
Representative's section 301 process. 212 In United States-Sections 301-310 of the
Trade Act of1974, the WTO Dispute Settlement Panel stated that WTO member states
are prohibited from taking retaliatory measures before they have exhausted all of the
actions permissible under the rules.213 That panel decision, however, does not affect
provisions that lie outside of the WTO agreement, including the TRIPs-extra
provisions.
Finally, "TRIPs-restrictive" provisions are those that neither increase the protection
under the TRIPs Agreement nor cover a new area outside of the Agreement. They are
important to the current analysis, because they limit the policy choices of less
developed countries by restricting how they interpret the Agreement. Usually, such
TRIPs-restrictive provisions take away the flexibilities less developed countries had
obtained during the TRIPs negotiations, although a bilateral or regional agreement
arguably could help foster a common position concerning the interpretation of the
Agreement. 214 A textbook example of a TRIPs-restrictive provision initiated by
developed countries is one that requires less developed countries to introduce the 1991
Act of the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants215 (UPOV)
to protect plant varieties.216 The TRIPs Agreement, by contrast, provides flexibility for
member states to decide whether they want to do so "by patents or by an effective sui
209. See, e.g., U.S.-Australia FTA, supra note 204, art. 17.9.4; U.S.-Morocco Free Trade
Agreement, U.S.-Morocco, art. 15.9, June 15, 2004, available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/
TradeAgreements/Bilateral/MoroccoFTA/FInalText/asset-uploadfile797_3849.pdf.
210. For a discussion of the choice-of-forum provisions in the bilateral and regional free
trade agreements initiated by the United States, see generally PETER DRAHos, TUE BiLATERAL
WEB OF TRADE DisPuTE SETTLEMENT (2005), http://www.twnside.org.sg/title2/FTAs/Dispute
ResolutioniTheBilateralWebOflradeDisputeSettlementPeterDrahos.doc.
211. See Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and the Information Ecosystem, 2005 MICH. ST.
L. REv. 1,5 [hereinafter Yu, Intellectual Property and the Information Ecosystem] (discussing
the expansion of categories of intellectual property rights).
212. For discussion of the section 301 process, see Yu, From Pirates to Partners I, supra
note 120, at 138-40.
213. Panel Report, United States--Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of1974, WT/DS152/R
(Dec. 22, 1999).
214. See SISULE F. MUSUNGU, SUSAN VILLANUEVA & ROXANA BLASETTI, UTILIZING TRIPS
FLExiBILITEs FOR PuBLIc HEALTH PROTECTION THROUGH SOUTH-SOUTH REGIONAL FRAMEwORKS
13, 20 (2004), http://mednet2.who.inttbs/global/s4968e.pdf.
215. International Convention for the Protection ofNew Varieties of Plants, Dec. 2, 1961, 33
U.S.T. 2703, 815 U.N.T.S. 89 (amended Mar. 19, 1991).
216. See, e.g., CAFTA, supra note 204, art. 15.1.5(a); U.S.-Australia FTA, supra note 204,
art. 17.1.2(e); U.S.-Singapore FTA, supra note 204, art. 16.1.2(a)(ii).
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generis system or by any combination thereof."21 7 An example in the public health
context is a limitation of the scope of diseases for which a compulsory license under
the proposed TRIPs Article 31 bis will be used.2t s The Doha Declaration "recognize[s]
the gravity of the public health problems afflicting many developing and least-




More than a century ago, when the Paris Convention was established, countries
were able to preserve the autonomy they needed to devise their own intellectual
property policies. Unfortunately, because of their colonial status, many less developed
countries were not members of the Paris Convention and never had this autonomy until
after their declaration of independence. Instead, intellectual property laws were
transplanted onto their soil from the colonial powers. 220 Although most colonies
became independent after the Second World War, the intellectual property laws from
the former controlling powers remain on the books, survive state succession, or have
been retroactively adopted as part of the post-independence national law.221' As Ruth
Okediji observed:
It is well-known... that most developing countries retained the structure and form
of laws and institutions established during the colonial period, including
intellectual property laws. Until 1989, Lesotho operated under the Patents, Trade
Marks and Designs Protection Proclamation of 1919, a United Kingdom
217. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 8, art. 27(3)(b).
218. See Abbott, WTO Medicines Decision, supra note 160, at 352-53 (discussing the use of
the phrase "in particular" in CAFTA to limit the scope of necessary measures to protect public
health).
219. Doha Declaration, supra note 13, 1 (emphasis added).
220. As Ruth Okediji explained:
Intellectual property law was not merely an incidental part of the colonial legal
apparatus, but a central technique in the commercial superiority sought by
European powers in their interactions with each other in regions beyond Europe.
Granted, intellectual property systems in Europe prior to the seventeenth century
were neither fully developed nor had intellectual property protection become a
systematic policy designed primarily for encouraging domestic innovation.
Whatever protections existed, however, would be exerted against other Europeans
in colonial territories in the process of empire building. The first multilateralism
[which occurred during the early period of European contact through trade with
non European peoples] thus was characterized predominantly by the extension of
intellectual property laws to the colonies for purposes associated generally with
the overarching colonial strategies of assimilation, incorporation and control. It
was also characterized by efforts to secure national economic interests against
other European countries in colonial territories.
Ruth L. Okediji, The International Relations of Intellectual Property: Narratives ofDeveloping
Country Participation in the Global Intellectual Property System, 7 SING. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
315, 324-25 (2003) (citations omitted).
221. For an excellent discussion of how the former colonies conducted their international
intellectual property relations following their declaration of independence, see id. at 325-334.
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instrument. Mauritius, a former French colony, continued to operate under its
Trade Marks Act (1868) and Patents Act (1975) for over twenty years after
obtaining independence in 1968. Swaziland also inherited its IP regime "as a
colonial legacy." The same is true with respect to other laws and institutions.
Indeed, prior to the compelled compliance with intellectual property rights
imposed by the TRIPS Agreement, many developing and least developed countries
still had as their own domestic laws the old Acts and Ordinances of the colonial
era. While some developing countries had laws in place that attracted the ire of the
developed countries by explicit refusals to grant patents to pharmaceutical
products, or through compulsory licensing provisions, or by the failure to enforce
recognized rights, many others simply had obsolete laws.22 2
By the time the TRIPs Agreement was established, the autonomy preserved in the Paris
Convention was no longer available to less developed countries. In lieu of choices that
are sensitive to local conditions, the Agreement includes many minimum standards that
require poor countries to develop a rich-country intellectual property system.
With the proliferation of recent bilateral and regional trade agreements ratcheting
up protection for pharmaceuticals, this slight room for maneuvering has been further
reduced to the point that countries are now required to introduce an intellectual
property system that achieves uniformity at the expense of local needs, national
interests, technological capabilities, institutional capacities, and public health
conditions. As less developed countries continue to struggle with their economic
development and public health crises, the need for this autonomy and the
corresponding ability to select an appropriate intellectual property system has never
been more important.
Although this Article focuses on WTO developments, it is important not to ignore
similar developments at WIPO, whose initiatives are sometimes hindered by the heavy
reliance on filing fees from the Patent Cooperation Treaty, 223 the narrow definition of
its mandate, and the development of training programs that serve this narrow
mandate.224 Indeed, the recent negotiation of the proposed Substantive Patent Law
Treaty225 has raised a lot of important questions about not only the balance of the
international intellectual property system, but also WIPO's role in the international
enclosure movement. In WIPO's defense, there have also been many interesting
developments concerning the WIPO Development Agenda that help to resist the
222. Id. at 335-36 & n.73 (footnotes and citations omitted).
223. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER MAY, THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION:
RESURGENCE AND THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 37 (2007) (noting the processing of applications
under the Patent Cooperation Treaty and other treaties "provide[s] the majority of the funds for
the rest of WIPO's undertakings"); Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property and the Development
Divide, 27 CARDOzO L. REv. 2821, 2844 n.109 (2006) ("WIPO's operating budget is derived
substantially from fees generated from Patent Cooperation Treaty filing fees, most of which
come from applications filed by developed country members.").
224. Christopher May, Capacity Building and the (Re)production of Intellectual Property
Rights, 25 THIRD WORLD Q. 821, 822 (2004) ("[C]apacity building for [intellectual property
rights] . . . may also lead to effective 'epistemic lock-in': capacity building programmes
socialise policy makers, practitioners and others into a specific way of dealing with, and
regulating, IPRs. It encourages the development of a TRIPs mind-set.").




continuous enclosure-or, at least, push for the type of enclosure that would better
promote economic development in less developed countries. 226 Because many of these
developments remain in flux, and because this Article focuses primarily on Article
31 bis of the TRIPs Agreement, this Part does not discuss developments at WIPO. It is,
nevertheless, important to acknowledge and beware of the role of those developments
in the international enclosure movement.
III. THE NEGOTIATION OF POLICY SPACE
Although there has been a "one-way ratchet" of intellectual property protection and
the public domain is increasingly enclosed,227 the international enclosure movement
has not been a unidirectional movement. Instead, there have been repeated
contestations between developed and less developed countries over the appropriateness
and ultimate adoption of legal standards.228 The repeat resistance and challenges by
less developed countries following the negotiation of the TRIPs Agreement eventually
led to the launch of the Doha Round, which underscored their need to have wide policy
space to develop intellectual property policies that take into consideration the public
health crises within their national borders. This Part focuses on these challenges and
resistance efforts, using as illustrations the August 30 Decision of the General Council
and the recently proposed Article 31 bis of the TRIPs Agreement. This Part points out
that, although the Doha Round drew attention to the development needs of less
developed countries and "ma[d]e a start in some rebalancing of the asymmetry of the
Uruguay Round,, 229 it did not enable them to reclaim their lost policy space or to roll
back the recent expansion of intellectual property rights.230 Instead, it merely identified
the policy space needed by less developed countries and facilitated their negotiation
with their developed counterparts about the governing standards within that particular
space.
A. Doha Declaration
The Doha Declaration came at a time when developed countries were eager to move
on to other issues in the international trade agenda,23 1 while the international
226. For a concise discussion of the WIPO Development Agenda, see MAY, supra note 223,
at 76-82.
227. See sources cited supra notes 1-2.
228. See Susan Sell, Intellectual Property and Public Policy in Historical Perspective:
Contestation and Settlement, 38 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 267 (2004) (discussing the repeated process
of contestation and settlement in the intellectual property arena); Yu, Currents and
Crosscurrents, supra note 127, at 328 (noting that the international intellectual property regime
is the product of repeated interactions between an evolving set of currents and crosscurrents).
229. Sylvia Ostry, WTO Membership for China: To Be or Not to Be-Is that the Answer, in
CHINA AND THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: ENTERING THE NEW MILLENNIUM 31,38 (Deborah Z.
Cass, Brett G. Williams & George Barker eds., 2003).
230. Cf OXFAM INTERNATIONAL, PATENTS VERSUS PATIENTS: FIvE YEARS AFTER THE DOHA
DECLARATION 1 (2006), http://www.oxfamamerica.org/newsandpublications/publications/
briefing_papers/patents_patients/Doha5_Finalpaper_101106_2.pdf (noting that "little has
changed" since the Doha Declaration).
231. See Abbott, WTO Medicines Decision, supra note 160, at 327 ("Developing as well as
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community had been paying growing attention to the human rights implications of
intellectual property protection.232 As the United States' rhetoric was weakened
following the "suggestion" of some of its officials and politicians to use compulsory
licenses as a response to high drug prices during the post-9/11 anthrax attacks,233 the
political climate became very favorable to less developed countries. In the Fourth
WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar, less developed countries pushed for the
adoption of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
"sen[ding] a clear message that they would take steps to protect and advance their
essential interests."234 The first two paragraphs of the Declaration explicitly
"recognize[d] the gravity of the public health problems afflicting many developing and
least-developed countries, especially those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis,
malaria and other epidemics... [and] the need for the [TRIPs Agreement] to be part of
the wider national and international action to address these problems."
235
In addition, the Declaration extended the deadline for least developed countries to
protect pharmaceuticals to January 1, 2016.236 The Declaration also noted affirmatively
that the TRIPs Agreement "can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner
supportive of WTO members' right to protect public health and, in particular, to
promote access to medicines for all., 237 Finally, paragraph 5 of the Declaration
underscored the various "flexibilities" reserved for all WTO members under the TRIPs
Agreement, which include the following:
(a) In applying the customary rules of interpretation of public international law,
each provision of the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the
object and purpose of the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its
objectives and principles.
(b) Each Member has the right to grant compulsory licences and the freedom to
determine the grounds upon which such licences are granted.
(c) Each Member has the right to determine what constitutes a national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being understood
that public health crises, including those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis,
malaria and other epidemics, can represent a national emergency or other
circumstances of extreme urgency.
(d) The effect of the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement that are relevant to the
exhaustion of intellectual property rights is to leave each Member free to
establish its own regime for such exhaustion without challenge, subject to the
MFN and national treatment provisions of Articles 3 and 4.238
developed countries had interests in items on the Cancin agenda[, and] ... failure to reach an
agreement on public health would virtually ensure a lack of progress on other matters."); id. at
349 (explaining why the United States made concession at the Doha Round).
232. See discussion supra Part II.C.
233. See Halbert, supra note 17, at 280 ("Because of the anthrax controversy, Doha proved
to be more successful for the developing world than it otherwise would have been.").
234. F.M. ABBOTT, LEGAL OPTIOrNS FOR IMPLEMENTING PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE MINISTERIAL
DECLARATION ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND PUBLIC HEALTH (2002) (on file with author).






The only unresolved issue concerning the lack of access to essential medicines in
less developed countries was how to address the lack of an indigenous capacity to
manufacture pharmaceuticals. Although paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration
"recognized that WTO Members with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the
pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory
licensing under the TRIPS Agreement," it merely instructed the TRIPs Council to
devise an "expeditious solution."
239
B. August 30 Decision
In August 2003, the TRIPs Council issued a decision granting interim waivers to
member states that lack an indigenous manufacturing capacity, as well as those that
have insufficient capacity to cope with unforeseen situations of national emergency.
240
These interim waivers allowed the WTO member states to suspend Article 31 (f) of the
TRIPs Agreement while they negotiated for a permanent solution, which was not
formally proposed until more than two years later. Following the August 30 Decision,
the United States, the European Communities, and other developed countries opted out
of the system by declaring that they would not use the waivers as importers, while other
higher-income countries have stated that they would only use these waivers "in
situations of national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.,
24 1
The statement by the latter group of countries is especially important. On the one
hand, it indicated that the waivers covered not only "situations of national emergency
or other circumstances of extreme urgency,, 242 but also other situations in which a
WTO member state lacked access to essential medicines. Pursuant to the Doha
Declaration, member states are free to determine for themselves what constitutes a
national emergency or urgency. 243 On the other hand, the opt-out declarations reminded
us that the access-to-medicines problem was not limited to less developed countries.
Indeed, as demonstrated by the concerns about the high prices of ciprofloxacin
following the anthrax attacks in the United States 244 and the potential inadequate
supply of Tamiflu in the event of an outbreak of the avian flu pandemic, 245 even
developed countries can suffer from temporarily insufficient manufacturing capacity in
unforeseen situations of national emergency.246 When such situations arise, the
arguments offered by developed countries will be similar to those made by less
developed countries under more widespread public health crises. 247 Ironically, the
239. Id. 6.
240. August 30 Decision, supra note 11.
241. Chairperson's Statement, supra note 68.
242. Id
243. Doha Declaration, supra note 13, 5(c).
244. See Halbert, supra note 17, at 280.
245. Manning, supra note 16.
246. See Abbott, WTO Medicines Decision, supra note 160, at 334 ("No country is immune
from public health problems or insulated from the need for affordable medicines. No country is
self-sufficient in the sense of producing the full range of medicines used in its health system.").
247. See, e.g., Halbert, supra note 17, at 280 ("The U.S. lost significant international
legitimacy when the overwhelming hypocrisy of its own efforts regarding anthrax were
juxtaposed against the efforts of developing countries to secure cheap access to AIDS drugs.");
Susan K. Sell, TRIPS and the Access to Medicines Campaign, 20 Wis. INT'L L.J. 481, 515-16
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availability of generic production in less developed countries may even help alleviate
such temporary shortages in the developed world,248 especially if a similar outbreak
does not arise in the source countries.
To the disappointment of less developed countries and their supporting
intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, the chair of the General
Council issued a controversial statement along with the decision, partly as a
compromise to induce agreement from the United States and other developed
countries. 249 To prevent countries from using the August 30 decision "to promote
national champions in the pharmaceutical sector,, 250 the Chairperson's Statement
(2002) (noting that the series of events surrounding the United States' response to high drug
prices during the anthrax attacks "caught the attention of the access campaign and developing
country negotiators, and was on everybody's minds at Doha"); 't Hoen, supra note 14, at 43
("The anthrax scare and the threatened shortage of Cipro forced all WTO Members to ask how
much of a prisoner they want to be of their own patent systems."); Jose Marcos Nogueira Viana,
Intellectual Property Rights, the World Trade Organization and Public Health: The Brazilian
Perspective, 17 CONN. J. INT'L L. 311, 313 (2002) ("U.S. and Canadian approaches to the
anthrax scare is precisely what the Brazilian government has been doing over the past two years
in response to HIV/AIDS.").
To be fair, one could distinguish the United States' response in the anthrax case from the
request for compulsory licensing by less developed countries in two respects. First, as the
industry has noted, the United States' response may be better characterized "as an exception,
rather than a precedent." Ragavan, Jekyll andHyde Story, supra note 79, at 816 (quoting Robert
Armitage, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Eli Lilly, Address at the "Patent Law,
Social Policy, and Public Interest: The Search for a Balanced System" Symposium at Benjamin
N. Cardozo School of Law (Nov. 7, 2002)). Even if granted, it is short-term by nature and does
not constitute a general long-term compulsory license. Second, in a challenge by Bayer and
other pharmaceutical companies, courts may strike down the government's proposal, even if
implemented. Nevertheless, the hypocritical tone of the United States' proposal has greatly
weakened its rhetoric in international fora. See sources cited supra.
248. See Ragavan, The Jekyll and Hyde Story, supra note 79, at 811 (noting that Canada
bought ciprofloxacin from a local generic drug manufacturer).
249. Chairperson's Statement, supra note 68; see also Roffe, supra note 31, at 24
(discussing the criticism of the Chairperson's Statement).
250. Roffe, supra note 31, at 20; see also Communication from the United States, Comments
on Implementation of the 30 August 2003 Agreement (Solution) on the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health, 12, IP/C/W/444 (Mar. 18, 2005) ("It is certain that the [Paragraph 6] solution
would not have been reached without the Chairman's Statement."). Some countries, however,
disagreed with the impact of the Chairperson's Statement. As Rwanda declared:
With regard to the Chairman's statement, it is important to understand the
circumstances in which the statement came into being, so that we can put this
statement in its proper context. The reading of the Chairman's statement, when the
Decision was adopted, was more of an attempt to provide comfort language to
assuage the concerns of some pharmaceutical industries that generic manufacturers
would gain a strong foothold in the pharmaceutical market. During the informal
TRIPS Council meetings, some developing and least-developed countries'
delegates had expressed their reservations over the content of the statement, a clear
indication that this statement was never intended to form any part of the permanent
solution.
The main reason why those countries with reservations agreed to go along with
the Chairman's statement was because they felt an urgent need to make a
contribution to the success of the Cancin Ministerial Conference. WTO Members
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declared that the system "should be used in good faith to protect public health and...
not be an instrument to pursue industrial or commercial policy objectives., 25' The
statement also maintained that "Members recognize that the purpose of the Decision
would be defeated if products supplied under this Decision are diverted from the
markets for which they are intended" and that "all reasonable measures should be taken
to prevent such diversion in accordance with the relevant paragraphs of the
Decision.
252
Taken together, the August 30 Decision and the Chairperson's Statement have
received mixed reactions from commentators. 253 For example, commentators have
criticized the interim waivers for being "unduly cumbersome and complex," citing lack
of usage in their more than three years of existence. 254 Other criticisms included their
lack of legal authority,255 their failure to address the transfer of pharmaceutical
technology to less developed countries, 25 6 and their inability to "prevent a private party
from blocking the exportation or importation of drugs, if the national laws do not
may recall that there was a strong feeling at that time that a solution, even if it was
an interim solution, had to be concluded before the Cancfin meeting so that the
meeting could focus on other issues and thus have a better chance of success. It
was felt by all that a Chairman's statement would help facilitate the quick
conclusion to the interim solution. But it was also the understanding that this
would only be for an interim solution, and that a permanent solution would require
more careful consideration, taking into account all the aspects, including how the
mechanism chosen could be operationalized in practice.
Communication from Rwanda on Behalf of the African Group, The TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health, 10-11, IP/C/W/445 (Apr. 6, 2005).
251. Chairperson's Statement, supra note 68.
252. Id.
253. See Roffe, supra note 31, at 22-24 (discussing the reactions to the August 30 Decision).
254. Timmermans, supra note 24, at 45; accord CARLOS M. CORREA, RECENT
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AREA OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 4 (2003),
http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/bellagio/docs/Correa Bellagio2.pdf [hereinafter CORREA,
RECENT INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS] ("The adopted 'solution' is so cumbersome for
potential suppliers that they will be hardly encouraged to use the Decision, 'because it is so
designed that no generic manufacturer would be able or willing to comply with its provisions."'
(footnote omitted) (quoting D. G. Shah, Indian Pharmaceutical Alliance)); K.M. Gopakumar,
The WTO Deal on Cheap Drugs: A Critique, 7 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 99 (2004).
255. Halbert, supra note 17, at 280 ("Because [the Doha Declaration] is not an amendment
to TRIPS, the declaration only has moral force."). But see M. Gregg Bloche, WTO Deference to
National Health Policy: Toward an Interpretive Principle, 5 J. INT'L ECON. L. 825, 842 (2002)
("More plausibly, the Doha Declaration has interpretive weight under the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, as either a 'subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the
interpretation' of TRIPS or 'subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation'." (footnote omitted)
(quoting Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.39/27)); Sykes, supra note 46, at 54 ("[T]he Doha Declaration is primarily interpretive
of imprecise obligations in TRIPS, and does not appear to contradict any textual provision. As
such, it is likely to be persuasive authority in the interpretation of TRIPS in the event of a
dispute."). This issue may become moot once Article 31bis makes the interim waivers
permanent.
256. M. Rafiqul Islam, The General Drug Deal of the WTO from Doha to Cancun: A
Peripheral Response to a Perennial Conundrum, 7 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 675 (2004).
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specifically permit such exports or imports under compulsory licenses. 257
Nevertheless, the waivers, on balance, represented a promising first step in focusing
attention on the public health crises in less developed countries and in reclaiming some
218
of their lost policy space.
C. Paragraph 6 Solution
Since the August 30 Decision, the TRIPs Council had been actively exploring a
permanent replacement for the temporary waivers, as required by Paragraph 6 of the
Doha Declaration. Paragraph 11 of the August 30 Decision stated that "[tihis Decision,
including the waivers granted in it, shall terminate for each Member on the date on
which an amendment to the TRIPS Agreement replacing its provisions takes effect for
that Member., 25 9 In light of the opportunity to reclaim their lost policy space, less
developed countries and their supporting intergovermental and nongovernmental
organizations actively advanced proposed templates for this "permanent solution,"
while developed countries offered alternative templates to protect the interests of their
nationals and exporting industries.
Among the contentious issues in this "battle of templates" were the scope of
diseases, the members' eligibility for the benefit of the solution, and the choice of the
TRIPs provision that would be used to implement the permanent solution. 260 Other
issues that were discussed and negotiated included the definition of the
"pharmaceutical sector," 261 protection against trade diversion and abuse,262 the ability
257. CORREA, RECENT INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 254, at 3 (emphasis
omitted).
258. But see Sykes, supra note 46, at 68 ("A lack of credible patent rights for
pharmaceuticals in the developing world may do far more harm in the long run than their
absence can accomplish in the short run."). For a response to Professor Sykes, see Cotter, supra
note 91.
259. August 30 Decision, supra note 11, 111.
260. For a discussion of the various proposals, see generally Note by the Secretariat,
Proposals on Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health: Thematic Compilation, IP/C/W/363 (July 11,2002); Abbott, WTO Medicines Decision,
supra note 160, at 327-43.
261. Compare African Group Proposal, supra note 14, T 6(b) ("[Tlhe phrase 'pharmaceutical
products' should [be] construed broadly in order to be meaningful, rather than narrowly in a
manner that would restrict it to only limited components of treatment or medicines.
'Pharmaceutical products' should be understood to include[] medicines, related technical
processes, and related technical equipment."), andCommunication from the Permanent Mission
of Brazil, Paragraph 6 of the Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, IP/C/W/355 (June 24, 2002) [hereinafter Brazil Proposal] (discussing the need for
access to medicines and "public health-related products"), with EC Proposal, supra note 160,
11 ("[T]he product scope is to be defined as pharmaceutical products needed to deal with
public health problems afflicting many developing and least-developed countries, especially
those resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics."), and Second
Communication fiom the United States, Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health, IP/C/W/358, 31 (July 9, 2002) [hereinafter U.S. Proposal]
(mentioning "patented pharmaceutical products").
262. EC Proposal, supra note 160, 13 (discussing the need to prevent trade diversion and
abuse); U.S. Proposal, supra note 261, 20 ("[W]e recommend that Members taking advantage
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to create economies of scale,263 the need for a moratorium on disputes over public
health-related remedies in countries with no or insufficient manufacturing capacity,
264
and the facilitation of technology transfer and technical assistance.265 The latter is
particularly important as a long-term solution to the access-to-medicines problem. As
the WHO Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health
stated, "[i]n the longer term, the development of innovative capacity for health research
in developing countries will be the most important determinant of their ability to
address their own need for appropriate health-care technologies.
266
Although the scope of diseases was not a major issue in the discussion leading to the
adoption of the proposed Article 31 bis, it was one of the more contentious issues in the
initial stage of this battle of templates.267 At the outset, less developed countries
considered it important to define the new provision "broadly [to] cover their present
and future public health needs. 268 While their immediate concerns were HIV/AIDS,
malaria, and tuberculosis, they sought recognition that the access-to-medicines problem
extended beyond the list of diseases identified in paragraph 1 of the Doha
Declaration.269 After all, from the standpoint of less developed countries, "[the] issue
of this proposal inform the TRIPs Council of actions taken under this mechanism. This will also
increase transparency and enable other Members to ensure that the medicines being exported
actually reach the intended country and are not diverted into other markets.").
263. See Brazil Proposal, supra note 261, 12 (noting the need to "consider establishing
economies of scale that would reduce costs of production and thus provide more affordable
prices for the beneficiary countries in situations, for instance, where domestic production in
small quantities from a compulsory licence for a particularly high-priced product may be
impractical or too costly").
264. See African Group Proposal, supra note 14, 6(g) ("There should be a comprehensive
moratorium on disputes against any Member that takes measures to address the international and
national health concerns in countries with insufficient or no manufacturing capacity.").
265. See id T 6(e) ("[T]he expeditious solution the TRIPS Council is required to find should
be part and parcel of a broader implementation of the TRIPS Agreement, taking into account the
objectives and principles set out in Articles 7 and 8, as well as Article 66.2 that deals
specifically with least developed Members."); Brazil Proposal, supra note 261, 20 ("[T]he
TRIPS Council should also consider measures under Article 66.2 of the TRIPS Agreement in
order to encourage the transfer of technology to least developed countries in order to strengthen
local manufacturing capacities in their territories.").
266. COMM'N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INNOVATION AND PUB. HEALTH, WHO, PUBLIC
HEALTH, INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 141 (2006), available at
http://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/documents/thereport/ENPublicHealthReport.pdf.
267. Abbott, WTO Medicines Decision, supra note 160, at 327 ("The so-called scope-of-
diseases issue was the most contentious.").
268. Id. at 328.
269. See Communication from Kenya, Elements of a Paragraph 6 Solution, IP/C/W/389, 4
(Nov. 14, 2002) [hereinafter Kenya Proposal] ("The position of the African Group is to retain
the expression 'pharmaceutical sector' as used in the Declaration, while at the same time
explicitly agreeing that the expression should be broadly construed in a manner that gives
efficacy to the solution and in accordance with the right of Members to take measures to protect
public health as highlighted in the Declaration."); Communication from the United Arab
Emirates, Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration of the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health,
IP/C/W/354, 9 (June 24, 2002) [hereinafter UAE Proposal] ("The Doha Declaration does not
refer just to situations that relate to serious health problems like malaria, HIV/AIDS,
tuberculosis, which are certainly very serious problems, but it relates also to all other public
health policy problems.").
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had been resolved at Doha by the adoption of a broadly framed declaration... [and
any] attempts to limit the solution to particular diseases [would] amount[] to an effort
to rewrite the Doha Declaration.,
270
Meanwhile, the United States feared that less developed countries with
manufacturing capacity, like Brazil and India, might use the new provision to export
drugs that were not intended to be covered by the Doha Declaration, such as lifestyle
drugs like Viagra. 271 The United States, therefore, embraced a restrictive approach that
sought to limit the list to only a few identified diseases. From the standpoint of
developed countries, it is important to limit the number of diseases that are subject to a
compulsory license, because that number will affect the amount of patented
technologies that will be used without the patent holder's authorization while
increasing the industry's risk of loss of revenues.
272
The second contentious issue concerned the eligibility of countries for the
importation of pharmaceuticals under a compulsory license. Although all countries
agreed to make the solution available to the least developed countries, it was uncertain
whether other WTO members would be eligible for the Paragraph 6 solution. The
European Communities, for example, wanted to include only less developed countries,
"focusing especially on least developed country Members and low income Members,
with no or insufficient domestic manufacturing capacity, or, in case that product is
patented in that Member, no or insufficient manufacturing capacity other than that of
the patent holder of the product in that Member., 273 To avoid disputes, the United
States preferred to "establish a procedure to clarify which developing country
Members can be considered to have insufficient or no manufacturing capacity in the




Meanwhile, many less developed countries did not want any limitation at all,
275
while others favored the lack of distinction between developing and least developed
countries.276 The African Group went even further to propose that "where a request is
270. Abbott, WTO Medicines Decision, supra note 160, at 328.
271. See id. (noting "the U.S. argument that developing countries such as India and Brazil
intended to use the negotiations to promote the export of lifestyle drugs such as Viagra"). To
alleviate the United States' concern, "developing country delegations and NGOs suggested the
inclusion of negative lists to exclude such drugs, but these proposals were not taken up." Id.
272. Id. at 329.
273. EC Proposal, supra note 160, 12.
274. U.S. Proposal, supra note 261, 12.
275. As Brazil noted in its proposal:
Any WTO Member could face difficulties in making effective use of compulsory
licences due to insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical
sector. Therefore, the solution to be considered by the TRIPS Council needs not
and should not be limited to a specific category of countries-although developing
countries, in particular least-developed countries, might figure among its main
beneficiaries.
Brazil Proposal, supra note 261, 4; accord Kenya Proposal, supra note 269, 7 ("The African
Group believes that all Members should be eligible as importers, on the understanding that they
will use the solution only when they need it, that is, in cases where they lack or have insufficient
manufacturing capacity.").
276. UAE Proposal, supra note 269, 11 ("Any solution under the Doha Declaration should




properly made under the solution, there should be an obligation on the requested
Member to take all measures necessary for the production and exportation to be
speedily accomplished." '277 Amidst the negotiation, tension developed among the less
developed countries-between countries that have manufacturing capacity, like India
and Brazil, and those that do not but want to increase local production capacity, like
those in the African group.27 8 Instead, the latter "believe[d] that the ultimate solution to
the paragraph 6 problem [wa]s to build domestic manufacturing capacity and that this
should be explicitly agreed and mentioned in the solution." 279 Fortunately for the less
developed world, the two groups of countries were able to set aside their differences
and joined together to battle the developed countries-perhaps because the African
Group realized that, for the foreseeable future, its members would continue to import
new drugs from Brazil, China, and India even if they sought to develop their
production capacity.
28 0
The last issue concerned whether the WTO member states would amend Article 30
or 31 (f) of the TRIPs Agreement. 28 1 During the TRIPs Council meeting in March 2002,
four basic options were put on the table:
(i) an authoritative interpretation based on Article 30;
(ii) an amendment to Article 31 in order to overcome the restriction, under
Article 3 1(f), to the possibility to export products manufactured and/or sold
under a compulsory licence;
(iii) a dispute settlement moratorium with regard to the non-respect of the
restriction under Article 31 (f); or
(iv) a waiver with regard to Article 31(f). 28 2
Initially, less developed countries, the World Health Organization, and
nongovernmental organizations, favored a modification of Article 30,283 partly due to
their concerns about potential bureaucratic delay caused by cumbersome compulsory
licensing procedures. 284 To provide "the most comprehensive approach to solving the
277. Kenya Proposal, supra note 269, T 9 (emphasis added).
278. Abbott, WTO Medicines Decision, supra note 160, at 334.
279. Kenya Proposal, supra note 269, 9 15(a).
280. Abbott, WTO Medicines Decision, supra note 160, at 334.
281. It is important to note, however, that regardless of which article was amended, "[t]he
article 31 (f) restriction on exports does not apply when a compulsory license is issued to remedy
an anticompetitive practice." Id. at 319.
282. EC Proposal, supra note 160, 2.
283. See Brazil Proposal, supra note 261,1 8 ("Article 30 of TRIPS should be interpreted so
as to recognize the fight of WTO Members to authorize third parties to make, sell and export
patented public health-related products without the consent of the patent holder to address
public health needs in another country." (footnote omitted)).
284. See id. $ 10 ("An authoritative interpretation of Article 30 of TRIPS would have the
major advantage of avoiding burdensome procedures related to the grant of compulsory licences
in the exporting country."); accord Kenya Proposal, supra note 269, 99 10-11 ("Any objective
criteria should not be a way of imposing cumbersome domestic pre-conditions for using the
solution, and should not limit the existing rights of Members to protect public health in any
circumstances. ... The mechanisms that a Member uses for establishing that this situation
exists, should be left to the Member itself."); see also Abbott, WTO Medicines Decision, supra
note 160, at 339 ("From the standpoint of many developing countries, NGOs, and the WHO, a
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problem, 2 85 the African Group also proposed to modify Article 31 in addition to
Article 30, while the United Arab Emirates favored the modification of Article 31 but
proposed the interpretation of Article 30 as "an alternative option."286 Meanwhile, the
United States preferred a modification of Article 31 only, and the European
Communities soon sided with the United States, 287 perhaps "because they concluded
that the United States would never accept an Article 30-based solution." 88 Less
developed countries eventually yielded to their demands, perhaps because the United
States was unlikely to change its position and other issues were far more important than
the modification of Article 30.
D. Proposed Article 31bis
On December 6, 2005, shortly before the Hong Kong Ministerial, WTO member
states agreed to accept a protocol of amendment to the TRIPs Agreement, making
permanent the interim waivers granted in the August 30 Decision.289 Embodied in the
proposed Article 31bis, along with an annex and an appendix to the annex, the
amendment lays out conditions under which countries can suspend Article 31 (f) of the
TRIPs Agreement. If ratified before December 1, 2007, the proposed provision will
enter into effect. 290 Because the proposal represented the first amendment of a core
WTO agreement, this Section examines in detail this proposed provision.
Article 31 bis(1) provides that "[t]he obligations of an exporting Member under
Article 31 (f) shall not apply with respect to the grant by it of a compulsory licence to
the extent necessary for the purposes ofproduction of a pharmaceutical product(s) and
solution based on Article 30 would have the major advantage of avoiding the need for a
compulsory licensing procedure in the country of export."). James Love, for example, has noted
that compulsory licensing provisions in practice in many less developed countries are quite
different from those that are in theory. As he explained:
Existing compulsory licensing laws are often a barrier to access. The standards for
issuing compulsory licences may rely excessively upon narrow grounds, such as
non-working or difficult-to-establish abuses, exhibit a lack of clarity regarding
public policy objectives, or invite litigation over factual issues or legal standards.
This has caused some governments to delay or reject requests for compulsory
licences despite enormous problems over access to patented medicines.
Love, supra note 42, at 241, 242; see also Scherer & Watal, supra note 18, at 924 ("The longer
the issuance of compulsory licenses is delayed after patented drugs enter the marketplace, the
less time licensees have to recover their start-up costs and the more difficult it is to achieve
effective competition among multiple generic substitute suppliers.").
285. Abbott, WTO Medicines Decision, supra note 160, at 340.
286. See UAE Proposal, supra note 269, 17.
287. See EC Proposal, supra note 160, 5 ("The addition of... a new paragraph to Article
31 of the TRIPS Agreement offers the best guarantees for a sustainable, balanced and workable
solution to the problem raised under paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration.").
288. Abbott, WTO Medicines Decision, supra note 160, at 340.
289. See WTO Press Release, supra note 10.
290. The temporary waivers will remain in force until two-thirds of the WTO membership
ratifies the proposed Article 31 bis of the TRIPs Agreement. See December 6 Decision, supra
note 9. As of April 5, 2007, only seven countries (United States, Switzerland, El Salvador,
South Korea, Norway, India, and Philippines) have ratified the proposed amendment. WTO,
Countries Accepting Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, http://www.wto.org/english/
tratope/trips-e/amendment_e.htm (Apr. 5, 2007).
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its export to an eligible importing Member(s)., 291 This provision uses the phrase "to
the extent necessary" to reflect the limited circumstances under which the provision
should be used, and thereby reminds member states that the provision "should be used
in good faith to protect public health and.., not be an instrument to pursue industrial
or commercial policy objectives. 292
Article 3 1 bis(2) sets out the parameters for remuneration to the patent holders.293
The provision first states that adequate remuneration will be paid in the exporting
member state "taking into account the economic value" to the importing member state
of the authorized use.294 It then discusses the situation in which compulsory licenses
exist in both the importing and exporting countries. To avoid double remuneration in
that situation, the provision will exempt the importing country from paying
remuneration if a compulsory license has already been paid for in the exporting
country.
295
Article 31 bis(3) extends the coverage of the provision to countries belonging to a
regional trade agreement. 296 As Part I discussed, market aggregation of various less
developed countries may be needed to generate enough purchasing power to make the
development of an indigenous pharmaceutical industry attractive. By allowing products
produced or imported under a compulsory license to be exported to other less
developed countries through a regional trade agreement, the provision, therefore, will
help "harness[] economies of scale for the purposes of enhancing purchasing power
for, and facilitating the local production of, pharmaceutical products." 297 It also paves
the way for the creation of regional supply centers,298 "the development of systems
providing for the grant of regional patents," and the provision of technical
cooperation.
29 9
It should be noted, however, that the provision limits its benefits to African
countries, as it specifically requires that at least half of the membership of the regional
agreement in question be least developed countries. While it is troubling that the
provision excludes countries in Asia and South America that are facing equally serious
public health crises 300 the limitation is partly a legacy of the August 30 Decision30' and
291. General Council, Protocol Amending the TRIPSAgreement, in December 6 Decision,
supra note 9, art. 31 bis(l) [hereinafter TRIPs Amendment].
292. Chairperson's Statement, supra note 68.
293. TRIPs Amendment, supra note 291, art. 31 bis(2).
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. art. 31bis(3).
297. Id.
298. See Jerome H. Reichman, Remarks at "Saving Profits, Saving Lives: A Comprehensive
Discussion of the Social, Legal, and Economic Implications of Reverse Engineering and Parallel
Importing on the Pharmaceutical Industry" Symposium at the University of North Carolina
School of Law (Feb. 25, 2006) (exploring the prospects of creating regional pharmaceutical
supply centers using a compulsory license permitted under the proposed Article 31 bis of the
TRIPs Agreement).
299. TRIPs Amendment, supra note 291, annex 5.
300. See Abbott, WTO Medicines Decision, supra note 160, at 345 n.202 ('Te restriction of
regional flexibility to Africa is not easy to explain from the standpoint of regions such as the
Caribbean, Central America, and East Asia, where there are very serious public health problems
and limited pharmaceutical-manufacturing capacity."); id. at 331 (noting that United States
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partly reflects the United States' earlier failed attempts to limit the Doha Declaration
and the paragraph 6 solution to the African continent-perhaps due to concerns about
the generic manufacturing capacity in Argentina, Brazil, China, India, and Thailand.
Article 31 bis(3) also specifically mentions Article XXIV of the GATT 02 and the
Decision of 28 November 1979 on Differential and More Favourable Treatment,
Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries.30 3 Notwithstanding these
explicit acknowledgements, the provision does not resolve the growing debate about
whether the benefits of bilateral and regional trade agreements signed by WTO
members would be extended to all members through the most favored nation treatment
as stated in Article 4 of the TRIPs Agreement.3 4 While some commentators have cited
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to illustrate that Article XXIV of
the GATT has made a special exception for the establishment of trade agreements,
others have suggested that obligations created by those agreements will be extended
not just to the relevant parties, but to all WTO member states.30 5
Article 31 bis(4) prohibits members from initiating non-violation complaints over
measures enacted to implement this amendment.306 This prohibition is particularly
Trade Representative Robert Zoellick indicated in a ministerial meeting in Tokyo that "the
United States might be willing to concede on the scope of diseases if the [paragraph 6] solution
were limited to Africa"). It is important to note that Brazil specifically stated the importance of
economies of scale in its proposal on behalf of less developed countries in South America and
Asia. As the proposal stated:
Members should bear in mind that legal solutions based on Article 30 will be best
achieved if grounded in economic solutions. In many situations, a public health
problem might affect more than a single country (as in the case of-but not limited
to-HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and several tropical diseases). Therefore, in
implementing such solutions, countries may consider establishing economies of
scale that would reduce costs of production and thus provide more affordable
prices for the beneficiary countries in situations, for instance, where domestic
production in small quantities from a compulsory licence for a particularly high-
priced product may be impractical or too costly.
Brazil Proposal, supra note 261, 12.
301. See August 30 Decision, supra note 11, 1 6(i).
302. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXIV, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55
U.N.T.S. 188 [hereinafter GATT].
303. Differential and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of
Developing Countries, Nov. 28, 1979, GAT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 203 (1980).
304. See JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS:
INNOVATION POLICY ISSUES CRS-21 (2005), http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs//data/
2005/upl-meta-crs-8252/RL33205_2005Dec2 1.pdf.
305. Compare Judy Rein, International Governance Through Trade Agreements: Patent
Protection for Essential Medicines, 21 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 379, 382 (2001) ("The exception
provided within the GATT, permitting customs unions and free trade areas, will probably be
applied to World Trade Organization ("WTO") agreements."), with Abbott, WTO Medicines
Decision, supra note 160, at 357 n.286 ("It may at least be worth exploring whether some
developing country generic producers may be suffering de facto MFN discrimination by
importing members of FTAs as a consequence of the new FTA rules, which may effectively
grant preferences to originator companies principally based in a few WTO members.").
306. TRIPs Amendment, supra note 291, art. 31bis(4) ("Members shall not challenge any
measures taken in conformity with the provisions of this Article and the Annex to this




important because the threat of being targeted with non-violation complaints remains
an important issue for less developed countries in the public health area. 30 7 Given the
limited resources and legal expertise in these countries, 308 the fear of becoming the
target of such a complaint may create a chilling effect, further hindering their ability to
develop policies to address the access-to-medicines problems within their borders.
At the end of the protocol is a proposed annex to the TRIPs Agreement, which
"set[s] out terms for using the system, and cover[s] such issues as definitions,
notification, avoiding the pharmaceuticals being diverted to the wrong markets,
developing regional systems to allow economies of scale, and annual reviews in the
TRIPs Council. 30 9 Paragraph 1(a) expands the term "pharmaceutical product" to cover
"active ingredients necessary for [the] manufacture [of the pharmaceutical product] and
diagnostic kits needed for its use."3 10 Paragraph 1(b) limits country eligibility to "any
least-developed country Member, and any other Member that has made a notification
to the TRIPs Council of its intention to use the system set out in Article 3 Ibis and this
Annex... as an importer., 311 It remains interesting to see whether countries that had
already opted out of the August 30 Decision would be able to opt in should unforeseen
situations of national emergency arise.312 Finally, to reduce the risk of trade diversion
of imported pharmaceutical products under the compulsory license, paragraph 3
requires the importing countries to "take reasonable measures within their means,
proportionate to their administrative capacities and to the risk of trade diversion to
prevent re-exportation of the products that have actually been imported into their
territories under the system."
313
The document concludes with a proposed appendix to the annex to the TRIPs
Agreement, detailing ways to factually establish the absence or insufficiency of
manufacturing capacity314 as required under paragraph 2 of the Annex, which sets out
In a nonviolation nullification or impairment action, a member does not seek to
challenge the conformity of another member's measures or actions with the terms
of the relevant agreement (e.g., GATT 1994), but contends that the measures or
actions adversely affect the benefits it expected to receive based on a negotiated
exchange of concessions.
Abbott, WTO Medicines Decision, supra note 160, at 346 n.209.
307. See Abbott, Cycle ofAction, supra note 15, at 35 ("Apart from dealing with the FTA
problem, resolution of the non-violation question may be the most important single item on the
WTO agenda from a TRIPS and public health standpoint.") (citation omitted); Dreyfuss &
Lowenfeld, supra note 172, at 285-88 (discussing non-violation complaints).
308. Dreyfuss, TRIPS-RoundlI, supra note 2, at 25 ("[I]t requires either that a country have
experience with intellectual property protection or sufficient human capital (in the form of legal
talent) to codify wiggles into law. Many developing countries lack both."); Gregory Shaffer,
Recognizing Public Goods in WTO Dispute Settlement: Who Participates? Who Decides? The
Case of TRIPS and Pharmaceutical Patent Protection, 7 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 459, 473-76 (2004)
(discussing the limited legal expertise in less developed countries).
309. WTO Press Release, supra note 10.
310. TRIPs Amendment, supra note 291, annex l(a).
311. Id. 1(b).
312. Commentators remain divided on the issue. Frederick Abbott, for example, has
suggested that "countries opting out directly in the text of the Decision are not free to modify
their status, as contrasted with those that merely stated their intention to the General Council."
Abbott, WTO Medicines Decision, supra note 160, at 336 n. 130.
313. TRIPs Amendment, supra note 291, annex 3.
314. Id. annex app.
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the terms for importing and exporting countries to notify the TRIPs Council regarding
their use of a compulsory license.3 15 Although no approval is required and the
notification requirement seems to be introduced to promote transparency, 316 paragraph
2 requires a confirmation that "the eligible importing Member in question, other than a
least-developed country Member, has established that it has insufficient or no
manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector for the product(s) in question in
one of the ways set out in the Appendix to this Annex." 317 This confirmation is likely to
be problematic, costly, and burdensome for many less developed countries.3 8 The fact
that the notification may be subject to the WTO dispute settlement process also may
deter some less developed countries from taking full advantage of these provisions.
319
315. Id. annex 2.
316. As the European Communities noted, transparency is very important to rights holders
and the exporting countries:
The application of the proposed exception would lead to the specific situation that
a product sold in one country (in certain cases pursuant to a compulsory licence)
would have been produced in another country under a compulsory licence. One
would indeed have to deal with a special situation where patent protected products
would cross the borders while covered by compulsory licences in both the country
of production and the country of consumption (except in those cases where the
product in question is not patented in the country of consumption). In view of this
situation it will be of paramount importance to ensure full transparency of the
process and to ensure that the patent holder(s) and other WTO Members remain
fully informed of the steps undertaken in view of granting the authorization.
Furthermore, transparency would also contribute to preventing trade diversion: by
being informed of the use of the exception, other Members will be able to increase
their vigilance with regard to possible (re)importation of the products concerned.
EC Proposal, supra note 160, 15.
317. TRIPs Amendment, supra note 291, annex 2(a)(ii).
318. See Jorge A.Z. Bermudez, Maria Auxiliadora Oliveira & Gabriela Costa Chaves,
Intellectual Property in the Context of the WTO TRIPS Agreement: What Is at Stake?, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE WTO TRIPS AGREEMENT: CHALLENGES FOR
PUBLIC HEALTH 23,56 (Jorge A. Z. Bermudez & Maria Auxiliadora Oliveira eds., 2004) ("Poor
countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America have to go through unnecessary red tape to prove
that they do not have manufacturing capacity"), available at http://www.who.int/
intellectualproperty/submissions/Tripsingles%20nova%2Oversao%202005.pdf; see also
Abbott, WTO Medicines Decision, supra note 160, at 353 ("Ambiguous pharmaceutical-related
rules raise serious problems when procurement officials try to do their work"). James Love of
Knowledge Ecology International (formerly the Consumer Project of Technology) has even
compared Article 31bis to the Appendix to the Berne Convention, which has been largely
unused by less developed countries due to its cumbersome requirements. Interview with James
Love, Director, Knowledge Ecology International, in Durham, N.C. (Feb. 25, 2006); see also
RUTH L. OKEDI, FOSTERING ACCESS TO EDUCATION, RESEARCH AND DISSEMINATION OF
KNOWLEDGE THROUGH COPYRIGHT 9-10 (2005), http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/bellagio/
docs/Okideiji Bellagio4.pdf (discussing the cumbersome requirements of the Berne Appendix).
319. See U.S. Proposal, supra note 261, 29 ("Because a country would only have full legal
certainty after the conclusion of a dispute process-a situation that we would like to avoid-we
are concerned that an interpretation or amendment will not deliver the legal certainty and
security sought by many WTO Members"). But see Kenya Proposal, supra note 269, 21 ("The
African Group takes the view that notification should serve the purpose of information sharing
but must not constitute a notification obligation.").
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In sum, the proposed Article 31 bis, along with the annex and appendix to the annex,
was an apparent compromise between developed and less developed countries. It was
significantly different from the one-size-fits-all template for which the United States or
the European Communities has been pushing. While the less developed countries were
able to prevail on the scope-of-diseases and country eligibility issues, the United States
was successful in limiting the amendment to Article 31. Nevertheless, the proposed
amendment did not allow less developed countries to reclaim their lost policy space or
to roll back the recent expansion of intellectual property rights. Thus, if they are to
reclaim this lost space and to further resist the international enclosure movement, they
need to understand the root causes of the movement and devise strategies accordingly
to resist or even roll back the enclosure attempts.
IV. THE RECLAMATION OF POLICY SPACE
From the TRIPs Agreement to bilateral and regional trade agreements, developed
countries have been fairly successful in inducing their less developed trading partners
to adopt a rich-country intellectual property system despite their limited economic
development and technological capabilities. To understand why developed countries
were successful in enclosing the policy space of less developed countries, this Part
advances three explanations. First, this Part argues that the significant disparity in
power between developed and less developed countries has given the less-powerful
countries no choice but to adopt harmful rich-country transplants. Second, this Part
underscores the incentive-investment divide between national and foreign intellectual
property policies and explains how the linkage between trade and intellectual property
has caused policymakers to focus unduly on the protection of trade interests while
ignoring the importance in harnessing local conditions to promote innovation. Finally,
this Part shows that the transformation of the international intellectual property system
from a patchwork coordination system to a supranational, harmonized code forces
countries to adopt legal standards that ignore local economic, social, cultural, and
technological conditions. As intellectual property protection becomes increasingly
globalized, it spills over into other areas. A reexamination of the design of the
international intellectual property system is, therefore, in order. Following the
discussion of each explanation, this Part offers suggestions on how countries can
reform the international intellectual property system to preserve the autonomy needed
to tailor policies to local conditions and how less developed countries can reclaim their
lost policy space to facilitate greater access to essential medicines.
A. Power Asymmetry
More than ten years have passed since the establishment of the TRIPs Agreement.
By now, it is apparent that the power asymmetry in the international trading system has
been projected into the intellectual property arena. Just as IP-irrelevant factors affect
the access-to-medicines problem, TRIPs-irrelevant factors equally affect the
implementation of the TRIPs Agreement and the overall design of the existing
international intellectual property system.320 Although the international intellectual
property system initially focused on the differences between what would today be
320. Thanks to Debora Halbert for making this suggestion.
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considered developed countries, its nature changed as a large number of less developed
countries joined the system in the post-colonial era. As less developed countries
realized the hard way, the changes required by the TRIPs Agreement were not only
dramatic, but also went beyond just intellectual property to affect other areas, such as
agriculture, health, the environment, education, and culture.32 1 Even worse for less
developed countries, while they have to modify their intellectual property systems or
risk sanctions under the WTO, they are unable to use the WTO dispute settlement
process to change the behavior of their more powerful trading partners, like the
European Communities or the United States. The recent bilateral and regional trade
agreements initiated by the European Communities and the United States have also
forced less developed countries to ratchet up intellectual property protection even
though they have yet to successfully adjust to the heightened protection required by the
TRIPs Agreement.
Although commentators have described the TRIPs Agreement as "coercive, ' 322 it is
not as one-sided as many commentators have claimed, especially when viewed in the
international trade context.323 Indeed, despite commentary suggesting that some less
developed countries might have been ignorant of the importance of intellectual
property when they signed on to the TRIPs Agreement,324 there was sufficient evidence
to suggest that negotiators in those countries might have negotiated to the best of their
ability under the circumstances and considering the inequitable nature of the geo-
political system. Indeed, one could view the TRIPs Agreement as a complex bargain in
which each party obtained its preferred benefits.325 While developed countries received
stronger protection for intellectual property rights and a reduction in restrictions
against foreign direct investment, less developed countries obtained lower tariffs on
textiles and agriculture and protection, via the mandatory dispute settlement process,
against unilateral sanctions imposed by their more-powerful counterparts. To some
negotiators, the complete WTO package might provide a net gain to their countries,
even though the TRIPs Agreement was a loss.
From the international trade perspective, this bargain narrative makes a lot of sense.
Although intellectual property rules are technical, the negotiation of these rules "do[es]
not take place in isolation from other trade and finance negotiations. 326 Today, many
less developed countries remain "highly dependent on the developed countries as the
source of capital, whether it is provided through the IMF or World Bank, or through
investment bankers and securities exchanges." 327 As Peter Gerhart noted, "international
intellectual property regimes are not made through a search for the right balance
between incentives and access because the states that make the regime are not,
321. See Yu, Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 127, at 365.
322. See sources cited in Peter K. Yu, Toward a Nonzero-sum Approach to Resolving
Global Intellectual Property Disputes: What We Can Learn from Mediators, Business
Strategists, and International Relations Theorists, 70 U. IN. L. REv. 569, 580 n.70 (2002).
323. Yu, TRIPS andIts Discontents, supra note 193, at 374-75.
324. See id. at 375-76 (discussing the ignorance narrative of the TRIPs Agreement).
325. See id. at 371-73 (discussing the bargain narrative of the TRIPs Agreement).
326. Frederick Abbott, The Future oflPRs in the Multilateral Trading System, in TRADING IN
KNOWLEDGE, supra note 7, at 36, 43.
327. Id.; see also Roffe, supra note 3 1, at 15 ("[I]t may need substantial courage for a small




individually, looking for that balance in the international sphere. Each state is looking
for an international regime that reflects that state's interests.,
328
However, when the Agreement is viewed in the context of intellectual property
protection (or public health) alone, there is no denial that the TRIPs Agreement is
biased against less developed countries. The fact that it is not intentionally biased in
the international trade context does not reduce the seriousness and impact of its bias in
the intellectual property area. Neither is it helpful to note that the WTO package as a
whole provides a net gain to the country or that some sectors within the nation may
have benefited from the package. Without a transfer of payments from one sector to
another, gains in one sector will do nothing to alleviate the problems of those sectors
that have lost out, such as the generic manufacturers or the poor consumers who cannot
afford to pay higher drug prices. As Frederick Abbott noted:
The problem with ... using net economic gains or losses as the developing
country benchmark is that gains for a developing country's textile or agricultural
producers do not directly translate into higher public or private health
expenditures. Salaries for part of the workforce may increase and government tax
revenues may rise, and this may indirectly to help offset pharmaceutical price
increases. However, in order for the health sector not to be adversely affected,
there must be some type of transfer payment, whether in the form of increased
public health expenditures on pharmaceuticals, by providing health insurance
benefits, or other affirmative acts. In a world of economic scarcity, the prospect
that governments will act to offset increases in medicines prices with increased
public health expenditures is uncertain.
329
Moreover, some of the gains are more aspirational than empirically grounded.33 °
While the TRIPs Agreement requires less developed countries to strengthen
328. Peter M. Gerhart, Introduction: The Triangulation of International Intellectual
Property Law: Cooperation, Power, and Normative Welfare, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 1, 11-
12 (2004).
329. Abbott, Cycle ofAction, supra note 15, at 33 (citation omitted); see MUSuNGU & OH,
supra note 12, at xi ("[The] net gains analysis presumes that earnings in agriculture or other
sectors due to increased market access.., would automatically translate into ability to afford
higher priced medicines."); Gerhart, supra note 328, at 16 ("[W]hen we think of the welfare
aspects of intellectual property we normally do not think of the distributive dimension--that is,
we do not think about how the gains and losses from policy design are distributed."); see also
JACK DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 201 (2d ed. 2003)
("[B]ecause markets distribute the benefits of growth without regard to short-term
deprivations-those who suffer 'adjustment costs'-lost jobs, higher food prices, inferior health
care-acquire no special claim to a share of the collective benefits of efficient markets.").
330. As David McGowan noted about the current intellectual property debate:
It is easy for each side to poke holes in the other side's positions. It is hard for
either side to make an affirmative, instrumental case for their views. For this
reason, and because scholars favor consequentialist rhetoric, the debate often
consists of competing narratives that use hunches and conjectures to link the result
an author desires to the policy the author favors. Because the evidence in such
arguments is so weak, the legal endgame is to place the burden of proof on the
other side. Whoever has to prove the unprovable facts is likely to lose.
David McGowan, Copyright Nonconsequentialism, 69 Mo. L. REv. 1, 2 (2004); see also IPR
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 166 ("As the rules [of the intellectual property system]
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intellectual property protection, it guarantees the prospects of neither technical
assistance nor increased foreign investment from developed countries. As one
commentator noted, "to pass and enforce the laws that create the US$60 billion a year
obligation is a bound obligation; however, the implementation assistance and the
impact on investment and innovation are not."
331
Indeed, the lack of technical assistance in developing intellectual property laws that
are sensitive to local conditions, as well as the lack of indigenous expertise to do so,
have hurt less developed countries. Due to such a lack, less developed countries often
have to directly transplant the TRIPs requirements onto their domestic laws, and
exceptions that the Agreement does not mention explicitly are unlikely to find their
way to the intellectual property system. As Rochelle Dreyfuss pointed out in the case of
trade secret protection, "since TRIPS does not mention a right to reverse engineer
[which exists in the United States], transcription would create a level of protection
surpassing that found in the United States, where the right to copy is privileged.3 32 To
make matters worse, appeals by less developed countries for guidance and technical
assistance are often met by those having a different orientation, or even a different
agenda. 333 Even if the assistance represents a well-intentioned effort to assist in the use
of intellectual property laws to promote economic development, there is no guarantee
that the advisor understands the local conditions.
Legal transplants that are not tailored to local conditions are problematic for several
reasons. First, because of the differences in economic conditions, imitative capacity,
and research and development productivities, 334 an innovative model that works well in
developed countries often does not suit the needs and interests of less developed
countries.335 Unquestioned adoption may not only fail to result in greater innovative
efforts, industrial progress, and transfer of technology, but may also drain away the
resources needed for dealing with socio-economic and public health problems. Such
adoption might also exacerbate the dire economic plight of less developed countries by
allowing foreign rights holders to crush local industries through the threats of litigation,
or even actual litigation.
336
evolve, it is important that their actual and potential impact be properly understood if
policymaking is to be more firmly based on evidence, and less on preconceptions of the value or
otherwise of these rules to developing countries."); Penrose, supra note 112, at 772 (noting that
the arguments for and against the effect of a domestic patent system on invention and innovation
generally is "primarily 'testimony' and that "there are very little 'hard' empirical data").
331. J. Michael Finger, Introduction and Overview, in POOR PEOPLE'S KNOWLEDGE:
PROMOTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1, 4 (J. Michael Finger &
Philip Schuler eds., 2004), available at http://www.worldbank.org/research/PoorPeoples_
Knowledge.pdf.
332. Dreyfuss, TRIPS-RoundI, supra note 2, at 25.
333. Id. ("[T]he countries in a position to provide assistance do so on their own terms; that
is, they help implement highly protectionist regimes, without regard for the actual needs of
developing nations.").
334. Claudio R. Frischtak, Harmonization Versus Differentiation in Intellectual Property
Rights Regime, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY 89,93-97 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein, Mary Ellen Mogee & Roberta A. Schoen eds.,
1993).
335. See sources cited in Yu, From Pirates to Partners I, supra note 120, at 233 n.502.
336. See 't Hoen, supra note 14, at 30-31 (discussing the lawsuit major pharmaceutical
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Second, from the development standpoint, those less developed countries that suffer
from the imbalance created by a rich-country intellectual property system are often
those that lack an indigenous capacity to develop and manufacture pharmaceuticals.
Although commentators and policymakers have explained at length why stronger
patent protection in these countries may help stimulate indigenous inventive activities,
significant empirical evidence shows that, while stronger protection may benefit those
possessing strong imitative capacity and technical expertise, it does not work well for
countries that do not have similar conditions.
337
Third, the high costs of pharmaceuticals and heavy medical expenses would take
away the needed resources to put in place mechanisms to correct an out-of-balance
intellectual property system. Although commentators have emphasized the importance
of a counter-balancing competition system, 338 it remains disturbing that many less
developed countries do not have the resources to put together at the same time both a
patent system and a competition system; instead, they often have to choose between the
two. Many of these countries also may not have the ability to put in place a correction
mechanism once they have exhausted their financial and human resources to update or
strengthen their intellectual property system. 339 Even worse, because reforms based on
foreign models always incur political costs on those pushing the reforms, policymakers
may have limited political capital to put in place further "correction" reforms once
their initial reforms fail.
Finally, from the standpoint of intellectual property rights holders, unquestioned
transplants of foreign laws are unlikely to result in sustained development of
intellectual property protection in a country that lacks a tradition or a legal culture of
such protection, which takes considerable time to build. As I pointed out in the case of
China, it was not until the development of local stakeholders that the Chinese leaders
became interested in offering stronger protection of intellectual property rights without
manufacturers brought against the government of South Africa).
337. See KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 116-
19 (2000).
338. See, e.g., Jonathan Berger, Advancing Public Health by Other Means: Using
Competition Policy, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 15, at 181, 182 (exploring how less
developed countries can use competition policy to "increase access to a sustainable supply of
affordable essential medicines"); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Competition Rules for
Governments and for Private Business: A "Trade Law Approach "for Linking Trade and
Competition Rules in the WTO, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 545,563 (1996) ("[D]eveloping countries
with underdeveloped national competition and intellectual property rights laws... will need
more systematic rules on the protection of competition among trade-related intellectual property
rights and on the prevention of their anticompetitive abuse."); J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders
to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 11, 52-58 (1997) (proposing to use "competition law to curb the abuse of market power"
as a pro-competitive strategy for implementing the TRIPs Agreement in less developed
countries).
339. See IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 4 ("(W]e consider that, if anything, the
costs of getting the IP system 'wrong' in a developing country are likely to be far higher than in
developed countries. Most developed countries have sophisticated systems of competition
regulation to ensure that abuses of any monopoly rights cannot unduly affect the public
interest."); MASKuS, supra note 337, at 237 (noting that developed countries "have mature legal
systems of corrective interventions" where "the exercise of [intellectual property rights]
threatens to be anticompetitive or excessively costly in social terms").
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the presence of foreign pressure.34 ° If intellectual property protection is to be
strengthened, an endogenous approach that seeks to develop local stakeholders and to
undermine resistance against stronger protection will be very important.
34
'
Thus, if we are to facilitate greater access to essential medicines in less developed
countries, we have to correct the imbalance in the current international intellectual
property system. The length of this Article does not allow me to engage in an elaborate
discussion of what less developed countries need to do to take advantage of the TRIPs
Agreement and to reform the international intellectual property system. The following
list, therefore, only recapitulates the eight courses of action I proposed and discussed
elsewhere:
1. Develop a pro-development interpretation of the TRIPs Agreement.
2. Explore the public interest safeguards in the TRIPs Agreement.
3. Take advantage of the WTO dispute settlement process.
4. Add explicit access rights to the TRIPs Agreement.
5. Explore the use of alternative international regimes.
6. Facilitate coalition building.
7. Understand the tension between the European Communities and the United
States.
8. Assess the compatibility of the free trade agreements with the multilateral
WTO system.
342
For illustrative purposes, consider the need for less developed countries to build
coalitions to resist pressures on public health.343 While the United States was actively
developing its divide-and-conquer strategy to reward those who were willing to work
with the country, Brazil, India, and other members of the Group of 20 successfully
established a united negotiating front for less developed countries.3 44 This coalition
eventually led to the collapse of the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancfin, in
which developed countries failed to obtain new legal standards on investment,
competition policy, government procurement, and trade facilitation.345 In light of the
340. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners I, supra note 120, at 140-54 (discussing the cycle of
futility and criticizing the U.S. foreign intellectual property policy toward China in the late
1980s and early 1990s).
341. See Peter K. Yu, The Copyright Divide, 25 CARDOZO L. REv. 331, 431-33 (2003)
(discussing the need to create local stakeholders).
342. Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, supra note 193, at 386-410 (delineating eight courses
of action to reform the international intellectual property system).
343. See Abbott, Cycle of Action, supra note 15, at 33 (noting the importance of "[t]he
formation of counter-coalitions committed to resisting pressures on public health"); Yu, TRIPS
and Its Discontents, supra note 193, at 403-06 (discussing coalition-building strategies).
344. Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, supra note 193, at 403 (discussing coalition-building
strategies used by the Group of 20). The twenty-one current members of the G-20 are:
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, Cuba, Egypt, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, Mexico,
Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Philippines, South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand, Uruguay,
Venezuela, and Zimbabwe. The website of the G-20 is available at http://www.g-20.mre.gov.br/.
345. See Elizabeth Becker, Poorer Countries Pull Out of Talks Over World Trade, N.Y.




increasing proliferation of bilateral and regional trade agreements, this coalition-
building strategy has become even more important.
34 6
Although the international system remains state-centered, coalition-building efforts
are not limited to states. Today, private actors have played an increasingly important
role. Thus, it is important for generic drug companies to pursue multicountry strategies
that help "reduce the problems of intimidation and direct confrontation that might
inhibit single developing countries to hold strong positions when negotiating with the
US, the EU or a TNC [transnational corporation]. 347 It is also important for less
developed countries "to work consistently with US and European political allies to
alter the US and European domestic political contexts." 348 In doing so, generic
manufacturers will be able to "enhance the prospects of their success [by convincing]
other US and European constituencies [to] offset the pharmaceutical industry's
pressure on US and European trade authorities to aggressively advance industry
interests. 349
B. The Incentive-Investment Divide
The TRIPs Agreement not only imposed intellectual property laws on less
developed countries, but for the first time linked intellectual property with trade at the
multilateral level. Commentators widely agreed that including intellectual property in
the trade agreement was one of the greatest achievements of the Uruguay Round. As
Michael Ryan noted, such bargain linkage has allowed member states to "achieve
treaties in diplomatically and politically difficult areas in which agreement would
otherwise be elusive." 351 Without such linkage, the developed and less developed
countries might not have been able to resolve the deadlock developed since the 1981
Diplomatic Conference in Nairobi.352
Notwithstanding these achievements, the linkage between trade and intellectual
property has greatly distorted the decision-making process concerning the development
of international intellectual property policies. Due to the enormous disparity in volume,
trade interests often take over intellectual property interests. Because trade negotiators
often have to negotiate intellectual property interests as part of a package trade deal,
they are keener on protecting the foreign investment of their nationals and exporting
industries than on striking the appropriate balance in the intellectual property system in
either the target country or the international community as a whole. 353 As a result, there
346. See Abbott, Cycle ofAction, supra note 15, at 34 (noting the urgency for less developed
countries to respond to the bilateral and regional free trade agreements).
347. Rovira, supra note 84, at 239.
348. Shaffer, supra note 308, at 479.
349. Id. at 480.
350. See, e.g., Dreyfuss & Lowenfeld, supra note 172, at 276-77 (considering the TRIPs
Agreement as one of the two major achievements of the Uruguay Round).
351. MIcHAEL P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL COMPETITION AND THE POLITICS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 12 (1998).
352. See supra Part II.A (discussing the deadlock between developed and less developed
countries in the diplomatic conference in Nairobi).
353. See Carlos M. Correa, Internationalization ofthe Patent System andNew Technologies,
20 WIS. INT'L L.J. 523, 524 (2002) ("During the last century, a new shift in emphasis took place
towards a system mainly concerned with the encouragement of the investment required to
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is increasingly an incentive-investment divide between national and foreign intellectual
property policies, and intellectual property protection has become a mere bargaining
chip among the many other trade items in a calculus of the country's international trade
bottom line.
Consider, for example, the recent United States-Australia Free Trade Agreement.
Although Australia's chief negotiator, Stephen Deady, "told the Senate Estimates
Committee that the Australian economy would receive an economic boost from the
copyright term extension... [, he confessed] that the Government had not engaged in
any economic research of its own into the impact of the copyright term extension.,
354
Other officials have, likewise, dismissed the importance of the copyright term
extension requirement amidst the many bargaining items in the Agreement. When
questioned about the economic benefits of the copyright term extension, a spokesman
for Australian Trade Minister Mark Vaile explained, "Our position was that we did not
think we needed to go the extra 20 years.. .but in the context of the overall agreement
we were happy to."
355
The position of the Australian government was understandable. As Michael Geist
noted:
Australia may recognize the importance of a balanced copyright policy to both
their cultural and economic policies, but they are increasingly willing to treat
intellectual property as little more than a bargaining chip as part of broader
negotiation. Since most trade deals are judged by an analysis of the bottom-line,
economic benefits that result from the agreement, and since quantifying the
negative impact of excessive copyright controls is difficult, the policy implications
of including copyright within trade agreements is [sic] often dismissed as
inconsequential.356
produce and exploit inventions."); Correa, Unfair Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement,
supra note 167, at 72 ("[T]est data protection is a reward for the investment in data production,
rather than for the creativity or inventiveness involved."); Gathii, Construing Intellectual
Property Rights, supra note 40, at 748 ("Although fair trade was the chosen means of the
advocates of the TRIPS agreement to combat IPR piracy, the true goal of these advocates in
adopting a private property model was to maximize profits and returns on investment for the
purpose of research and development of IPRs."); Ruth L. Okediji, Back to Bilateralism?
Pendulum Swings in International Intellectual Property Protection, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & TECH. J.
125, 130 (2004) ("[It is important to understand the new bilateralism, both its structure and its
pervasiveness, as a significant expression of the enduring project of the post-colonial
assimilation of developing countries and peoples into an international legal order that privileges
private capital, particularly through the agency of transnational corporations.").
354. Matthew Rimmer, Robbery Under Arms: Copyright Law and the Australia-United
States Free Trade Agreement, FIRST MONDAY, Mar. 2006, at http://www.firstmonday.dk/
issues/issuel 1 3/rimmer/index.html.
355. Id. (quoting Fergus Shiel, Libraries Caught in Copyright Changes, AGE (Melbourne),
Feb. 11, 2006, at AS, available at http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/02/l0/
1076388365432.htnl).
356. Michael Geist, Why We Must Stand on Guard Over Copyright, TORONTO STAR, Oct. 20,
2003, at D3; see also Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical Arbitrage: Balancing Access and
Innovation in International Prescription Drug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHIcs
193,243 (2005) ("USTR may succeed in raising drug prices in the least appropriate places. The
greatest success will be found in the poorest countries, or other smaller countries desperately
seeking preferential access to the U.S. market. Small, poor countries offered a free trade deal
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Given the fact that the negotiators had considered intellectual property protection as
merely one of the many bargaining chips in international trade, it is, therefore, no
surprise that Australia agreed to adopt TRIPs-plus and TRIPs-extra measures without
asking hard questions about whether these changes strike an optimal balance in the
Australian intellectual property system.3 57 Nevertheless, the Australian example
foreshadows the difficulty confronting less developed countries in their dealings with
more powerful trading partners. Because Australia is one ofthe larger economies in the
world, 5 8 if it did not find it beneficial to resist the United States's demands in the
intellectual property area, one can only imagine how effective less developed countries
can be in resisting those demands.
To make matters worse, less developed countries were equally blinded by their
concern about compliance with their international obligations. As Keith Maskus and
Jerome Reichman have pointed out, many of these countries are "compliance
oriented." Concerned about using the intellectual property system to attract foreign
direct investment, technology transfer, inward trade flows, and human capital, 359 many
of these countries have yet to "treat intellectual property as an integral part of nationalor regional systems of innovation.'360 Just as developed countries are obsessed with the
protection of the investment made by their exporting industries, less developed
countries are also obsessed with international compliance and the acquisition of foreign
direct investment. In the end, both groups of countries focus so much on investment
that they pay little attention to innovation and its needed incentives.
Consider the implementation of Article 39(3) of the TRIPs Agreement as an
illustration. Although the provision requires member states to protect only undisclosed
information against unfair commercial use, recent bilateral and regional trade
agreements have pushed for stronger protection that allows pharmaceutical companies
to prevent their competitors from using clinical trial data submitted to authorities for
regulatory approval.3 6 1 As the pharmaceutical industry claimed, "the development and
bringing to market of a new drug requires the originator to conduct extensive chemical,
pharmacological, toxicological and clinical research and testing, at an average cost of
US$800 million, and taking 10 to 15 years to complete., 362 Thus, the industry contends
with the United States may well agree to provisions which undermine health in order to serve
commercial interests.") (footnote omitted); Shira Perlmutter, Future Directions in International
Copyright, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 369, 378 (1998) (contending that, for many countries,
"the trade-related benefits that may be obtained from joining a club like the WTO can outweigh
any perceived drawbacks of adopting a new copyright law").
357. These measures include an extension of the copyright term, the adoption of an anti-
circumvention provision, and a ban on the parallel importation of cheap generic drugs. U.S.-
Australia FTA, supra note 204, ch. 17.
358. List of countries by GDP (nominal), WIKIPEDiA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List-of
_countries-by_GDP_%28nominal%29 (last visited Apr. 11, 2007).
359. See Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China Puzzle,
in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS PLUS ERA (Daniel J. Gervais ed., forthcoming 2007) [hereinafter Yu,
Intellectual Property, Economic Development], available at http://ssm.com/abstract--97830 1.
360. Maskus & Reichman, supra note 43, at 18.
361. See sources cited supra note 206.
362. IFPMA REVIEW, supra note 166. Commentators, however, have queried the oft-cited
$800 million figure. As Marcia Angell explained:
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that additional protection, other than what it has already received under the patent
system, is needed to enable them to recoup the high costs of data collection.
However, as commentators and economists have pointed out, the need for such
protection is at best dubious from an economic standpoint. 363 Although the costs of
clinical trials remain high and could make up for a major portion of the research and
development costs of new drugs, 364 companies already have large incentives under the
current patent system as well as public funding support to conduct research and
development. To be certain, many of these companies need incentives to obtain market
approval for the product, even if they have already obtained incentives from the patent
system to invent it in the first place.365 However, unless the regulatory authorities
require different clinical trials, most of the marketing costs are already included in the
total costs that are used to justify stronger patent protection. If additional incentives are
provided by the data exclusivity regime, one has to wonder whether patent protection
should be weakened proportionally to reflect the additional incentives.
In addition, there is no evidence that a data exclusivity system within developed
countries will not enable the pharmaceutical companies to recoup their investment.
Because "developing countries provide a small share of the global pharmaceutical
market and their policy choices have a minimal impact upon the R&D investment
decisions of multinational pharmaceutical companies," ratcheting up protection in the
form of data exclusivity in less developed countries is unlikely to result in greater
foreign direct investment in those countries.366 If the need for data exclusivity is not
supported by empirical evidence, one has to wonder whether the regime is justified for
any reason other than the desire to protect the pharmaceutical exports of developed
countries. As Peter Drahos noted, "[e]ven within some developed countries, the
tendency to espouse a protectionist IP agenda seems more a reflection ofpolicy capture
than a reasoned attempt to balance domestic needs."
367
Today, the trade deficit has figured largely in the discussion of any international
intellectual property agreement. Viewed through this lens, one can easily understand
[The Tufts estimate of $802 million] is not the actual out-of-pocket cost at all,
even for the special group of drugs considered. That cost was $403 million per
drug. The $802 million is what the authors call the "capitalized" costs-that is, it
includes the estimated revenue that might have been generated if the money spent
on R&D had instead been invested in the equity market. It's as though drug
companies don't have to spend any money at all on R&D; they could invest it
instead.... This theoretically lost revenue is known as the "opportunity cost," and
the Tufts consultants simply tacked it on to the industry's out-of-pocket costs. That
accounting maneuver nearly doubled the $403 million to $802 million.
ANGELL, supra note 19, at 44-45.
363. See, e.g., Carlos M. Correa, Protecting Test Data for Pharmaceutical and
Agrochemical Products Under Free Trade Agreements, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 15,
at 81; Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Secrecy, Monopoly, and Access to Pharmaceuticals in
International Trade Law: Protection of Marketing Approval Data Under the TRIPs Agreement,
45 HARv. INT'L L.J. 443, 469 (2004); Pugatch, supra note 48; Robert Weissman, Data
Protection: Options for Implementation, in NEGOTIATING HEALTH, supra note 15, at 151
[hereinafter Weissman, Data Protection].
364. See Henry Grabowski, Increasing R&D Incentives for Neglected Diseases: Lessons
from the Orphan Drug Act, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS, supra note 43, at 457.
365. Thanks to Aaron Fellmeth for raising this important question.
366. Weissman, Data Protection, supra note 363, at 154.
367. Maskus & Reichman, supra note 43, at 10.
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why policymakers and negotiators have been particularly concerned about the foreign
investment of their nationals and exporting industries. Indeed, trade agreements,
including those in the intellectual property area, can be increasingly considered as
investment treaties. As Frederick Abbott has noted:
A patent is essentially a financial instrument that entitles its bearer to achieve
greater than competitive market rates of return on investment. The Pharma
companies are market-oriented enterprises that seek to maximize shareholder
returns on investment. Pharma treats potential intrusion on the security of the
patent and regulated regulatory support as a threat to return on investment. Pharma
justifies its rent seeking as necessary to the funding of research and development
for new medicines.... The Pharma companies demand rules and enforcement that
will protect their income streams, justifying a high return on investment as
necessary to drug development.
368
Because trade negotiators focus more on the protection of investment by their
nationals than the economic efficiency of and the welfare gain in the intellectual
property system, they are more likely to request the development of a system that is
biased toward foreign investors and that does not take into consideration the public
interest, the local innovative environment, and the country's social-economic
conditions. Indeed, although it has been shown that countries need to have different
patent systems due to their varying economic, social, cultural, and technological
conditions, 369 the international patent system has increasingly focused on the
development of a one-size-fits-all template. Such a "universal" template seeks to offer
maximum protection to the investment of exporting industries based in developed
countries, regardless of whether such investment makes economic sense or represents a
windfall to the investors.
370
Moreover, while commentators have discussed how intellectual property can
enhance foreign direct investment,371 they have yet to provide concrete evidence
368. Abbott, Cycle ofAction, supra note 15, at 36.
369. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, TRIPS and the Dynamics of
Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 36 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 95, 95 (2004) ("As new industries
emerge and mature, nations must have the flexibility to modify their intellectual property rules
to readjust the balance between public and private rights."); Yu, Intellectual Property and the
Information Ecosystem, supra note 211, at 9 ("[P]olicymakers in less developed countries often
find themselves confronted with contradictory intellectual property policies."); Peter K. Yu, Still
DissatisfiedAfter All These Years: Intellectual Property, Post-WTO China, and the Avoidable
Cycle of Futility, 34 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 143, 153 (2005) [hereinafter Yu, Still Dissatisfied
After All These Years] (noting that China is likely to be "schizophrenic" over its intellectual
property policies, due to its preference for stronger protection for entertainment, software,
biotechnology, and semiconductors while having lower protection for pharmaceuticals,
chemicals, and foodstuffs).
370. See Assafa Endeshaw, The Paradox of Intellectual Property Lawmaking in the New
Millennium: Universal Templates as Terms of Surrender for Non-Industrial Nations; Piracy as
an Offshoot, 10 CARDOZO J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 47 (2002) (criticizing the application of universal
templates to non-industrial nations); Peter K. Yu, World Trade, Intellectual Property and the
Global Elites: An Introduction, 10 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMp. L. 1, 2-3 (2002) (criticizing the
requirement that less developed countries adopt a one-size-fits-all intellectual property system).
371. Josh Martin, Copyright Law Reforms Mean Better Business Climate, J. COM., Mar. 7,
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concerning the correlation between intellectual property protection and such
investment. Studies, indeed, have shown that many companies that are doing business
in China are not particularly concerned about intellectual property issues.3 72 Rather,
foreign companies set up operations in the country either to take advantage of the
lower production costs, the large growing market, or the preferential treatment of
foreign investors.
373
To correct the imbalance in the intellectual property system, this Part proposes three
courses of actions. First, policymakers need to delink intellectual property from trade
in their policy assessment and carefully evaluate the need for intellectual property
protection outside the trade context. While this Article advocates the delinking of
intellectual property from trade when the need for particular intellectual property
protection is assessed, it does not call for a delinking of intellectual property from trade
in the international intellectual property system. Linking intellectual property and trade
has its benefits, including getting both developed and less developed countries to reach
an agreement in the first place.374 Notwithstanding these benefits, such linkage is likely
to result in an inaccurate assessment of the need for intellectual property protection.
By contrast, an independent evaluation would allow countries to develop a balanced
system that helps protect the interests of intellectual property rights holders while
facilitating the much needed access to essential medicines (as well as meeting other
public access needs). It would also allow countries whose economic sectors are
growing at a different pace to avoid making a difficult choice that will benefit only
some of the sectors. For example, emerging countries like China, Brazil, and India are
likely to be "schizophrenic" over their intellectual property policies. While they want
strong protection of intellectual property rights in such sectors as entertainment,
software, biotechnology, and semiconductors, they prefer lower protection in other
areas, such as pharmaceuticals, chemicals, and foodstuffs.375 Unfortunately for these
countries, which "generate substantial trade surpluses with OECD countries, arguments
in favour of price concessions on pharmaceuticals may become less compelling in a
wider political arena,, 3 76 even though the poor in these countries continue to suffer
from high prices and the resulting inaccessibility of drugs.
To undertake an independent inquiry that delinks intellectual property and trade,
policymakers need to explore whether the protection is needed in the first place-for
example, whether it would generate the optimal level of incentives to promote
1996, at 2C (reporting about a World Bank survey of major U.S. companies that demonstrated
the correlation between intellectual property rights and foreign investment).
372. See Paul Tackaberry, Intellectual Property Risks in China: Their Effect on Foreign
Investment and Technology Transfer, J. AsiAN Bus., Fall 1998, at 1, 26, quoted in Yahong Li,
The Wolf Has Come: Are China's Intellectual Property Industries Preparedfor the WTO?, 20
UCLA PAC. BAsIN L.J. 77, 79 n.9 (2002); see also Carlos A. Primo Braga & Carsten Fink, The
Relationship Between Intellectual Property Rights and Foreign Direct Investment, 9 DuKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 163, 164 (1998) ("[T]he available empirical evidence does not conclusively
establish the relationship between IPRs and FDI decisions.").
373. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, supra note 359.
374. See RYAN, supra note 351, at 12 (noting that bargain linkage allowed member states to
"achieve treaties in diplomatically and politically difficult areas in which agreement would
otherwise be elusive").
375. Yu, Still Dissatisfied After All These Years, supra note 369, at 153.
376. Abbott, Cycle ofAction, supra note 15, at 29.
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innovative activities and consumer welfare.377 The fact that the pharmaceutical industry
is spending millions of dollars on collecting clinical trial data does not mean that it
deserves protection unless such protection will result in therapeutic advances and the
further development of pharmaceutical products. Indeed, as pointed out above, there is
insufficient empirical evidence to warrant the recent expansion of intellectual property
rights. An inquiry based on intellectual property protection alone, therefore, would
force policymakers to ask hard questions about why they need to introduce additional
protection in the first place.
Objections can be raised about the difficulty in proving or disproving the benefits of
a patent system through empirical analyses. As Fritz Machlup remarked famously in
his critical examination of the American patent system: "If we did not have a patent
system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present knowledge of its
economic consequences to recommend instituting one. But since we have had a patent
system for a long time, it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present
knowledge, to recommend abolishing it."378 Thus, if intellectual property rightsholders
are concerned about the paradox alluded to by Professor Machlup, policymakers could
perhaps lower the burden of proof in the inquiry. While it may be difficult to obtain
conclusive proof, such difficulty does not mean that policymakers should not undertake
the inquiry at all. Rather, it means that they should be cautious in undertaking such an
inquiry.
Some may also be concerned that many less developed countries do not have the
needed expertise or resources to conduct impact studies. In addition, as Rochelle
Dreyfuss and others have pointed out, the empirical approach tends to favor the
retention of an undesirable status quo.379 To alleviate these concerns, policymakers
could further adjust the burden to reflect the interests and development needs of less
developed countries-for example, by focusing on the upward ratchet while keeping in
mind the special nature of protection for traditional knowledge, folklore, and
indigenous materials. They could even require developed countries or
377. Some commentators have pointed out the inefficiency of the R&D strategy used by the
pharmaceutical industry by focusing on the marginal costs of drug production. However, due to
the high fixed costs involved in drug production, the pharmaceutical industry is one of those
sectors in which a calculation based on marginal costs would not fully reflect the risks and
investment involved. As one commentator explained:
Perhaps [the industry's] most differentiating characteristic is that it is particularly
intensive in fixed costs.... Once those fixed costs are expended, the remaining
costs of drug marketing, manufacturing, and distribution-while far from
insignificant-are relatively small. The model of price-setting in a perfectly
competitive market suggests that prices are based upon marginal costs. But this
model obviously does not apply for pharmaceuticals, for if they were priced
according to their marginal costs, they would be very inexpensive, but in the long
run no expenditures on R&D would be made.
SCHWEITZER, supra note 40, at 8-9.
378. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE
PATENT SYSTEM 80 (Comm. Print 1958) (prepared by Fritz Machlup).
379. Rochelle Dreyfuss has raised her concems along this line. See Justin Hughes, Of World
Music and Sovereign States, Professors and the Formation of Legal Norms, 35 Loy. U. CHI. L.J.
155, 199 (2003).
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intergovernmental organizations, like WIPO or the WTO, to provide financial support
and technical assistance for these studies.
Once policymakers find protection is warranted, they need to explore whether there
are alternative strategies that are less restrictive to the access to essential medicines.
This proposal calls for a "less restrictive" standard, as compared to the "least
restrictive" standard used often in constitutional law, because the latter would impose
too heavy a burden on those seeking protection, significantly reducing incentives for
innovation.
In the past few years, commentators have advanced many different proposals, and it
is time we seriously evaluate whether these proposals would offer a less restrictive
means to protect intellectual property. For example, Tim Hubbard and James Love
proposed a treaty that sought to help revamp the way governments fund research and
development while alleviating concerns by the United States and other major countries
over the free-riding problem.380 The late Jean Lanjouw offered a proposal that requires
pharmaceutical companies that develop a patented product for a global disease to
"choose either protection in the rich countries or in the poor countries but not in
both."38' Led by Yochai Benkler, researchers at Yale Law School have also advocated
an open licensing approach for university innovations to address global health
inequities. 382 In addition, commentators have proposed the establishment of
international purchase funds for vaccines and essential medicines.383 There are also
numerous research and case studies about the use of public-private partnerships to
enhance access to medicines in less developed countries.?
In the context of clinical trial data, Jerome Reichman has explored the use of a cost-
sharing or liability-rule approach, as compared to the data exclusivity approach, to
enable pharmaceutical companies to receive compensation for the high costs of the
clinical trials used to obtain market approval for pharmaceuticals.385 He also advanced
a proposal to treat clinical trials as a global public good, as compared to "a private-
sector obligation whose results and outcomes must necessarily be rendered artificially
380. Tim Hubbard & James Love, A New Trade Frameworkfor Global Healthcare R&D, 2
PLoS BIOLOGY 147 (2004), available at http://biology.plosjoumals.org/archive/1545-
7885/2/2/pdf/l 0.137 ljoumal.pbio.0020052-S.pdf; see also JOHN BARTON, PRESERVING THE
GLOBAL SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL COMMONs 4 (2003), http://www.ictsd.org/dlogue/docs/
techtransfer dialogue.pdf (noting the need for "a treaty that defines rules freeing
scientific/technological exchange and establishes procedures for negotiating regular
improvements and expansions of those rules").
381. Jean 0. Lanjouw, A New Global Patent Regime for Diseases: US. and International
Legal Issues, 16 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 85, 90-91 (2002).
382. See Amy Kapczynski, Samantha Chaifetz, Zachary Katz & Yochai Benkler, Addressing
Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for University Innovations, 20
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031 (2005).
383. For a list of some of these proposals, see Opderbeck, supra note 77, at 530.
384. See Maskus, supra note 31, at 576 (discussing various "innovative research programs
within private firms or among collaborative ventures, with substantial shares of funding coming
from governments, NGOs, and multilateral organizations"); Obijiofor Aginam, From the Core
to the Peripheries: Multilateral Governance of Malaria in a Multi-Cultural World, 3 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 87, 90-91 (2002) (discussing the development of public-private partnerships as a
response to malaria).
385. See Reichman, International Legal Status, supra note 167, at 144-48.
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scarce in order to appropriate returns from investment."386 Meanwhile, Aaron Fellmeth
has proposed a very interesting readjustable royalties model that allows "for the
calculation of royalty payments to the initial registrant by subsequent registrants.
3 87
In exploring all of these alternatives, it is particularly important to examine whether
the proposals can be compatible with existing treatments in less developed countries,
such as the use of traditional medicine. As one commentator noted, "[i]n developing
countries, up to 80 percent of the population relies on traditional medicine to meet its
health-care needs. Such medicine is not only affordable, but it is also widely available
and trusted. 3 88 Indeed, "[e]thnomedical knowledge of plants by indigenous people
across societies and cultures has 'long served as [a] crucial source[] of medicines either
directly as [a source of] therapeutic agents, as [a] starting point[] for the elaboration of
more complex semi-synthetic compounds or as synthetic compounds.'
38 9
As traditional medicines become more important and patented medicines become
more costly and unaffordable, it is no surprise that many less developed countries have
raised issues about biopiracy of indigenous knowledge and resources. 39 As Peter
Drahos noted, "significant numbers ofpharmaceutical products that have been released
onto the market over the years have their lineage in, and can be traced back to,
traditional origins. Yet, property rights protection in these assets does not match the
kind of intellectual property rights protection available to companies for their
compounds and processes of treatment." 391 Most recently, less developed countries
have put forward a proposal that requires the disclosure of the source and origin of
genetic material as part of the patent application process. 392 The proposal, introduced
as a draft Article 29bis of the TRIPs Agreement, thus far has faced strong resistance
from the patent community in the developed world, including Japan, Korea, and the
United States.
386. Id. at 147.
387. Fellmeth, supra note 363, at 483. For a discussion of the model, see id. at 482-99.
388. Nanda & Lodha, supra note 30, at 586; see also Aginam, supra note 384, at 93
("[E]thnomedical therapies for malaria may be readily available at a cost the community can
afford while orthodox (Western) malaria medicines may not be."). For a discussion of legal
issues concerning traditional medicine, see generally Carlos M. Correa, Protection and
Promotion of Traditional Medicine Implications for Public Health in Developing Countries
(2002), http://www.southcentre.org/publications/traditionalmedicine/traditionalmedicine.pdf.
389. Aginam, supra note 384, at 93.
390. For discussions of biopiracy, see, for example, VANDANA SHIVA, BIoPmAcY: THE
PLUNDER OF NATURE AND KNOWLEDGE (1997); Keith Aoki, Neocolonialism, Anticommons
Property, and Biopiracy in the (Not-So-Brave) New World Order of International Intellectual
Property Protection, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 11 (1998); Peter Drahos, Indigenous
Knowledge, Intellectual Property and Biopiracy: Is a Global Bio-Collecting Society the
Answer?, 2000 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 245 (2000); Paul J. Heald, The Rhetoric ofBiopiracy,
11 CARDOZO J. INT'L & CoMp. L. 519 (2003); Ikechi Mgbeoji, Patents and Traditional
Knowledge of the Uses of Plants: Is a Communal Patent Regime Part of the Solution to the
Scourge of Bio Piracy?, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 163 (2001); Remigius N. Nwabueze,
Ethnopharmacology, Patents and the Politics of Plants' Genetic Resources, 11 CARDOzO J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 585 (2003); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Of Seeds and Shamans: The Appropriation
of the Scientific and Technical Knowledge of Indigenous and Local Communities, 17 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 919 (1996).
391. Drahos, Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical Markets, supra note 5, at 403-04.
392. See Abbott, Cycle ofAction, supra note 15, at 35 (discussing the proposal).
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Finally, it is important to require impact studies before a further expansion of
intellectual property protection. For example, during an intergovernmental meeting on
the WIPO Development Agenda, Bahrain proposed that "WIPO... prepare studies on
intellectual property, in cooperation with Member States, to demonstrate the economic,
social and cultural impact of the use of intellectual property systems in Member States,
with particular emphasis on the contribution of cultural industries to national
economies., 393 Other international fora, like the human rights regime, have called for
similar assessment. In a recent interpretive comment, the CESCR stated that "States
parties should.., consider undertaking human rights impact assessments prior to the
adoption and after a period of implementation of legislation for the protection of the
moral and material interests resulting from one's scientific, literary or artistic
productions." 394 Such assessment is important, because it not only will provide the
needed information for all member states to consider, but also will ensure that nationals
and policymakers of the demandeur countries are aware of the development-related
impact of the policies for which they are pushing. The study will also provide helpful
information to enable policymakers to make informed judgment in the face of heavy
lobbying by intellectual property rights holders.
C. Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights
When the international intellectual property regime was established, the intention of
the member states was to coordinate protection to a level that would reduce
infringement and commercial piracy. As a result, they focused on anti-discrimination
tools, like the national treatment provision. Although the Paris Convention includes
some minimum standards of protection in a small number of areas, it reserves to each
member state considerable autonomy to develop its own intellectual property policies
based on local needs and conditions. Indeed, although some members preferred to have
greater harmonization of the intellectual property system, "practical impracticality"
prevented them from obtaining their preferred system.
395
As protection becomes more uniform in the developed world, however, countries
have found it important to have greater harmonization of intellectual property rights.
Led by the United States and members of the European Communities, developed
countries have pushed for a harmonization process that transformed the international
intellectual property system from a patchwork system that coordinates varying national
393. Proposal by the Kingdom of Bahrain on the Importance of Intellectual Property in
Social and Economic Development and National Development Programs, WIPO Doc. IlIM/2/2
(June 14, 2005); see also Frederick M. Abbott, Toward a New Era of Objective Assessment in
the Field of TRIPS and Variable Geometry for the Preservation of Multilateralism, 8 J. INT'L
ECON. L. 77, 79 (2005) (contending that "new [intellectual property rights] and associated
regulatory provisions be subject to objective impact assessment").
394. General Comment No. 17, supra note 196, 35.
395. See Beier, supra note 134, at 8 ("In view of the large variety of national laws and
interests . . . [the] idealistic concept of an international uniform law [under the Paris
Convention] proved too utopian. And in fact, the idea of a 'world patent' or 'world trademark,'
which was subsequently revived still remains a castle in the sky."); see also Sam Ricketson, The
Birth of the Berne Union, 11 COLuM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 9, 19 (1986) (discussing the political
difficulty in creating uniform protection in the Berne Convention).
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systems396 to a global "supranational code" that imposes obligations on the different
members of the system. 397 Because of power asymmetry, this harmonization process
eventually became a Westernization, or Northemization, process. At times, when
multilateral efforts failed, developed countries have resorted to the use of bilateral and
regional trade agreements to fill in the gaps and to achieve what their harmonization
efforts could not.
398
To add to the plight of less developed countries, the TRIPs Agreement was
designed with a focus on setting only the floor, rather than the ceiling, of protection.
Article 1 of the TRIPs Agreement stipulated specifically that "[m]embers may, but
shall not be obliged to, implement in their law more extensive protection than is
required by this Agreement, provided that such protection does not contravene the
provisions of this Agreement. ' '399 Thus, although the Agreement includes a
considerable number of minimum standards, it has very limited maximum standards.
400
This misguided focus on floor setting and minimum standards has two negative
effects on the international intellectual property system. First, it fails to retain the
balance commonly found in domestic intellectual property systems, in which
limitations and exceptions are arguably as important as the grants of rights. 401 By
having an undue focus on the floor, countries ignore the fact that policymakers may not
be able to protect their own industries and nationals by balancing the additional
protection through the inclusion of exceptions and public interest safeguards. Indeed,
such exceptions would likely be viewed with disfavor by their richer and more
powerful trading partners (and the multinational corporations that heavily lobbied those
countries).
Second, it has made it difficult for countries to take a holistic perspective and offer
package legislation that includes strengthened protection and public interest offsets,
especially when the rules are scrutinized by the WTO dispute settlement panels. As
Rochelle Dreyfuss and Graeme Dinwoodie noted:
Th[e] "discrete" approach to adjudication (by which we mean that discrete parts of
legislative compromises are broken out for individual assessment) can produce
perverse consequences. Not only does it unravel carefully negotiated legislative
deals, it does so in a systematic way. Because TRIPS sets only minimum
standards, WTO dispute resolution operates as a one-way ratchet: complaints can
lead to the invalidation of measures that reduce the level of intellectual property
protection, but they never reach measures that increase protection. Thus,
compromises will always unravel in the same direction, requiring nations to
396. See generally Paul Edward Geller, From Patchwork to Network: Strategies for
International Intellectual Property in Flux, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 69 (1998) (discussing
the move from the patchwork model to the network model).
397. Jane C. Ginsburg, International Copyright. From a "Bundle" of National Copyright
Laws to a Supranational Code?, 47 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 265 (2000); see also Yu,
Currents and Crosscurrents, supra note 127, at 354-75 (discussing the transformation from
international agreements to a supranational code).
398. See supra Part II.D.
399. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 8, art. 1.
400. See sources cited in Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, supra note 193, at 402 n. 138
(2005).
401. JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE & SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE
INFORMATION SOCIETY 138 (1996).
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change those features of their legislation that benefit user groups while protection-
enhancing provisions stay in place.4°2
Noting that the panel struck down the Fairness in Music Licensing Act, which
expanded the unauthorized use of music by restaurants, bars, retail stores, and other
small business establishments, while leaving alone the copyright term extension
legislation that was enacted under the same package deal,40 3 Professors Dreyfuss and
Dinwoodie cautioned us that the discrete approach taken by the panels might have the
perverse effect of encouraging intellectual property rights holders "to agree to
provisions that reduce the level of protection in exchange for the protection-enhancing
legislation that they want, knowing that the reductions will be successfully challenged
at the international level." 4°4
It is high time that we reconsider the way the international intellectual property
system is developed. If the system has been transformed from an international system
that uses patchwork treaties to harmonize protection to a global one that imposes
protection and obligations on all of the member states, there is a strong need to strike a
balance between proprietary interests and public access needs in an intellectual
property system, taking into consideration both the public interest and distribution
concerns. 40 5 To do so, countries need to consider both endogenous and exogenous
limits.
40 6
For example, commentators have articulated the need for access rights to provide
endogenous limits. They have noted the need for the creation and use of early working
exceptions, 407 like the Bolar exception in the United States, 40 8 which "makes it legal for
402. Dinwoodie & Dreyfuss, supra note 369, at 99-100 (emphasis omitted).
403. See id. at 99.
404. Id. at 100.
405. As Peter Gerhart explained:
[W]e normally think of normative welfare within a country, where we can rely on
the tax and spend power of government to address the distributive values that
cannot be reached through the intellectual property system. If some people are too
poor to have access to essential patented medicines, for example, the government
can subsidize their purchase in order to provide access that the intellectual
property system would otherwise deny....
In the international system, however, the institutional infrastructure for making
such distributive decisions is missing; we have no institutional structure for
making the welfare decisions that determine, across states, whether and how those
who gain from a particular policy should compensate those who lose from the
policy. Accordingly, in the international system, distributive values must be
embedded in the international intellectual property system itself, through the
provisions of intellectual property systems that provide for fair use or other access
rights--otherwise these values will be ignored. Simply put, in the international
arena, there is no good mechanism for taking into account the inability of poor
countries to pay for the knowledge goods that they need in order to enhance their
own welfare, and if distributional goals are to have any salience, the goals must be
forthrightly addressed.
Gerhart, supra note 328, at 16.
406. See Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, supra note 193, at 396-401 (discussing literature
that calls for the creation of explicit access rights).
407. See IPR COMMISsION REPORT, supra note 6, at 50 (recommending less developed
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a generic producer to import, manufacture and test a patented product prior to the
expiry of the patent in order that it may fulfil the regulatory requirements imposed by
particular countries as necessary for marketing as a generic." 4 9 In light of the
increased patenting of research tools, commentators have also noted the need for
research exemptions for those tools, lest scientific progress be stifled.410 In addition,
commentators have underscored the importance of Articles 31 (k) and 40 of the TRIPs
Agreement, which permit member states to take appropriate measures to curb "an
abuse of intellectual property rights having an adverse effect on competition in the
relevant market.
'A1
Exogenous limits are equally important. Commentators have already noted how
international human rights, 1 2 in particular the right to health,413 have provided
countries to "include an appropriate exception for 'early working' to patent rights in their
legislation, which will accelerate the introduction of generic substitutes on patent expiry");
Timmermans, supra note 24, at 52 (noting the need to "ensure that... a 'Bolar provision'...
[is] incorporated within the national patent law, and that [it applies] to bio-pharmaceuticals as
well as to conventional pharmaceuticals").
408. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000)).
409. IPR COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, at 50.
410. See Timmermans, supra note 24, at 52 (noting the need for "a research exemption").
For discussions of the experimental use exemption, see generally Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protecting
the Public Domain of Science: Has the Time for an Experimental Use Defense Arrived?, 46
ARIz. L. REv. 457 (2004); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive
Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1017 (1989); Janice M. Mueller, No
"Dilettante Affair": Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for
Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REv. 1 (2001); Janice M. Mueller, The Evanescent
Experimental Use Exemption from United States Patent Infringement Liability: Implications for
University and Nonprofit Research and Development, 56 BAYLOR L. REv. 917 (2004);
Katherine J. Strandburg, What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain,
2004 Wis. L. REv. 81.
411. TRIPs Agreement, supra note 8, art. 40. As commentators have pointed out, many less
developed countries "may decide against investing resources in giving effect to competition
policy unless and until required to do so." Berger, supra note 338, at 196; see also Dreyfuss,
TRIPS-RoundII, supra note 2, at 31 (noting that although "[t]he TRIPS Agreement recognizes
that members may need law to control the abuse of intellectual property rights,... countries that
did not have enforceable intellectual property laws prior to joining the WTO had little reason to
develop competition law to control right holders" (footnote omitted)). Nevertheless, some
commentators, like Jonathan Berger, believed that "developing countries will most likely at
some point in the future be required to commit to the enforcement of competition policy as part
of the ultimate resolution of the 'Singapore issues,' either as a result of the Doha Development
Round or regional and bilateral trade agreements." Berger, supra note 338, at 196 (footnote
omitted).
412. See generally Bloche, supra note 255, at 827 ("The WTO system... has come to treat
protection for health as a de facto interpretive principle when disputes arise over members'
treaty obligations."); Audrey R. Chapman, The Human Rights Implications of Intellectual
Property Protection, 5 J. INT'L EcoN. L. 861 (2002) (discussing the human rights implications
of intellectual property protection); Helfer, Toward a Human Rights Framework, supra note
189 (outlining a human rights framework for intellectual property rights); Yu,
Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests, supra note 189 (examining ways to develop a
human rights framework for intellectual property rights).
413. For a discussion of the right to health and the international normative and legal
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language that may trump intellectual property protection. In the Resolution 2000/7 on
"Intellectual Property Rights and Human Rights," for example, the United Nations
Sub-Commission on the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights urged national
governments, intergovernmental organizations, and civil society groups to give human
rights "primacy . . . over economic policies and agreements. '414 In a recent
interpretative comment on the ICESCR, the CESCR also stated that "States parties are
... obliged to strike an adequate balance between their obligations under article 15,
paragraph 1 (c), on one hand, and under the other provisions of the Covenant, on the
other hand, with a view to promoting and protecting the full range of rights guaranteed
in the Covenant. ' 4 15 The other human rights with which the TRIPs Agreement may
present conflicts include the right to food, the right to health, the right to education, the
right to self-determination, the right to freedom of expression, the right to cultural
participation and development, and the right to the benefits of scientific progress.
4 16
To "codify" the principle of human rights primacy, countries can consider
negotiating for a treaty provision that allows public health concerns to trump other
concerns, such as the protection of intellectual property. Uma Suthersanen recently
proposed to amend Article 13 of the TRIPs Agreement by adding the phrase "taking
note of the need to maintain a balance between the rights holders and the larger public
interest, particularly education, development and access to information" at the end of
the provision.47 One could make an analogous change by amending Article 30 of the
TRIPs Agreement by adding the following phrase: "taking note ofthe need to maintain
a balance between the rights holders and the larger public interest, particularly
development and access to essential medicines." Such a provision would allow
policymakers to focus on the promotion of public health, rather than on creating
benefits for either the pharmaceutical industry or generic manufacturers. 4 s The
standards defining such a right, see generally Audrey R. Chapman, Conceptualizing the Right to
Health: A Violations Approach, 65 TENN. L. REV. 389 (1998); Eleanor D. Kinney, The
International Human Right to Health: What Does This Mean for Our Nation and World?, 34
IND. L. REV. 1457 (2001).
414. Helfer, Toward a Human Rights Framework, supra note 189; see also Chon, supra note
223, at 2886 (proposing to integrate a principle of substantive equality "throughout intellectual
property globalization decision-making via a legal rule akin to the strict scrutiny doctrine in U.S.
constitutional law"). As the U.K. Commission on Intellectual Property Rights noted in its
chapter on health:
Our starting point in this analysis is that healthcare considerations must be the
main objective in determining what IP regime should apply to healthcare products.
IP rights are not conferred to deliver profits to industry except so that these can be
used to deliver better healthcare in the long term. Such rights must therefore be
closely monitored to ensure that they do actually promote healthcare objectives
and, above all, are not responsible for preventing poor people in developing
countries from obtaining healthcare.
IPR COMMIssIoN REPORT, supra note 6, at 30.
415. General Comment No. 17, supra note 196, 35.
416. Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests, supra note 189, at 1148; Peter K.
Yu, Ten Common Questions About Intellectual Property and Human Rights, 23 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. (forthcoming 2007), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=979193.
417. UMA SUTHERSANEN, THE FUTURE OF COPYRIGHT REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:
TELEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION, LOCALIZED GLOBALIsM AND THE "PUBLIC INTEREST" RULE 24
(2005), http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/bellagio/Bellagio2005/Suthersanen-final.pdf.
418. See supra text accompanying notes 57-58.
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provision is particularly important in light of the public health crises in less developed
countries and in light of the lack of a special public health exception in the TRIPs
Agreement.1 9 Unfortunately, the history of the development of the Paragraph 6
solution suggests that the United States is very unlikely to welcome such a change.
Thus, a more politically feasible approach is to locate exogenous limits outside the
intellectual property regime. As Laurence Helfer explained in the context of regime
shifting, exogenous limits can come initially in the form of "counterregime norms
' ' 20
and then be incorporated into the intellectual property system as "revisionist norms."
421
As he explained, "[t]he value of counterregime norms for developing countries is
grounded in two fundamental characteristics of the international legal system. The first
is the disaggregated and nonhierarchical structure of that system, and the second is the
frequent use of nonbinding norms to guide the behavior of states and private
parties."A22 Because the impact of intellectual property protection is now spilling over
into other areas, such as agriculture, health, the environment, education, culture, free
speech, and democracy, the need to locate limits outside the intellectual property
regime is becoming more important.
Despite the importance of these limits, one should remember that the exportation of
these limitations could be as dangerous as the exportation of substantive rights. Indeed,
commentators have been concerned about such exportation and have argued for the
retention of the original international intellectual property system, which included only
limited minimum standards. While this Article takes the view that it is no longer
politically feasible to retain such a system, it is important to underscore the fact that
limits that ignore local conditions-for example, limits on the protection of traditional
knowledge--could be as problematic as rights that ignore local conditions. Intellectual
property is a means to an end, rather than the end itself. The limits that make itdifficult
for less developed countries to innovate will ultimately defeat the purpose of having
the limits in the first place.
CONCLUSION
Although this Article focuses on the access-to-medicines problem, the analysis is
equally applicable to other intellectual property-related problems, such as access to
419. Commentators and policymakers have sought to increase such an exception through
other exceptions for the protection of "ordre public," TRIPs Agreement, supra note 8, art.
27(2), "public interest," id. art. 8(1), and national security. See id. art. 73 (stipulating an
exception for member states to pursue their essential security interests and to fulfill obligations
under the United Nations Charter in relation to the maintenance of international peace and
security); see also David P. Fidler, Constitutional Outlines of Public Health s "New World
Order," 77 TEMP. L. REv. 247, 251-53 (2004) (discussing public health in the context of
national security). One could also locate a special exception in Article XX of the GATT, which
allows for "measures necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health." GATT, supra
note 302, art. XX (emphasis added).
420. Professor Heifer defined counterregime norms as "binding treaty rules and nonbinding
soft law standards that seek to alter the prevailing legal landscape." Heifer, Regime Shifting,
supra note 193, at 14.
421. Laurence R. Heifer, Mediating Interactions in an Expanding International Intellectual
Property Regime, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 123, 127 (2004).
422. Id.
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educational materials; access to computer software and information technology; the
protection of traditional knowledge, folklore, and indigenous materials; the promotion
of biological diversity; and the preservation of culture and freedom of expression. This
analysis is also important to understanding other trade-related problems that create
tensions between developed and less developed countries as well as problems that are
within developed countries.
Nationwide decisions are inherently complex. Countries, as a result, need wide
policy space regardless of their economic development and technological capabilities.
With the establishment of the TRIPs Agreement and the proliferation of bilateral and
regional trade agreements, the policy space of less developed countries has been
drastically reduced. While commentators and policymakers have expressed grave
concerns about the enclosure of the public domain and devise responses to address this
enclosure, they also need to pay attention to a different, and perhaps more important,
enclosure movement. The international enclosure movement will not only take away
the policy space individual countries have in their attempts to respond to problems
within their borders, but will also limit their abilities to independently resist and
respond to the enclosure of the public domain.
Despite the importance and urgency to resist the international enclosure movement,
the cessation of the movement does not guarantee the end to intellectual property-
related problems confronting less developed countries. In fact, some forms of
enclosure, such as those pushed by the WTO Development Agenda, can be beneficial
to these countries and promote economic development there (although developed
countries could see those initiatives as an enclosure of their own policy space). Thus, if
we are to fully understand the implications of the international enclosure movement,
we need to separate contextualized enclosure from decontextualized enclosure-the
type of enclosure that ignores local conditions. It is the latter that makes the movement
particularly dangerous to both developed and less developed countries.
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